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RELIGIOUS VALUES IN THE SACRAMENTS

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Being the Croall Lectures
1926–1927

by
H. J. WOTHERSPOON, M.A., D.D.

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PREFACE

THERE is no purpose or attempt in these lectures to enter on discussion of the Sacraments generally. That is a subject too high and deep for such treatment as a few lectures allow, and would call for a better equipment than I could bring to it. The intention is not to examine the Sacraments historically or theologically, but only to note some of their values as they are factors in religious experience, influencing the spiritual life—in relation to belief, worship, the development of religious temperament, and as they affect our consciousness of relations to God and to the human fellowship. This, however, has involved at least some general consideration of the objective values and content of the Sacraments, since it is our conception of these which creates for us the subjective and religious values. There is no reaction to the imaginary ; nor is there reaction of much importance to the merely figurative—" the power of suggestion operating through noble symbolic rites " falls far short of the power to the soul of Sacraments which are conceived of as effective acts of God and channels of Divine Grace. If our belief is that we can take from Sacraments only what we have first put into them, we can as a consequence put in little or nothing.

The discussion of grace and personality in the third and fourth lectures discovered itself in the process of writing as necessary, since without grace there can be no Sacrament; while on the other hand the unguarded use of the term sacramental grace may easily lead to a conception of Sacraments as self-operative. And, again, because no doctrine of grace is possible along with a philosophy of personality which represents finite spirit as impermeable to the Divine Spirit. I hope then that these sections may not seem entirely digressive.

It is impossible to offer anything on the subject of the Holy Sacraments without a pungent sense of inadequacy or without apology. I have ventured to write of them only because of a deep impression that the Sacraments are our Lord's witnesses to an everlasting Gospel, that they are the Church's anchors to the evangelic interpretation of doctrine, that they are for the soul a school of education in faith and devotion, and that religious revival, if it is granted us, seems likely to owe much in impulse and in form to Sacramental influences; and that therefore a reconsideration of the place of the Sacraments in the Divine disposition for the Church and for the soul is one at least of the present needs. Among the discoveries of modern criticism one is that sacramentalism is both scriptural and primitive, and that the teaching of the chief Apostles, as recorded, is of the type which we call Catholic, as

truly as it is evangelical—some may think, Catholic because evangelical. Professor Andrews (Forsyth's *Church and Sacraments*, ch. viii.) points to this "swing of the pendulum" and instances as illustrating it, "to mention but a few"—Weiss, Wernle, Pfleiderer, Kirsopp Lake, Weinel, Feine, Titius, Heitmüller, and Schweitzer. Evidence of sacramental revival is not entirely wanting in the Church of Scotland. Among the "Free Churches" it appears in the work of such writers as the late Professor Forsyth, Professor Platt, Professor Andrews, Dr. Orchard, and of Fr. Peck while still Wesleyan. And as to the general interest which the subject has for modern thought, the very large recent literature which the subject has called forth, and the constant additions to it are sufficient indication.

I am very deeply indebted to friends who have been good enough to be interested in my work —to Principal Perry who saw the third and fourth lectures in MS. and pointed out some of their omissions—to the Rev. O. S. Rankin, of Sorbie, who has ungrudingly put at my service his scholarly acquaintance with untranslated German theological literature, to which I owe not a little, my own knowledge of that language being negligible—to my brother, the Rev. A. W. Wotherspoon, for constant encouragement and advice—to Dr. R. S. Kirkpatrick, Dr. J. M. Kirkpatrick, and the Rev. J. Cromarty Smith, for their counsel and criticism on a number of

points touched—and to Dr. W. W. D. Gardiner for his kindness in verifying references throughout.

During and after the completion of these lectures various publications have been issued, or have come to my notice. Where I have referred to these it is sometimes within square brackets. An excursus on Confirmation has been added in view of recent publications on the subject and of the present inquiry into the requirements for Christian unity, and because the question is intimately related to the religious value of Baptism.

H. J. W.

EDINBURGH,
30*th Jan.* 1928.

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RELIGIOUS VALUES IN THE SACRAMENTS

FIRST LECTURE

The Sacramental Principle

I

There are two methods of handling any idea or practice which because we meet it in experience we wish to rationalise in order to fit it into our scheme of orderly thought and into an intelligible conception of our life.

One method is to return to origins, the more remote the better, and so to trace through successive periods either the thing itself which we desire to understand or what seems more or less analogous to it. Thus, in giving account of the Sacraments, it is quite usual to start from prehistoric man. The sacrificial and the symbolic are found in primitive religion. One can construct a series through Totem-worship, Paganism, Judaism, the Hellenistic Mysteries, concluding with a high and spiritual form as Sacraments are found in Christian doctrine and worship. The weakness of this method, as a method of explanation, is that it explains so little. Its *post hoc* is not necessarily a *propter hoc*; the nexus between

the members of the series is seldom certain : the development of the idea or of the practice may be far from a simple unfolding ; various things may have incidentally occurred to recolour the idea or to change the character of the practice, and the explanation which is reached may lie entirely among these influences which have modified the idea on its way to us. The thing itself has changed, and we have changed ; it is not to us at all what its parallel was to our remote ancestry. What we for ourselves may desire to know is the thing as it is in our own possession and use, and that neither anthropology nor archæology can at all describe to us. The historical treatment results naturally in the knowledge of the history of a matter, but not necessarily in knowledge of the matter itself. The study of the history of medicine, for example, would leave one still helpless to diagnose illness or to prescribe remedy ; and acquaintance with the history of the doctrine of the Atonement would help one little to bring peace to a soul under conviction of sin. For the investigation of spiritual matters, the historical treatment is very imperfectly helpful. In its application to institutions, such as for instance Sacraments, it has the drawback that, beginning with origins and analogies as these are found among men at their rudest, it is apt to discover the continuity which it seeks in the observed or supposed survival of primitive superstitions and materialisms. But these, so far as they are to be found among us at this date (as in one quarter or another they may be) have possibly no derivation from the prehistoric and are not survivals, but are intrusions more or less recent, from the superstitious thinking and from the inclination

to materialise, which are common to man. Thus it may come about that we should be accused of practising magic when we are only saying our prayers, and humble communicants learn with surprise that they are endeavouring to attain salvation by eating their God.

The other method is to examine the thing which has to be explained as we find it in its real and present values—in its actual relation with our consciousness and in its correlations to the whole of which it is part. Since we are at the pains to investigate it, the thing is likely to be one which has a universal significance as well as a significance for ourselves, and it is that universal significance which we desire to ascertain. We are more likely to reach the truth of that by considering the thing as it is, because as it now presents itself to us, it is probably more fully itself than at any earlier point it can have been. To understand, for example, Christian Matrimony and its place in human life as He Who made them male and female has meant life to be, we shall learn less by study of prehistoric courtship or of the customs of intermediate but more or less barbarous races, than we shall by considering what in our own knowledge of contemporary instances married life can be and very often is ; for in such a matter the best is the truest. Or even with St. Paul we may look for the norm of marriage in a great revelation concerning Christ and the Church.

Neither of these methods can be used in anything like complete isolation from the other. At the end of his series, whether it is really a series of developments or only of homologies, the historical enquirer must in the end reach the present things as they are, and must estimate, in

order to exalt or to depreciate, the place among them to be assigned to the subject of enquiry. For the reasons given his judgment is then apt, I think, to be the less favourable, because he brings with him to it the impressions of the gross past which almost inevitably he assigns to his subject —the recollection of superstitions, crudities, materialisms clings to him; he sees them persisting, re-emerging, threatening to re-emerge, and while he approves, does so with anxiety and with warnings, and his approval is itself tempered by less edifying associations. The theological student on his part can as little dispense with the historical setting in which he finds his subject unfold itself. But a less exhaustive research may content him. He may be satisfied with such origins as he finds in the Dominical and in the Apostolic, and with development such as he can trace in Christian experience, Christian thought, and Christian practice. For the rest he will probably set more store by the philosophic justification of the conceptions on which his view of the matter in hand may depend; and while he too will lay some stress on homologous beliefs and practices in the ethnic religions, he will regard them not so much as the roots of that in Christianity which in some measure corresponds, but rather as evidence of universal need to which Christianity supplies satisfaction, evidence of an intuitive groping and growth towards truth, as of plants in the darkness drawn to the light and able to blossom and bear fruit only when they have reached the light.

Since then in these lectures the intention is not so much to speak of the Sacraments as they are in themselves as to speak of their religious values in

the spiritual life, the natural starting-point seems to be found in the sacramental principle which explains and justifies such institutions and claims for them a permanent place in ultimate religion, a place which is likely to be progressively emphasised as religion becomes more spiritual, more a communion with God and less an intellectual exercise on the human plane.

II

Non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvare populum suum: not in a syllogism or by argument or philosophy, not by mere process of self-revelation, not by leading humanity to elevated trains of thought and so to a certain spiritual culture; but by doing things for men and in men, and by making men do things themselves—that is the Divine method; the Sacraments conform to it and are part of it.

As early as St. Paul we find the distinction drawn between θεολογία (as later writers call it), things eternal in the heavens, the Divine love and purpose which are the background of the Incarnation, and the οἰκονομία[1] of grace in which these eternals took temporal form; and already in Ignatius[2] we have the further distinction between the two stages of the economy, that of the Incarnate life on earth and that of its continuation in and by the Church of the redeemed. The economy nevertheless is one economy, continuous in its stages: the second phase of it must follow the method and conform to the principle of the former phase.

That is, no doubt, what is meant when it is said

[1] Eph. i. 10. [2] *Ad Eph.* xx.

that the Sacraments are "an extension of the Incarnation"—a phrase which in itself is somewhat strained and even hazardous—possibly applicable to the Church, if applied with precaution (it is easy to claim too much for the Church). It may be safer to say that, in the whole economy of which Church and Sacraments are features, that principle of which the Incarnation is the comprehensive example, is followed.[1] And this is to be expected. The Incarnation is not an experiment in grace which has failed, so that God should have left its way and have turned instead to save the world *in dialectica*. The Sacraments are congruous to the Incarnation and are consequent upon it; the economy throughout is one economy. For the Sacraments then, as for the rest of the equipment of the Church, we have to seek a *rationale* in the antecedent Incarnation, as for the Incarnation itself we have to seek a *rationale* in the Eternal.

To do so we are helped by the more modern religious philosophy with its view of God as determining the universe by a purpose of self-expression, and by its view of that self-expression as a continuous creation, which through matter aims at life and through life aims at spirit, and so has found man, the beloved of God. "The universe," Bishop Temple says, "is a Divine utterance, a form of speech."[2] But to speak is not

[1] [Dr. Gore (in *Conf. on Reservation*, p. 5) finds the phrase, with the originator of it and with the Fathers whom he quotes, to mean "exclusively the extension of the Incarnation by our sacramental incorporation into Christ." To speak of the Incarnation as "an extension of the Atonement" is still less safe. At the Farnham Conference the phrase was expressly set aside by four or five of those who took part: see *Reservation*, pp. 5, 69.]

[2] *The Sacramental Principle*, The Pilgrim, 1921.

necessarily to say everything at once. The Divine thought which is embedded in natural law grows more articulate as stage after stage is reached in creation. It is "at sundry times and in divers manners," but to issue at last ἐν υἱῷ, when the Creator evokes that which is in His own image, namely, the human soul which can recognise its Author—through which creation can answer His call, respond to His love, His meaning in creation be interpreted, and from which His glory of goodness can be mirrored to Him. The self-expression of God in creation reaches its fullest in that human nature which is such that it shall supply a speech in which, when God assumes it for that purpose, God, so far as humanly apprehensible, shall be completely uttered. In such a process man, as the goal of the process and as to be ultimately its interpreter, has been at every stage immanent in creation. Such a process necessarily leaves upon the universe everywhere the seal of the Divine activity, so that in St. Paul's phrase "the invisible things of God from the creation of this world are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made." Man perceives them—they are vernacular to him—he is native to the universe, and is intuitively aware of its significances and reads the thought which it expresses. Its correspondences with that thought reappear in his mind as correspondences with his own thought. The material order produces and supplies to him the organism by which he is in touch with it and with his fellow-men. Because that order is instinct with spiritual meaning and for that reason only, it is capable of becoming a means of correspondence between spirit and spirit, between man and man, and

between man and God. The material universe carries the same significances to one man as to another, to man and to the Creator.

That is to say that in whole and in part the material, in so far at least as man is related to it, is pregnant throughout with meanings, and with highest meanings: because one purpose as well as one thought works throughout it, and the beginning contains the end: "the Gospel is implicit in creation"—the Cross is nailed together in the act of creating, and Christ is slain from the foundation of the world. God moves in a *continuum*, not in a series of jerks which we can label as chaos, creation, ruin, Incarnation, and finally salvation by dialectic, but in a constant wisdom and in a flowing will to declare Himself to that which shall know Him, and in the desire of an everlasting love for that which shall love Him.

We are helped too, it may be thought, by modern science in its failure to delimit matter from spirit, or to define matter in terms of itself, or to account for the universe as exclusively material. Not long ago I heard a distinguished mathematician and student of nature who spoke of the relations of religion and science. He showed us the modern physicist (he did not speak for all science), as not a materialist, nothing so little as a materialist, but rather a mystic absorbed in contemplation of matter as the sphere of force invisible, immeasurable, inexplicable, and in research of the meanings of such force and its operation. To the modern man of science, he thought, the universe is essentially sacramental, the outward sign of immaterial agency and the expression of intent and purpose. The scientific habit of mind, he suggested, already inclines to

religion in its sacramental rather than in its dialectic form, and on that account he was doubtful whether what may be broadly called the protestant type of Christianity were that which is likely to attract or hold or satisfy the mind of the future, scientifically trained as that mind may probably in increasing degree be. It will rather, he thought, demand a statement and a worship in which the mystery which stands at the foundation of Christianity shall be expressed in continuous activity and by sacramental media.

The grossness of matter has in fact disappeared from our conception of it. The idea of some sharp alternative between matter and spirit, as of things contrasted or possibly to be opposed in thought, no longer troubles us. Instead, it begins to appear as though matter must be regarded as the proper vehicle or instrument of at least finite spirit, and possibly as its necessity.

Gilbert Murray has said that "soul cannot ever be found naked without any body at all"; it is always making for itself body, clothing itself in form, organising for itself a means of action. In any environment spirit needs some embodiment in order to be in correspondence with environment. Hence St. Paul's doctrine of a spiritual body (1 Cor. xv. 35–49) which he seems to identify with the doctrine of human immortality. Where the organising power is present it must shape for itself a form and instrument of expression. "If we are to apply the predicates, unity and reality, it is to the soul as entelechy."[1] The Incarnation in fact is not an isolated phenomenon —it is the fulfilment of a principle which is at the secret heart of what we call creation, and is the

[1] Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of Immortality*, p. 65.

satisfaction of an Eternal and Divine impulse. Everything has led up to it: God has always been clothing something of Himself ("even His Eternal Power and Godhead") in forms, each of which helps to make that something cognisable and effective. Nature speaks because nature is symbolism; but it is symbolism precisely because it is more—it is the expression of a self, and the self which it expresses is the Self of God.

III

That Divine Self emerging into expression is the background of symbol. The Divine thought repeats itself in more speeches than one and on more planes than one; so that the physical echoes and repeats the spiritual. "Things made" are figures of reality. The external is the outward sign of the inward and imponderable. The concrete and the abstract in some inexplicable fashion correspond, and in our consciousness answer to one another. We who are in God's image understand both forms of utterance, the voice of God in creation and the voice of the Spirit who bears witness with our spirit; both are intelligible to us and both carry to us the same messages. Light and truth, darkness and evil—these have something more than analogy: they connote each other; an identical undertone of meaning penetrates to our mind in each of their languages. In the speech which addresses itself to our senses we recognise *light* as the same term which in the world of thought we know as *truth* or in the sphere of emotion as *joy*: while darkness is the material expression of ignorance, evil, sorrow. The right line in some way describes

the just action; the broken line depicts and suggests the ways of crooked men. These correspondences are not fanciful—they are real, and on them our power of ordered thought and of the communication of thought depend. For language is the medium in which thought works, as an artist works in clay or marble: we cannot think abstractedly and consecutively until we find terms for our abstractions; and we must seek for these in physical analogues. All language is primarily symbolic—the words which it handles denote originally the physical. *Rectus* means "straight" before it comes to mean, or can mean, "righteous." We discover community of experience first in relation to material conditions and objects, and from that we obtain a nomenclature for comparison of our interior processes and subjective experiences with those of other men. And this primary characteristic of the vehicle of thought does not allow itself to be forgotten. We have constantly to return upon it to verify and to simplify our abstractions—as for example in our more recent metaphysic with its uncouth vocabulary of "this-ness" and "that-ness," "here-ness" and "there-ness." All poetry and all art (all suggestive art) are made possible only by the sacramentalness of nature. Take from us the simile and the metaphor and the consciousness of the *lacrimæ rerum*, the vision of nature as significant of the spiritual, and both the poet and the artist would be dumb. All poetry is a straining to say something more than can be said—to force their suggestiveness out of words, and to drive them deeper into the truth which their symbolism partly utters, or to wring from them a higher significance; and that is possible because

no term which we use exhausts the significance of the natural on which it rests. Plain phrases and logical statements suffice us for common purposes, but not for the expression of emotion ; when we are moved our speech becomes poetical. The effort to interpret what is fresh in thought sends us at once in search of comparison—that is, of symbol.

So long as our Lord spoke of "earthly things" He spoke simply, in aphorisms and precepts ; when He passed to teach of spiritual things, of the relations of God and man, and of man to the Kingdom which is within himself, and of the soul to the eternal purpose in which it moves, He turned to parable. Consider any of His parables ; what is it but a quotation from nature or from the story of common life ? Yet He reasons from it to the profoundest issues. His discourse constantly leaves us marvelling what manner of world this is, that is so pregnant with teaching of the unseen as to His vision it was and as He revealed it to be. He has only to say "Look there," "Look here," and we see. He has only to say "Remember," and we perceive.

And the meaning which He indicates is not read into the scrap of nature or the incident of experience which He quotes—it is there to be read—we find it in what He instances : it is the thing that speaks, not He : we discover in it for ourselves what He intends us to perceive. We find for ourselves : that is the value of the symbolic. Under instruction we may be passive : as we listen to argument we may doubt : but in the parable, the metaphor, the simile, the significant object or action, it is ourselves who penetrate to the thought or reason to the infer-

ence. As Mr. A. E. Baker[1] has said of our Lord's parables, "they touch the deepest and most real in every man, not the mind alone, not the emotion alone, but the very springs of motive, the sources of action. Much religious instruction (all theorising and theology, and nearly all moral exhortation) fails just here. It cannot purify the motives, it cannot change the will, it gives no power to realise the ideals it expounds. But just in so far as men yield to the appeal and influence of Christ's parables, they will find this obstinate inward conflict reconciled." In the hearing of the parable one must oneself understand—and feel: in the use of the symbol one must oneself see—and feel.

Dr. Temple has told us that "religion is partly inarticulate"; our human speech is for its purposes a rude and incompetent tool; for its verbal symbols are necessarily drawn from the known and are fitted to state only what is already known. The inarticulateness—the difficulty of expression—is therefore, one may say with all reverence, on both sides; speech of ours is an insufficient vehicle for the purposes of God in revealing, as well as for those of our purpose in adoring. In its ultimate form revelation has been possible, not through speech, but in the concrete form of a life. Not what Christ has said, but what Christ is and has done, distinctively reveals God. Among ourselves he who teaches concerning God and man has more to say than he can put in phrases—his subject, even as he knows it, is too great for utterance; he who prays knows not what to ask for as he ought; we believe implicitly much more than we can explicate, or

[1] *Theology*, December 1921, p. 317.

rather perhaps what we possess in belief surpasses our powers of definition ; worship is often at its truest when it takes refuge in silence and is only worship.

Further, faith, prayer, worship, can be fully realised only in fellowship. In order that religion may have liberty in communion with God it must rejoice in itself as a bond of community among men. The West, if it has gained something, has also lost something, since it has learned to say "I believe" instead of "We believe." But, as a vehicle of religion held in common, our speech is still less tractable than we find it to be in the personal and solitary exercise of religion. For now it is limited to expressing what the community is able to recognise as shared by all. Nevertheless the heart knows its own fulness. In any assembly of Christians there is, it is probable, even corporately, a consciousness of God, an apprehension of the heavenly, a self-prostration, a thirst for contact with the living God, which things said entirely fail, and always must fail, to overtake in utterance. Words soon come to an end in that matter. Therefore Christ, Who Himself prayed and taught us to pray, in the last resort said, *For My memorial*, DO THIS.

It is here then that symbolism comes to our help, I do not say to supplement, but as much to anticipate and interpret those "unutterable groanings" of the Holy Spirit in our hearts, of which the Apostle says that God, if not we, knows the meaning. We may have made our deepest confession of sin, we may have exhausted our powers of supplication and of praise, the Gospel may have been set forth in some attainable fulness, and still there is so much unexpressed. But there

remains that the Bread and the Cup may speak for God to us and for us to God, and may *show* what words cannot say. What the Bread and the Cup say for us has been in all the rest; it has been in our confession to make repentance sharp, in our praises to make them glad, in our prayers as the faith by which prayer prevails, in our Gospel as its power—in each of these we "show the Lord's death": but in the Action itself, the offering, the giving, the receiving of the symbols which mean it, God deals with us and we with God—God with us in a closeness and power, and we with Him in a sense of reality, which are attained in no verbal communion of God and man. Deity would seem indeed to be the arch-symbolist, and we the inevitable imitators as soon as we begin to be busy with the things of God, whether to think of them or to speak. If one admits any prophetic ordering of the Old Testament system of worship, or any Divine prescription to the Old Testament methods of approach to God, or any foundation of inspiration to prophecy itself—then one finds oneself engaged to think of symbolism as the natural atmosphere of worship, and to think of worship as something which, apart from symbolism, is in great part deprived of expression. Set all that aside, if you feel free to do so, as being of an obsolete dispensation (though, after all, the Divine nature and human nature and the nature of things persist as they were); come into the new age of realities in the Spirit, and you find that the central rites of the new life which Christ lives in us and which is hid with Him in God, are symbols indeed and more—they are symbol and reality blent into Sacrament: and in the Sacrament you

find the living Christ and the flowing Spirit of God. So far as rite or worship are prescribed by our Lord (and it is difficult to question that He did prescribe) they are sacramental: and whatever else Sacrament may be, it is first and on the face of it symbol; and this implies that for adequate worship there is at least an irreducible minimum of symbolism. Mohammedanism goes farthest towards excluding its use—though it too has its prescribed gestures and ablutions. But Mohammedanism has little to symbolise. Its creed is a brief negation—"There is no God but God," with as brief a testimony—"And Mohammed is His prophet." One cannot symbolise a negative or a man. Occasion for symbol arises in proportion to the richness of faith, the complexity of experience, and the apprehension of the depths of God; *vice versa*, the meagre and the vague can dispense with symbol. Religion needs it—the criticism of religion does not.

There is an aspect in which apocalyptic is a typical, almost a representative, religious form. Apocalyptic is the effort of the spiritual mind as prophetic (not necessarily as predictive—by no means the whole of St. John's Apocalypse, for example, is predictive) to penetrate beyond the experienced, and to describe what it finds determined in the certainties of Divine purpose. Apocalypse is therefore of necessity wholly stated in the language of symbol. Wherever religion endeavours a similar extension of grasp upon the unseen, it must more or less work in the same vehicle. All religion has in it something of the apocalyptic character—"I looked, and behold a door opened in heaven."

The power of the symbol lies also in its immediacy. It can suggest so much and so instantly and to all simultaneously, and that without elaboration or the distraction which the attempt to say the same thing in words must impose. Take the simplest and most common of symbols, the uplifted hand of benediction, and see how it moves a multitude, imposes a mood, bends all in one emotion, as the wind sweeps a cornfield. Consider how much it summarises—of God the Father—of the Mission of Christ, which in the act re-emerges from the heavens—of the Communion of the Spirit—of the forgiveness of sins—of the presence of the supernatural in the Church. All of this is implied in benediction, and all who receive the blessing together are aware of it. Or again, how long will it take to say in words what is said by the two bits of stick tied crosswise and set on the soldier's grave? How else could you say it to the passer-by and touch every heart? That symbol creates its own atmosphere. It appeals to imagination and to association. It unites. It brings together in time and space—what it means to one it has meant to so many in all the ages—what it means to us it means to men of the one faith the world over. And it has the power of allusion, bringing before the mind on the moment a world of recollection, and places the soul in contact with its beliefs and hopes. It has the short way to the heart. The two sticks on the grave have infinite implications—of sacrifice, redemption, peace, promise for the body—"still united to Christ": could any inscription say as much, or say it and be felt as all men feel this? Symbol conveys its message without the cumber of mental effort

or the challenge to thought which the verbal statement imposes. Hence its restfulness—itself a great value.

Symbol is therefore the natural language of religion in some of its more spiritual phases—in devotion—in communion of the fellowship of believers with one another and with God : because of its power to unite in what is more easily felt than stated, and to express in common the sense of things which lie behind thought and are beyond the mental grasp, but are entirely real to the soul. The symbol, quoted from the world of sense in which all are versed, is apprehensible by all, however various their culture. A thing (the Cross), a gesture (to kneel), the triumphant swell or the dull cadence of a musical phrase wedded to its parallel verse, has on the whole the same subjective effect for the cultured and for the ignorant. The symbolic is even peculiarly suitable to the cultured, who can unite with the populace in a significant action much more eagerly than they can submit to a prelection which meets the popular need, but not always their need.

IV

All these values depend on what has been already spoken of as the sacramental character of external nature—" sacrament " being understood in the broad sense of " the outward sign of spiritual content." We shall reach later the question of the proper limitation of the term. Meantime it is enough if it can be recognised that the external in some sense corresponds to the real, being penetrated and informed by absolutes which

give no account of themselves, but nakedly appeal to us as divine, and which, being immanent to ourselves, are intuitively recognised by us; if we admit that spirit is always in quest of body, by which to enter the cosmic process and become effective towards its design; if we recognise that the universe is itself (in the sense stated) continuously illustrative of God's "invisible things"; if we recognise that the correspondences of the material with the immaterial, which are felt but cannot easily be defined, are not imaginary but actual correspondences, representing the unity of creation whether of things visible or invisible as the outcome of one mind, postulated in the nature of the material as the product of spirit, and are so real that on them depends not only language but the process of thought itself, since without terms we cannot think, and since abstract terms are all in the first place material in sense; if we consider further how language fails thought and we are driven for expression to the symbolic, and that without it the higher brain is dumb. We have enough then to warrant us in asserting a sacramental principle to be characteristic of nature as we know it and of life as we have it—enough to teach us how comprehensive that principle is, how valid and how essential the method which is based upon it, and how impossible of omission from the service of religion—religion being the realisation of that communion of God and man for which a sphere and a language are thus supplied. So much so that, as more than one writer has expressed it, if there were no instituted sacraments, we might have had to devise them. In that case, however, they would not be sacraments—for the

sacramental in nature or in grace comes only from God.

If then in the economy of grace we find a sacramental element, it is no more than we must expect. Sacraments need not seem to be, as some have thought them, concessions to our nature, as being weak through the flesh—we have escaped from that conception of man as *ψυχάριον βάσταζον νεκρόν*: nor are they intrusions of materialism into a system otherwise spiritual. Rather they are the harmonious incidents of an economic system within a concatenated universe, in which the material is uninterruptedly expressive of the spiritual, and is the peculiar instrument of God for spiritual ends. The symbol (and sacraments are in the first place symbols) is the spirituality of matter emerging into service. We are definitely past the stage at which it was possible to suggest that "the Church has outgrown the Sacraments." A developing psychology in its application to the religious life demands sacraments; for it recognises the power exerted on the soul by things done in the body, and is aware of the formative influence of actions. It knows that works make faith, as well as faith works. The sacramental in religion is not losing —it is gaining—by modern revaluations.

V

Not every symbol is a sacrament, though every sacrament is symbolic and speaks in language congruous to its content. A sacrament has definitely a content. It is the symbol *in excelsis*; a symbol which is a sign from God and is war-

ranted by the fact of its origin. It speaks, not to the imagination but to faith; and the faith to which it speaks is faith in God, that He is true to His own appointment, and that what by the symbol He indicates Himself as doing, that He does. It is a sign from God—of what it is the sign the symbol tells us. The sacrament is not only significant—it is also efficacious. "The claim made for sacraments is that they are something more than efficient instruments for producing a psychological state: it is claimed that in them God Himself takes action upon the soul." [1] The sacrament must be symbolic—that is, it must speak intelligibly; but it must do more—it must speak with power: "Let there be"—and there is: pardon, cleansing, life from the dead, reconciliation, incorporation, grace. As symbol it has its proper psychological effect: as sacrament it has also spiritual efficacy. The work of grace is not merely psychological.

The distinction between sacrament and mere symbol appears nowhere more clearly than in the upper chamber itself. On the same night in which He was betrayed, our Lord fulfilled two symbolic actions—the one the washing of the disciples' feet, the other the proleptic showing of His sacrifice. The former of these the Church has never supposed to be more than didactic—although with reference to it the Lord said, "Ye also ought to wash one another's feet. For I have given you an example." It was example, not Institution. Its significance lay between man and man, not between man and God. It inculcated a moral and aimed to "produce a

[1] Bishop Temple, *loc. cit.* p. 227.

psychological state," which is the proper function of symbol as such. It was no more than this; it contained no suggestion of promise or of grace to fulfil what it taught. It said simply, "Ye ought." Of the latter of the two actions, Christ said, "This do ye for My memorial." It was with prayer and blessing, and had therefore a Godward reference. It was with words of definition, which being the words of the Lord, are heard as words of power—"This is My Body"—"This is the Cup of the New Covenant in My Blood." It was with giving and receiving, and therefore with implication of promise. It had no direct ethical suggestion for its motive, unless inasmuch as the eternal gospel which it embodies implies everything of ethical obligation. Its value therefore must be sought within itself as an act of our approach to God and of God's approach to us. It portends "God taking action upon the soul."

Nothing is more easy than to multiply symbols: it is only too easy. Symbolism in worship may be dangerous by excess or by its fascination or by pursuit of it for its own sake. It may overlay the understanding: it may drift into complication and triviality: it may overtax imagination and memory: it may become an obsession. It may become obsolete, being always open to the risk that its origin and sense may be forgotten in habit. The Cross itself can be used meaninglessly, powdered about as decoration, without recollection of its grimness or of its glory.

Sacrament, however, cannot be multiplied. Nothing can claim the sacramental character unless it can first demonstrate its origin in Divine

institution. It is symbol in the hands of God. In our use it is an act of faith, and the faith which it requires and evidences is faith in God—that through the symbol He indicates to His children what He in fact does. The background of sacrament as a point of faith is the trustworthiness of God and our confidence in His fidelity to His own appointments. An institution warrants an expectation : a precept embodies a promise. We can meet with faith such an action as that of Baptism or of the Eucharist, only in so far as we see them directed for us by a Divine authority—for God is the only object of faith : the sacrament in itself, as it presents itself to our senses, is not an object of faith, but a transparency (transparent because of its symbolism) through which our vision passes direct to the Mediator of Divine gifts, Who is faithful and will neither dishonour His own ordinance nor disappoint our reliance. It is our Blessed Lord on Whom our expectation is set ; as though in the Spirit we perceived Him following the action which He has prescribed, and making it His own, speaking from heaven the words which He has taught us to repeat here in His Name, and fulfilling the conditions on which, as regarded from the side of Divine operation, the reality which the symbol indicates is made accessible to the soul that, by the way which He has thus opened, seeks to Him for it. External nature, as Bishop Temple says, is capable of supplying the symbol " because all creation is in principle sacramental " : but the symbol can become sacrament—that is to say, a means by which God takes action in the soul—only in the hands of Christ ; and we can recognise it as sacrament only by tracing it to the

appointment of Christ which guarantees to us its content.

The faith exercised in approach to the Font or to the Table of the Lord is faith in the Lord Who calls us to each. The intrinsic capabilities resident in what one may call the apparatus of the Sacramental do not invite faith. St. Peter speaks bluntly of the "putting away of the filth of the flesh" as emphatically *not* that which makes the baptismal water a "bath of rebirth": and he says no more than every Christian heart knows for itself. The value of a cheque has no relation to that of the "scrap of paper" on which it is written: its value is determined by the writing upon it and by the name which is subscribed to it. If that is good, the value of the cheque is simply its face value. What is it worth? Read it and you will know. What does the Sacrament convey? *Tolle, lege:* read its symbolism and you will understand.

We see then this in Sacraments, more vividly than we are aware of it in anything else of our religious equipment, that they throw us at once and absolutely on Christ Himself for any worth that they can have to us. They bring us to His feet, expecting from Him an instant bounty. They demand and in a sense they compel a present realisation of His personal relation and personal action toward us. They exercise us in the act of faith—faith which is not faith in the Gospel or in the Atonement or in the power of faith itself, but is an apprehension of Christ then and there doing for us that which by the Sacrament He is represented to do. They imply a naked reliance on Him, which in its realisation can carry us far into the unseen.

They are trysting-places with Christ, at which we consciously seek Him—the Galilee where He awaits us.[1] This is one value of the sacramental discipline.

[1] St. Matt. xxviii. 7.

SECOND LECTURE

The Sacraments and Magic

I

Sacramental doctrine then, as has been said, depends on trust in the faithfulness of Him Who has appointed Sacraments—it assumes Him as standing behind them and as fulfilling the tacit covenant which subsists in the fact of their being His institution.

But it must depend also on some definite conception of the Holy Spirit as specifically mediated by Christ to the Church and to its members. The subject of the Sacraments receives just now abundant and careful treatment; but the more it is elaborated, the more evident is the need of a clarified and definite theology of the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity in His Pentecostal relation and mode, such as may make clear the distinction between His universal activities towards humanity generally and those activities which are restricted to the fellowship of the Church, in which He operates as the Spirit of Christ.[1] Without some such theology it is difficult to know what we really mean when we speak, for example, of the presence of Christ, either in the Church or with the two or three or

[1] [St. John xiv. 16, 17. Dr. Gore has made a similar reflection in his paper read at Farnham.]

in the more pregnant sense in which we speak of a Presence in the Eucharist, and difficult to think coherently when we assert of actions ministerially fulfilled that they are Christ's actions.

It is through His Humanity that our Lord mediates from the Father to us men. In virtue of His glorified Humanity He vivifies the Church with a supernatural life. By the assumption of humanity to His Deity He has invaded the sphere of our embodied existence and has made the employment of the bodily for the expression of the Spiritual natural to Himself, as it is to us.

Now whatever the glorification of our Lord in Ascension may mean and include, it certainly involves the removal of His Humanity from our plane of present existence—that is to say that it involves under normal conditions its absence. In what sense then do we assert His presence? It is not the presence of the Holy Spirit only which we assert, but that of Christ. We do not ascribe the activities which are ministered among us to the Holy Spirit—we do not, for example, conceive of the Holy Spirit as baptizing, but of Christ as baptizing through and with the Holy Spirit. At the same time we are conscious, I think, that whatever we believe as to our Lord's presence in the Church or in Sacrament or in the soul, and of His gracious action in His ordinances generally, is dependent on the constant issue from Him of the Pentecostal Spirit and on the constant flow of that Spirit as a River of Life going through the City of God.

Such a faith is, it may be presumed, implicitly the common possession of Christians; but to make sacramental conceptions accessible to the understanding there is need that it be made explicit and

definite. At present the terms spirit, spiritual, spiritually, are used so vaguely and so frequently, and that so often by teachers who are of all the least inclined to imply by them anything supernatural or supramundane, that they have in great part lost definiteness of meaning.[1] One is continually befogged and baffled by their repetition, and one longs vainly that their employment should be proscribed, except where St. Paul would have written πνεῦμα, πνευματικός, πνευματικῶς; for with him their sense is seldom doubtful—the πνεῦμα of whom he thinks is πνεῦμα ἅγιον. Such a doctrine of the Christ-mediated Spirit as I have ventured to call implicit in our common Christianity—the doctrine of the Pentecostal Spirit reaching the Church from and through its Head, in such a mode that He (the Spirit) conveys to us the will and thought and life of Christ, and such that through Him Christ extends into the Church the energies of Himself—is, I think, requisite to any clear sacramental conceptions, and entirely requisite for their justification. Apart from such a presentation, belief in the Church as a Divinely energized society in some actual sense a Body for Christ, or for that matter confidence in the effectiveness of anything which the Church may affect to administer in Christ's behalf, may be accepted, but will with difficulty be represented to the intelligence.

But granted such a doctrine, the Church necessarily appears as at all points sacramental, itself the outward sign of spiritual presence, an

[1] It may be worth while to consider in how many instances of its occurrence the word *spiritual* is without reference to personal spirit, human or divine, and is merely equivalent to *non-institutional*, in some semi-controversial or evasive sense. Such use in theological writing is indefensible.

entity which is not mechanically but vitally associated and which is pregnant with supernatural forces, so that in its administration for Christ the external corresponds to the unseen and the earthly to the Heavenly. In that case it can hardly be superstition, as seems sometimes to be implied, if we think that in Christ's administration by the Spirit, symbol may become sacrament—efficacious, that is, to secure for the soul, or at least to bring within its reach, gift or effect corresponding to the significance of the symbol. Superstition is belief of that which is unworthy; it is to think that a thing can be true which to a developed moral sense is unmoral and therefore obviously untrue. On such a definition of the superstitious it does not appear superstition to regard sacraments as possible media of grace. The faith which so regards them is (as has been said) in the first place a confidence in the trustworthiness of Him Who appoints them, and in the second place is a confidence (which may be quite intelligent) in the ability of our Lord—mediating to the Church the Holy Spirit, commanding thereby the resources of Divine energy, effectively transmitting His own vitality, spreading Himself (if a phrase may be so forced) in volition and intuition into the operation of those ministerially administered actions which have Himself for Author—ability to make good the assurances which these actions symbolically convey. By such a mediation, if it exists, He is still at the centres of the Church's life—"in the midst" as factually, as personally, I will even say as literally, as when the five thousand were gathered at His feet and the Twelve moved in ministry between Him and them: to such mediation of Spirit

distance is no measure of obstacle, whether it be, as then, of so many yards, or, as now, the unscanned gulf between our mortality and the life of the Resurrection in which He stands. It is hard to see that such a faith is unworthy or irrational or unmoral. No doubt a worthy faith may be held unworthily. It would be hazardous to deny that superstitious interpretations or accretions may attach themselves to sacramental observance: but, if they do, they are in so far untrue to the sacramental, and "overthrow the nature of the Sacrament" to which they attach.[1] Yet they do not make a hope in Christ through the Holy Spirit to be superstition.

II

I do not here question whether it is advisable or necessary that such terms as superstition or magic should be introduced into criticism of religious conviction—but I question their accuracy. Magic is generally defined as an attempt to compel the supernatural to our service—the idea underlying it being that, by the knowledge of formulæ or of practices or of spells, it is possible so to control unseen and superhuman sources of power that, whether willing or not, these powers, being properly invoked, shall be subservient to the will of the invoker. I submit that it is impossible to

[1] ["The use of Sacraments has always a tendency to degenerate into superstition. But the danger of it is no justification for rejecting what history shows to be an original feature of the corporate life of the Church which is of our Lord's own provision. All the best ideals of humanity are liable to startling abuse, and if we are to reject ideals and institutions because they have been greatly abused we should find humanity empty of all content."—Dr. Gore, *Can We then Believe?*, p. 119.]

attribute this idea to those who resort to the Christian institutions. Our invocations are prayers. It is in the answer to prayer that we look for the result which we seek. Ordination, for instance, or Confirmation, are expressly prayers—accompanied no doubt by interpretative symbol in action, expressed perhaps in determined forms of speech—but without the thought that either the action or the formula is to produce the result desired; for that we look to Him to Whom our prayer is made. In magic the supranatural serves the magician — in the Christian ordinance the Minister of the ordinance offers himself as the instrument of the Divine. Absolution is prayer: the Eucharistic consecration is prayer; all that the Church does, it does by way of prayer. If, having prayed, we proceed upon the assumption that our prayer prevails and that the thing asked for has taken place, that is because in such prayer the Church knows that it asks according to the will of Him Who has directed the action, and that we have our petition.[1] Magic is peremptory[2]—sacrament is a declared dependence: magic is wrought by the wizard—sacrament is the act of God. Magic addresses itself to the lower powers, generally to the malignant—never, so far as I am aware, to the High Gods or to Deity in the absolute sense.

Professor M. P. Nilsson[3] distinguishes magic

[1] 1 St. John v. 15.

[2] "The difference between this [the sacramental theory] and magic is that a sacrament implies that the worshipper obtains certain benefits by fulfilling a covenant made with him by God, while magic implies that he obtains them because he knows how to compel the Deity to grant them."—Kirsopp Lake, *Earlier Epistles of Paul*, p. 433.

[3] *Greek Religion*, p. 88.

from religion, saying that " the essential difference seems to be whether an action takes place as an *opus operatum* of itself, or whether it addresses itself to a higher will through which it strives to see its intention fulfilled." In this sentence all turns on the words " of itself." In Sacrament it is the " higher will," the Divine will, which is supposed to be effective. Sometimes it would seem to be suggested that appeal to this higher Will is itself the practice of magic—but with that opinion few will agree. That which works " of itself " is a charm ; that in which God is the Worker is response to the obedience of faith. If there is any magician discoverable in this matter of sacraments, the magician is God, the magic that of His omnipotence. Von Hügel complains[1] of the readiness of Liberal Protestantism to stigmatise any attribution of " productive efficacy " to symbol or sacrament, and says that in this it is opposed to idealistic philosophy ; and that while in the connection materialism and superstition are always possible, yet " to ignore the body " is as little in accordance with psychology or history as it is to ignore the community.

III

One may be allowed further to deprecate the application of the terms sacrament and sacramental to whatever rite of whatever religion employs symbolic objects in cultual action. The depravation of words by using them out of their historical sense is a common and an easy form of question-begging and is a misappropriation of which the legitimate heirs of

[1] *Eternal Life*, p. 328 f.

the words so misapplied may properly complain. Sacrament is a word of Christian association and tradition, and has for very long come to be used of symbols only when they are held to be conjoined with a Spiritual content. It cannot be used, for example, of the Hellenistic cults without something of an implication, either that such ceremonies are supernaturally enriched and effective, or else that the Christian Sacraments are not, but are of the same class with the pagan mystery, and have only a similar claim in faith.[1] Either of these propositions may be argued, but neither of them ought to be assumed ; nor should the assumption be allowed by the adoption of the nomenclature by writers who do not admit its implications.

It is (if, not being an expert, I may venture to say so) less necessary to-day than even recently it might have seemed, to dwell at length on the relation of sacramental doctrine to the Mystery cults and their influence : recent criticism, so far as I may estimate its drift, does not incline to favour the account of Christianity as a " Mystery religion."[2] It cannot be now assumed with the former confidence that all these cults were exemplifications of a single conception, or that their rituals were variations of a common and that a sacramental practice, or that of these rituals Christian worship in its Apostolic or sub-Apostolic phase was one.[3] It may be admitted that

[1] Similar is the practice of writing of the Mohammedan or Buddhist " Church " ; which cannot be done without at least neglect of the claim of the Christian religion to be what it claims to be.

[2] See N. P. Williams, *Ess. Cath. and Crit.*, " Origin of Sacraments," p. 392 nn.

[3] A. Schweitzer, *Paul and his Interpreters*, p. 192 ff.

there are analogies and in a sense parallels to the Christian Sacraments in some of the Mystery religions, if, that is, they were religions. To call them so is, I think, an extension of that word; discussion of them has often been characterised by looseness of vocabulary, and more has been suggested thereby than has been supported by evidence. Parallels even in ideas involved may be recognised. These facts, in so far as they are facts, can be used apologetically for Christianity as well as in depreciation of it. As for the possibility that there was borrowing one way or the other, that may have been, at least in the later stages of Mystery development: Dean Inge thinks (or at the date of *Contentio Veritatis*[1] inclined to think) that there was, and that the borrowing was on the Christian side—but every one does not think so, nor is it apparent why any one should: for the history of the Christian ordinances is fairly well known to us, whence they come and how and whither—there is no gap in their story which has to be filled from pagan sources; it is a story complete in itself and self explanatory. If on the Christian side there was any borrower, it must have been St. Paul (St. John concurring and following); and a more improbable borrower from Heathenism than that Hebrew of the Hebrews, Pharisee of the Pharisees, it would be hard to imagine.[2]

There was nothing to borrow. St. Paul in his

[1] Page 287.

[2] [Mr. K. D. Mackenzie, in his contribution to *Essays Catholic and Critical*, has pointed out—acutely—almost, I think, conclusively, that if St. Paul had either so borrowed or had been supposed to borrow, he would have heard of the matter from his watchful critics, the Christian Jews. But there is no trace of such accusation.] See Appended Note A.

account of the Eucharist certainly emphasises the death of Christ and its redeeming purpose—and that has been ascribed to Mystery suggestion—but the Eucharist itself concerns nothing else than the death of Christ and that it is redemptive St. John records a discourse which treats of our Lord's Body and Blood as spiritually nutritive, and which appears to have a doctrinal background in which it meets with the Eucharistic Institution ; but the idea of the Eucharist as an ordinance of nourishment does not derive from that discourse—the Institution itself involves a feeding upon that which our Lord named His Body and Blood. The sacramental does not enter as a fresh conception when St. Paul or St. John appeal to it : St. Paul at his conversion had found it in the Church [1]—the Church had found it in the Institution itself, and from the Institution it directly and sufficiently derives. It has not been so far (to my knowledge) suggested that Christ borrowed it from any source.

IV

Parallels and analogies may be interpreted in more ways than one, and in arguing from them it has to be remembered that " analogy is never proof of origin " ; for in similar conditions men tend to act in similar ways. We may on the one hand see such adumbrations of the Christian conceptions as are found in ethnic religion as the origin and explanation of these conceptions ; we may read the Christian narratives and interpret

[1] " Both sacraments Paul already found in the Church, and neither of them is explicable from Judaism " : Reitzenstein, *Die Hellenist. Myst. Relig.*, 3rd ed., 1927, p. 81.

the Christian institutions for which analogies can be found in ethnic systems as borrowings from ethnic sources—there is a mental attitude to which that is the natural, even the cogent, inference; on the other hand we may see them as evidence of the adequacy of the Christian content to the human need; we may see them as indications of an intuitional testimony by the Logos who lightens every man coming into the world; we may see them as part of the Evangelic preparation and as an instance of preadaptation to the Gospel in the *anima naturaliter Christiana*. There is an originality which Christ, and with Him Christianity, expressly repudiates: the entirely original—that which has no relation to the known and familiar—must be in so far the incomprehensible and unserviceable; it speaks in an unknown tongue. Christ came to fulfil; and to fulfil not only the Judaic approximations and anticipations of "that which is perfect," but to fulfil as well all gropings and attemptings which anywhere and at any time had sought God or had moved in the direction of His will. "Whatever is true is Christian"; but so also is whatever in the proper sense is natural, the expression of a right longing or just sorrow or good hope—for these things too are from God. Christianity is not eclectic, though "all things are ours": it is focal—it is the meeting-point of those ideas, those systems, those worships, those codes, which along different lines have ever or anywhere directed themselves towards the Light of the world.[1] The Christian Sacraments may indeed have a link to

[1] "If Jews or heathens can be shown to have anticipated such rites, it only confirms their significance."—A. V. G. Allen, *Christian Institutions*, p. 400.

the pagan Mysteries ; but it is not a genealogical link—it is a link in the nature of things, in the nature of God and in the nature of man, in the constitution of the Universe and in the oneness of humanity, in the identities of that moral and spiritual poverty which all men feel, which paganism has attempted to meet, which God in Christ does meet. One may boldly say that their link is in the truth—truth instinctively but dimly perceived by whoever conceived the Mysteries, or at least gave them their higher intention—truth which our Lord recognised and fulfilled in His sacramental Institutions.

There is something quaint in the demand that God, Who worketh hitherto and now works, should, where finality in revelation is reached, show originality. Heaven is not at that stage barred from the method of Incarnation by the fact that Hinduism is full of incarnation stories or that the idea of incarnation haunts Classic religion. The virgin birth attributed to redeeming heroes in this or that mythology does not necessarily imply that St. Matthew or St Luke borrowed from mythologies—it may be taken instead to mean that no son of any Joseph can be readily imagined as Saviour of the world. " Everything has two handles," and so of Sacrament and Mystery. We may suppose that Mysteries suggested Sacraments, and that these were by St. Paul and St. John developed on Mystery lines from dubious germs of incident embedded in the Palestinian tradition ; or, if that reading seem too entirely irreconcilable with fact, we may judge instead that the more or less contemporaneous emergence into prominence of Mystery cults and of a more spiritual interpreta-

tion of such as had previously existed, and therewith of a higher valuation of them and of a more extensive resort to them, really suggests that at a certain stage of religious advance—as the crudities of nature-worship cease to satisfy and as a consciousness of spiritual individuality is substituted for that of mass-responsibility [1] (as in the case of Israel we see it being substituted by the prophets [2])—that then a sense of bondage in evil is awakened in the soul, and is followed by a quest for redemption ; and that the vagueness of the emotion and the uncertainty of the quest would at that point make the quasi-sacramental the natural, perhaps the only possible, form of expression ; that in fact the Mystery development in the Hellenistic world is one feature of that " fulness of the times " into which that world had arranged itself when Christianity entered.

V

On the whole subject it has been made fairly clear by such work as that of Professor H. A. A. Kennedy,[3] and others more recent, that the suggestion of a Mystery influence among the Christian origins has been overworked even by its moderate advocates ; that traces of it have been discovered where there is no reason to suppose their existence ; and that, so far as they do exist, their importance has been exaggerated.

[1] " We may suggest that the feeling for justice generated the sense of guilt, when the demands of justice were applied to the individual himself." — Professor Nilsson, *op. cit.* p. 217 ; and see the whole passage.

[2] Jer. xxxi. 29, 30 ; Ezek. xviii.

[3] *St. Paul and the Mystery Religions*, for which I would express admiration and my sense of indebtedness.

On examination they prove to be few, uncertain and slight, and as explanation of Christian conceptions or institutions to be unnecessary, since both the conceptions and the institutions are sufficiently accounted for by their Jewish antecedents, taken along with the narrative of the Evangelists and of St. Paul. Christianity inherited and fulfilled the prophetic religion. St. Paul's theories are rooted in the Old Testament, read in the light of what was "delivered" to him by those who were in Christ before him and as interpreted by his own experiences.[1] The doctrines of sin, of redemption, of sacrifice, of atonement, of remission, of regeneration, of life from God, of communion with God, of an elect society, of a given Spirit, of holiness, of salvation, of resurrection, of immortality, of future penalty and reward—for which of them is it needful to go outside of the psalms and prophets and of Rabbinic teaching? They were the ordinary heritage of the instructed Hebrew, and there is no one of them on which it is possible to fasten and to say, "A devout Jew would not have thought of that; this is not natural to a student of the prophets, a disciple of the Rabbis"; one would rather ask, "Which of these ideas could such a man have failed to possess and to handle?" The Apostolic vocabulary is that of the Septuagint, and the sense in which words are used in the New Testament is, however expanded, essentially the same which translation of the Hebrew Old Testament into Greek had fixed upon them. It is perverse to suggest that the New Testament writers acquired either the terms for their connotation from Gentile cults rather than from that

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 1–3; Rom. xvi. 7.

handbook of their religious training, their familiar manual of quotation. St. Paul has words and phrases gathered from the usage of conversation, as when he speaks of " being initiated " into both hardship and comfort [1]—it is the sparkle of a fluent writer who catches an unexpected turn of language, and uses it for its strangeness as much as for its familiarity. We need not conceive of St. Paul as another St. James or as a David Deans of the first century, wrapped in isolation from his contemporary world and its society : he was everything of the opposite, " all things to all men " ; that does not mean that he affected Judaism among Jews or Hellenism among Mysteriosophists—but it does mean that he did his best to understand his company or his audience, to enter their mind and to speak their language, unhampered by cautious reserves, in his own mind too entirely filled with Christ to have room for anything that was not from Christ.[2]

If there is any doctrinal idea in the New Testament which the Old Testament does not suggest,[3] it would be that which we find in such passages as 2 St. Peter i. 4, " partakers of the Divine nature," or in St. John i. 12, " power to become sons of God " ; but these are far from conveying anything like " progressive deification " or that the Christian becomes a Christ—they arise out of the conscious possession of the Spirit of God and of Christ, and are in direct line with St. Paul's doctrine of union with Christ for all purposes and of identification with His experience.

[1] Phil. iv. 12.

[2] Cf. Professor F. C. Burkitt, *Christian Beginnings*, p. 107 ff.

[3] Nor did it enter into Jewish mystical speculation. See H. A. A. Kennedy, *op. cit.* p. 50.

Had Christianity penetrated a Gentile world which had not developed the Mystery habit and which still used only the forms of popular ancestral and official paganism, its task would have been harder and its progress slower; outside of the circles of the "devout," the students of Judaism and its literature, its public would have been strange, not only to its factual message but to its whole thought and the presentation of it; Christian emissaries would have had to teach ideas as well as doctrines, to expound new senses for common words, and to create spiritual longings rather than to meet them with immediate satisfaction. But it is not apparent that what they taught would have been other, or that it would have been stated in language different from that which they in fact employed: for still their work would have lain, as historically it did, in the first place among the εὐσεβεῖς, the σεβόμενοι, and still through these their Gospel would have soaked to the purely Hellenistic environment, clothed in the Hebraic forms of thought and expression which we find in their actual use. Is there any element in the teaching of St. Paul or of St. John which in the absence of the Mystery cults would necessarily be also absent? or is there anything in practice of the first age of which it must be said, "Had there been no Mysteries, that could not have been"? This is not to say that the presence of the cults made no difference, but it is to say that the difference which they made lay in the world addressed, rather than in the Christianity which addressed the world. In other and less prepared soil the grain of mustard seed might have germinated more tardily; yet with time it would have borne fruit after its kind

with the same pungency, and in due season have spread to give as wide shelter. If in the third or fourth generation from St. Paul's period of activity we find Clement beginning to coquette with the idea of Christianity as the final Mystery, becoming as a hierophant if by any means he might gain some, he is the first who does so ; and before his date, as has been often pointed out, the Church had already formulated its system and had shaped its principles of teaching and practice, in an isolation from paganism and in an antagonism to it which protected it from infection. It was clad in the panoply of God, having for shield the Faith.

VI

Too much has been made of the Mysteries ; and though they will always be recognised as an important element among the social conditions in which Christianity defined its positions, they are likely for the future, as far as appears, to create less interest in this regard. Nothing lives to itself: society, thought, speech, are continuous—no man, and least of all such a man as St. Paul, thinks or speaks in a closed world of his own. The Church grew up in a Hellenistic society, side by side with the developing cults, of which every one knew something and some knew everything —many of its converts must have been initiates. Its thought may have been facilitated, even enriched, by these contacts—one cannot teach without learning as one teaches, or dispute without a resulting clarification of one's own mind. And that is perhaps as much as can be said with confidence ; we do not know enough about the

Mysteries or their doctrines—if they had doctrine as well as aspiration—to say much more.

At the same time they suggest one religious value for Sacraments—not relatively a high value, in so far that it counts on the human side only: nevertheless one that does count. They testify to a need, rooted in our nature and there always asserting itself, to externalise belief in symbol and in symbolic action. As Professor Kennedy has said, Sacramentalism is "everywhere latent in humanity."[1] It is not enough to have for oneself a belief or hope or dream of truth; there is an impulse, of which all who believe or hope or dream are aware, to share our thought and to know that it is shared; and this in practice can be best attained when the thought is set forth in a ritual which can be exercised in community. It is not enough to speak together of the invisible and intangible towards which the soul reaches; the thing itself is beyond reach, but at least its idea may be clothed in some apprehensible shape; contact with it may be established through sensible forms such as those in which men can have fellowship; what is told of the gods may be represented in drama: what is said to have been done, men may do for themselves; what is felt or hoped may be enacted and is thereby confirmed. So the belief and the fellowship in belief is realised; grasp upon it is assured; and more—the sense of grasping and of being grasped by the powers toward which the ritual is addressed is strengthened. Everywhere we find men framing what stands to them for belief into the symbolic act, and from this obtaining some contentment and some sense of being

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 120 (see also the whole passages, pp. 121, 122).

thereby in the way towards communion with that Unknown on which they are dependent.

To this instinct the Sacraments of our Lord correspond. They are native and proper to the religion which in order to be absolute must be exhaustive of human need and must satisfy the soul with its goodness. As the Dean of St. Paul's has said, they belong to its universality. They are sacraments and not mere rituals, inasmuch as they are given and not devised. It is not, in the first place, their significance but their givenness, of which the soul is aware in approaching them and which makes them to it what they are: these things are of God—they are apprehended as forms of Divine action upon the soul, having efficacy as well as meaning.[1] Prayer, it may be said, is equally a communion with God and equally immediate. But prayer, as it is known to us and as we can follow its process, is a one-sided thing—it is from us to God: we seek that which is from God to us—that in which the answer to prayer is indicated and pledged, in which that which faith may appropriate is offered; this we find in the Dominically instituted sacraments and in the Divine activity which their form implies. Apart from their givenness and from the hope which this inspires, they have a natural subjective value. In Professor Kennedy's words, Sacramentalism "is no excrescence of primitive superstition, but corresponds to a permanent demand of the human consciousness, the demand that the visible and tangible should be a seal to faith of that which is unseen and eternal." [2] Von Hügel [3] goes so far as to declare

[1] See Appended Note B. [2] *Op. cit.* p. 263.
[3] *Eternal Life*, p. 325 ff.

it to be increasingly clear to deep and candid thinkers that religion has primarily expressed and found itself in a cultus—symbols, sacraments, contacts between spirit and matter: "the essence of Religion," he says, "is not the Dogma and idea, but the Cultus and communion." "The absence of Communion and Cultus is the specific malady of modern religion generally." In his recent *Religion of Yesterday and To-Morrow*, Professor Kirsopp Lake has indicted Protestantism in that, to his judgment, it has failed (for one thing—he recounts other failures) to meet the need of Sacraments, which "have their own great value in religion." [1] Comparative Religion would of itself demonstrate this value. The value is one which exists for all, but especially for two classes of persons, both of which classes are, for opposite reasons, less accessible to religion dialectically stated: the uneducated, namely, and the highly educated, those to whom propositions and exhortations mean little, and those to whom they are apt to seem crude and to be provocative. These, however, find common ground in Sacraments, which do not argue for religion, but are religion. In this quality there is great practical value, for it is in its dealings with these two classes that the Church, in the phase of it which is best known to ourselves, is most aware of incompetence.

Appended Note A

"Those who are not specialists must depend on the labours of others"—only experts have command of the material which their research has

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 149.

brought to the illustration and to the support or disproof of the "Mystery Religion" account of Christian ideas and institutions. It has been suggested that some scholar should collect and edit this material in the form of definite extracts from the texts relied on, with the dates and regions to which they apply. Detached references and quotations, gathered from widely sundered areas and periods, some barely relevant, others strained in application—these the basis of unnecessary inference or of unverified supposition, by and by to be taken for conclusions—do not, however numerous, amount to evidence; and without evidence historical method is impossible—we can only have rhetoric. Scanty and uncertain data may suggest a hypothesis, and have frequently done so, but are insufficient as a basis for theory: hypothesis becomes theory only when it serves to explain facts which cannot be otherwise explained; and even then it is desirable that the facts should not themselves contradict the hypothesis. A theory, to be acceptable, should not involve difficulty greater than that which its acceptance would remove. Now the theory that Christianity is a syncretistic derivative or variant from Hellenistic cults is not necessary to the explanation of Christianity, which has a self-explanatory setting in history: and further it does not explain Christianity. In order to succeed, it would have to establish that certain practices and interpretations of practice are ascertained (not supposed) to have existed in connection with the cults, that similar interpretations were by Christians of the first period (not of later centuries or of the Middle Ages) associated with the Sacraments: and that these two series of

facts are connected—by infiltration or by adoption or by imitation. This has not been done, and so far as discussion has gone there appears no reason to suppose that it will be done. We are warned by competent scholars of the insufficiency of basis for the supposition of Mystery influence among Christian origins. Thus Professor H. A. A. Kennedy speaks[1] of "meagre data . . . made the foundation of extraordinarily bold assertions" and of "statements so often dogmatically reiterated that writers who receive them at second-hand repeat them as beyond challenge," and Mr. K. E. Kirk of the assumption[2] "practically without question" that the cult ceremonies gave mystic union with the god, "and the idea has passed, practically without criticism, into English writers." It is admitted that Mithraism, in which the nearest parallels to Christian observance can be discovered is, in the developed form in which we discover these parallels, too late to be drawn into the question. The earliest epigraphical evidence for a conception of the Taurobolium which has analogy to the Christian doctrine of Baptism "belongs to 305 A.D."[3] Justin's complaint that Mithraism had copied the Christian Sacrament of the Table is of the middle second century, and is probably made with reason.[4]

As matter of fact our knowledge of the

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 211, 261.

[2] By Bousset, Reitzenstein, Loisy, Cumont: see *Theology*, p. 335, December, 1925. The whole note is important.

[3] Hepding, quoted by Kennedy, *op. cit.* p. 208.

[4] "Les mystères de Mithra comme les mystères d'Eleusis et autres servaient au paganisme de dernier retranchement dans lequel il se réfugiait pour se defendre contre la puissance toujour croissante de la religion Chrétienne": *Mithriaca ou les Mithriaques*, Jos. de Hammer, 1833, p. 22.

Mysteries in the proper sense of the word, of something revealed only to initiates, is extremely limited. Guesses are not knowledge. We know a good deal about some initiations—into what they initiated we do not know. We know of preliminaries to initiation, such as the processions and the sea-bathings which led up to the Eleusinian celebrations. That again is to say that we know what was not mysterious, what any one might see for himself, and some things besides, no doubt (as to initiations) which were not worth concealing. That is to say that our knowledge of these matters is similar in kind to that which—to use a modern instance—an outsider may have of Free Masonry: probably in amount a good deal less. The initiated have rigidly observed their obligation of secrecy; there must have been initiates among converts to Christianity, but they too have been silent—partly, no doubt, because the awe of the old gods as probably powerful demons remained upon them, and partly from a regard to their personal safety. One may leave a secret society, but one had better not afterwards talk about its lodge-business. And early Christians knew that much better than we.

The phrase "religious" or "sacred" or "sacramental meal," which is used by writers of various schools, of acts of eating and drinking in connection with Mystery religion, is misleading. Something of the sort occurred in the Eleusinian and in the Attis cults, and something else, but entirely different, occurred in the Orphic—but neither as to the one nor as to the other is there record of what can with propriety be described as "a meal," religious or otherwise. To speak of a meal is to suggest an eating and drinking,

comfortable and for sustenance and probably social: the phrase "a religious meal" or "a sacramental meal" suggests to us, who have certain associations, something of the nature of the Agape or of that which was done in an upper chamber at Jerusalem. No such suggestion is legitimate, unless questions are to be begged, not argued. These phrases do beg an important question. Anything may have happened in the celebration of the Mysteries—we do not know what happened; but the Eleusinian and Attis eatings and drinkings of which we have information were not incidents of Mystery celebration, but of initiation preparatory to taking part in the Mystery, whatever that may have been. They were not acts of the Mystery fellowship, but of the individual candidate before being received to the fellowship. They present no analogy to the Christian Eucharist, which has never in conception or practice been initiatory.

Further, these eatings and drinkings from *κυκεών* or *τύμπανον* or *κύμβαλον* were not a meal, but were gustations of a different character and purpose from that of a meal. The idea that to taste the food of the unseen world commits one to that world and knits a permanent link to its life is common to folk-lore from the pomegranate of Persephone to the food of Faeryland against which True Thomas was so well warned, as Wandering Willie is warned in *Redgauntlet*—"See that ye tak naething frae onybody here, neither meat, drink, nor siller." It is this idea which apparently underlay the tastings of the initiations. Talk of a religious meal in the connection should be given up, as forcing upon the mind an interpretation of their nature which is irrelevant.

There remains the Dionysiac-Orphic omophagy, to which the foregoing does not apply. That was not initiatory, but was a culminating rite of the celebrating group ; and it was not a tasting, but a frenzied devouring. Frenzy, however, is not fellowship, either with god or man ; [1] and to be driven by possession to inhuman appetite is not appropriately described as a way to union with Deity. Dieterich (H. A. A. Kennedy, *op. cit.* p. 257) supports some such intention of the omophagy by " a fragment from the Κρῆτες of Euripides "—that is, of the latter part of the fifth century B.C. : it does not seem to imply union with either the Idæan Zeus or the night-roaming Zagreus ; and in any case, as Professor Kennedy remarks, " the usage belongs to a different epoch from that with which we are concerned." No strong case, if any case at all, can be constructed from allusions so far fetched : but it is in the accumulation of such material that the case for the Mystery theory of Christian origins chiefly depends.

The real analogy is found, not among initiatory partakings or acts of Orgiastic spasm, but in the sacrificial feasts attached to ordinary pagan worship, as public banquets or as private hospitalities. The former were open to public observation,[2] and as to the latter there was probably nothing mysterious, so far as we know—they were " religious," but not secret. This, and not that of Mystery initiatory gustation, is that which

[1] H. A. A. Kennedy's reference (*op. cit.* p. 89 n.) does not appear to bear out his inference that the votary in this case believed himself to be by his frenzy " united with the Deity." The adjectives are *capta, raptos*, and suggest rather possession or compulsion.

[2] Livy xxii. 10, *in conspectu* ; xl. 59, *in foris publicis.*

as analogous St. Paul[1] frankly recognises and with all significance uses.

St Paul used, as men must, the vocabulary of his time and world, a world saturated with the phraseology and thought which the cults used. The ideas with which he had to deal, of guilt, redemption, purgation, fellowship with the Divine, and so on, were largely those with which, as understood by their practitioners, the Mysteries also were occupied. If these Mysteries were at all part of a *preparatio evangelica*, it was because they were so occupied, had taught men to think of such things and to speak of them, and so had equipped Hellenism with a terminology in which the Christian conception could be presented. St. Paul freely employs the vocabulary of Gnosticism and even declares himself also to teach a Gnosis. What he actually does is to give to certain Gnostic terms a new orientation and to show that Christianity contains the truths to which they were relevant—using the Gnostic conceptions, so far as they were justified, to expound Christ, and redeeming them by applying them in a different context. He habitually employs the word " mystery " (twenty-one times), but with quite a different meaning ; to him it denotes the secret of God revealed in the Atonement. He could not have employed it as he does if any possible ambiguity in its application had been present to his mind : as Reitzenstein says, he knows the speech of mysteriosophy and constantly uses his knowledge, but the very freedom with which he does so shows how little he feared confusion with them.[2]

[1] 1 Cor. x. 18–22.

[2] " In St. Paul himself we are not able to establish relationship to the Mystery-religions, but only in the pictures of

No doubt, as we go on from the Apostolic and sub-Apostolic age through that of the Apologists and onwards, we find an awakening consciousness of the Mysteries and cults as possessing features in some respects analogous to the Christian practice: not, however, as a source or model or even of illustration, but, at first at least, as something to be repudiated as of diabolic prompting (Justin) and to be resented as unfair and malicious. That at a later stage the idea of Christianity as in a technical sense "mysterious" should have entered, is not wonderful but was probably unfortunate, as secrecy is always unfortunate, even when there is no alternative; and the Church of the third century had little alternative. The *Disciplina Arcani* was not chosen, but was enforced by circumstances. As Christianity was driven underground by persecution it necessarily adopted a system of privacy and precaution for which the cultic methods would quite inevitably suggest a form. No doctrinal modification is thereby implied.

Clement, of Alexandria, is primarily responsible for the exposition of Christianity in Mystery terms. He makes use of its available analogies somewhat as St. Paul had made use of Gnosis and of the Gnostic ideas and terms, and was therein no more a mysteriosophist than St. Paul is to be accounted for a Gnostic because he speaks of true Gnosis and contrasts it with its pseudonymous counterfeit or because he talks of πλήρωμα, ἄρχοντες, and the like.

Much has been made of the phrase, φάρμακον ἀθανασίας and of its use by Clement, as if it

speech and in single peculiar words." (Reitzenstein, *Die Hellenist. Myst. Relig.*, 3rd ed., 1927, p. 81.)

illustrated or even dated the entrance of an idea of the Eucharist, and was connected with a "magical" doctrine of that Sacrament. It occurs of course in Ignatius (*Ad Ephes.* xx.), writing some three generations earlier (ἕνα ἄρτον κλῶντες, ὅς ἐστιν φάρ. ἀθαν., ἀντίδοτος τοῦ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν, ἀλλὰ ζῆν ἐν Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ διὰ παντός). We must agree with Lightfoot that the ἄρτος here is allusive to the Sacrament, but also may agree with him that Ignatius does not necessarily speak in a materialistic sense: cf. xvii. 1, πνέῃ . . . ἀφθαρσίαν; and for ἄρτος, *Ad. Rom.* vii. 4, ἄρτον θεοῦ, ὅ ἐστιν σὰρξ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, contrasted with τροφῇ φθορᾶς—the corresponding πόμα being τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ, ὅ ἐστιν ἀγάπη ἄφθαρτος.

So far as Ignatius' meaning, as well as his allusion, is sacramental, its obvious basis and source is not in mysteriosophy, but in the teaching of St. John vi. 50–57 It is true that Irenæus (as Lightfoot notes) writing, it may be believed, rather earlier than Clement, though he does not use the phrase φάρμ. ἀθαν., very explicitly connects the hope of resurrection with our reception of Christ's sacramental body; but for Clement, who does use it, the passage in which it appears (*Cohort.* x.) has no sacramental reference; it occurs in the course of an exhortation to hear the Gospel, to look heavenward and to forsake evil—an expansion of Ps. lviii. 4, 5. Clement is somewhat addicted to the "medicine" metaphor: in *Paed.* i. viii. it is applied to the love of God, anxiously rebuking, and, in ix. 1, to the bitterness of fear: here, in *Cohort.* x., the medicine seems to be truth.

But the phrase φάρμ. ἀθαν. appears to have been a current one in Oriental mysticism. Reitzen-

stein finds it in a very old, originally Aramaic alchemistic text, applied to a "sweet savour" (εὐωδία), life-bringing, awakening the dead: "the sweet savour came from its place; Truth came from her seat" (*ut supra*, p. 82). "The sweet savour is in the first instance only the bearer and mediator of the γνῶσις" (p. 393). The conception, Reitzenstein says, is Iranian; but is found again in late Egyptian literature, and "has evidently become a formula and can signify for Ignatius, who is acquainted with the Syrian cycle of thought, even the bread of the Lord's Supper, and therefore the Body of Christ." As St. Paul recognises that there is a true Gnosis which he speaks, so Ignatius indicates that there is a true medicine of immortality—"that a man may eat thereof and not die." [1]

The word μυστήριον is found once in the *Didache*, three times in Ignatius, and in the (later) *Ep. to Diognetus* six times—in no instance in the technical sense. It is significant that early Latin versions avoid the transliteration *mysterium* and substitute *sacramentum*; even the more obvious *arcanum* is avoided. *Mysterium* was familiar to Cicero and was as admissible as forms such as *historia* or *poema*; but it was not adopted by Christian translators. One possible reason is its pagan association with rites whose analogy to their own Christians would not suggest. And we may notice that it does not seem to have occurred to Pliny that in his research as to Christianity he had lit on a Mystery of a new kind. If that idea had suggested itself to him, he would certainly have introduced it to explain the position to Trajan. And if the idea had

[1] I owe this reference to the Rev. O. S. Rankin.

existed in the minds of his unhappy witnesses, torture would as certainly have extracted it from them. Instead he uses, and is the first known to have used in that relation, the difficult term *sacramentum*—a fact which is most easily accounted for by supposing that he heard it from the witnesses themselves and that it was a word current with them. That these witnesses did not think of Christianity as a Mystery cult is practically certain from the fact that they did not avail themselves of that account of their association and its practices; as the θίασος of a new redemptive myth they would have had more prospect of toleration than as secret followers of a *religio illicita*.

Appended Note B

I have been asked whether there is anything to be obtained in the Holy Communion which may not be obtained by devout meditation on, let us say, St. John's sixth chapter. One may assume familiarity with the doctrine of spiritual communion, as held by even extreme Sacramentalists, according to which, under certain conditions of necessity and with concomitant penitence and faith, any devout person may by interior act of communion obtain all that is to be obtained by receiving the actual Elements. I cannot, however, answer the question put to me by referring to that doctrine, because a deliberate act of spiritual communion, associated in intention with the Sacrament as celebrated, is one thing: meditation is another. But it may be answered that there are two Sacraments; that any sufficient doctrine of sacraments should cover

them both, and that meditation can hardly be suggested as to take the place of Baptism. As to the Eucharist it may be said that meditation involves only part of our nature, whereas the Holy Communion engages and exercises the whole of our manhood, bodily and spiritual. Meditation has not that "corporeity" which Robertson Nicol in a significant correspondence insists upon as possessed by the Sacrament.[1] It may also be said that the Sacrament is an act of worship and appeal, which meditation is not; that it is a corporate act, which meditation is not; and again that meditation is meditation, and is not prayer for gift—and, while it may result in edification, does not issue in any identifiable reception: in the Sacrament Christ "gave to them," and gives. And again it may be said that meditation is difficult, probably as a spiritual exercise rare, and is uncertain in its conclusions—which the Sacrament is not. It may further be pointed out that few Christians propose to substitute meditation for the Holy Communion—which suggests that there are few to whom Sacrament and meditation seem to be equivalents in spiritual productivity. The history of the Society of Friends sufficiently indicates that the view that they are equivalent fails to commend itself to the general judgment of Christians, which on the whole and in such a matter of experience is trustworthy.

Appended Note C

We have at least one would-be borrower in Simon of Samaria (Acts viii. 13–24). Origen reckons that by his time Simon's followers had

[1] T. H. Darlow, *Life and Letters*, p. 345 ff.

dwindled to a possible thirty, to be found chiefly in Palestine (*Cont. Cels.* Bk. I. lvii.; cf. *Eus.* ii. 14. 3); but a century or so earlier Justin Martyr, himself a native of Sichem, could speak of them as "almost all (σχεδὸν πάντες) the Samaritans, besides a few in other peoples" (*1st Apol.* xxvi.); and both Irenæus (*Adv. Hær.* i. 23) and Hippolytus (*Ref. Omn. Hær.* VI. iv.) consider his system worth somewhat extended notice. To Irenæus, Simon is *magister ac progenitor omnium hæreticorum*; he ascribes to him a doctrine of saving grace (himself the giver of grace), and also of justification by faith (himself with Helena the object of faith) (*Hær.* I. 23. 3), and a doctrine of his self-manifestation as (to Samaritans) the Eternal Father, (to Jews) as the Son, and (to other peoples) as Holy Spirit (*Hær.* I. 23. 1; cf. Tert. *De Anima* xxxiv. and Hippol. *Refut.* vi. 14).

The followers of Simon are not said to have practised a Mystery or Cult, but that is no reason why they should be overlooked. To discover in this teaching a source for Paul's soteriology or an origin of the Church's doctrine (at least in its Sabellian form) of the Holy Trinity might seem fantastic—but the "analogies" are obvious and might be instanced as plausibly as some which have been utilised. The teaching of Simon was soon forgotten, but it evidently bulked in the eyes of the first generations of the Church—it was taken seriously, and was probably more familiar, for example, to Justin, than the undeveloped Mithraism which he also denounces.

THIRD LECTURE

Sacraments and Grace

I

In his *Gifford Lectures* (1924–25) Professor W. P. Paterson has told us that the chief end of religion, historically considered, "has been to enable man through union with a Divine power to obtain deliverance from the actual and the threatened evils of his lot and to gain a title to the secure possession of the highest blessings." [1] The emphasis of this statement falls upon the words "through union with a Divine power." Not through enlightenment only, though the soul craves for light upon its darkness; and not only by submission to the Heavenly rebuke or by yielding to the pleadings of God. "St. Paul taught that man chiefly needs power, and that light is not necessarily power"; [2] still less does chastisement or reproach enable to amendment. Both enlightenment and correction must enter into the process of salvation, but at its highest religion has learnt that neither of them suffices, and that nothing suffices which addresses the soul *ab extra*, or that is calculated only to increase its efforts to reach salvation. Salvation has come to mean to the soul change, not in its way, but in itself. Behind every one of the problems which beset it lies that question of human ability, to be or to do;

[1] *The Nature of Religion*, p. 228. [2] *Ibid.* p. 324.

ability to cease from evil, to act rightly, to see, to feel, to respond. It is not a question of desire or of will, as St. Paul had found, wretched man that he was, not doing what he would but that which he hated.[1]

Now such ability means *life*; as the currents of vitality ebb or flow in us, so our capability for being or doing wanes or waxes. And the fountain of life is with God: we can manipulate the natural, but cannot quicken it: nor can we control the processes of life, to add a cubit to stature or to make one hair white or black. There is but one source of life—it is in God, and we must seek it there. But further, it must be newness of life. For it is inconceivable to the soul and is denied by all its experience, that the mere stimulus or increase of such vitality as is proper to itself can effect the salvation which it desires: if its stimulation might avail (and of that the soul instinctively doubts) "to obtain deliverance from the actual and threatened evils of its lot," it is yet beyond hope that out of its possible resources one should "gain a title to the secure possession of the highest blessings." For the highest and ultimately beatific, short of which the soul's longing cannot pause, is communion with God; and communion with God demands something in us more than the image of God—it demands some creaturely sharing in the Divine life itself. Therefore religion, in measure as it realises its own object and goal, sees that goal as to be sought and found, and above all as to be "securely possessed" by its weakness, only "in union with a Divine and recreative power." In the Christian religion at the highest such union

[1] Rom. vii. 15.

is conceived of as possible through Christ's mediating to us, in and by His perfected humanity, itself united to God, the Holy Spirit the Life-giver: a union which is both effected by and conducted by God, through methods which originate in the Incarnation, and by means which are congruous to the Incarnation. Among these means are the Word, Sacraments, and Prayer, which, where channels of grace are recognised at all, are universally recognised to be such channels.

We are thus brought at once to the consideration of *grace*—of the meaning of the term, and so of its methods: that is to say of grace in general and then of grace as the content of Divine ordinance, and particularly as in the Sacraments. Whoever says *Sacrament* says *grace*: for grace is the differentia of a Sacrament, by which it is more than a symbol. We have therefore to ask for what the word stands: that is, to consider the nature of grace.

II

Let us return for the moment to Professor Paterson, where, as quoted, he finds "the chief end"—perhaps rather the motive power—of religion in two desires: the desire to escape dangers and the desire to reach blessedness. These desires no doubt do actuate—it is not said that they originate—religion generally; and they are within the background of our own Faith, which assumes our need of salvation and opens to us the hope of its attainment. These desires are among the "earthly" things (ἐπίγεια) of which our Lord assumed [1] that any thoughtful,

[1] St. John iii. 12.

not to say instructed, person, should of himself know. But there are also "heavenly" things (ἐπουράνια)—and these we cannot know of ourselves,[1] but only as they are made known to us: these make the differentia of revealed religion, of that prophetic Gospel which Bishop Gore [2] traces through the dispensations and finds completed in Christ Jesus, Who is the absolute Prophet of God, even before He is Priest and King. The prophetic revelation is revelation, not of the distress of man, which needs no voice from Heaven to declare it, but of the goodness, pity, and mercy of God—not the ethical statement of God's justice and truth, requiring that man be just and faithful—that conviction is common to mankind, "written in their hearts": [3] but is but the unfolding of God as love. The conception of God as loving men, therefore forgiving and redeeming, is the distinctive element of that progressive unveiling of reality which unifies Old Testament and New, which runs through the prophets and reaches demonstration in the Incarnation and Atonement. That God is love is not a Christian novelty of teaching—*latet in vetere*: presented indeed there as love for Israel rather than for humanity, and as compassion for the righteous rather than as travail for sinners—yet even in the Old Testament the later prophets proclaim a Gospel for the world of men as well as for Israel. Israel is the instance and example in which God's attitude to man may manifest itself and a right relation between God and man develop: but that relation may, and in the full prophetic view shall,

[1] St. Matt. xi. 27.
[2] *Reconstruction of Belief*, passim.
[3] Rom. ii. 15.

become general to man, and the ends of the earth see the salvation of God.

Old Testament and New insist alike on the gratuitousness of the Divine mercies. The Old Testament views this from the standpoint of the transcendence of God and realises it by dwelling on the insignificance of man in contrast with that majesty, on the impossibility of God's gaining anything from human aid or gift, and on the demerit in particular of Israel, against which God's enduring persevering wooing love shines out inexplicable. The New Testament dwells rather on the strangeness of the significance which the Divine goodness assigns to man, and explains it by an eternal purpose, inherent in Creation itself. But it emphasises still more strongly than does the Old Testament the human demerit; the world of men has judged itself by its rejection and murder of the Wellbeloved—it is not only unworthy of God's favour, but it is deserving of His wrath. God loves, in fact, only because He is love.

In this continuity of revelation a continuity of ideas and of terms emerges; the continuity of terms being made possible by the fact that for over two centuries the prophetic conceptions had found expression in a Gentile language, and that the common speech of classic civilisation. The Septuagint translation of the Old Testament had become the current Scripture of the Jewish Diaspora, and by the beginning of Christian evangelism was the manual for communication of Jewish religious culture to the very numerous "devout" Gentiles, "Godfearers," who were everywhere the first to receive the Gospel; Greek equivalents for the abstract terms of Old Testa-

ment usage had been determined, and within those circles had passed into the common religious vocabulary. From these Christian evangelism had to select such as with expansion of content and fresh orientation of thought should best express its distinctive message—still that of Divine love, but now the love of God for mankind, for the sinful—revealed, and effective in Christ Jesus.

Among the terms, more or less synonymous, which Old Testament writers had employed to describe the Divine goodwill and which offered themselves in Septuagint equivalents, the choice evidently must have lain between two which occur more frequently than others and are in fact the stock words for the purpose. Of these, one, *Chesedh* (חסד), is by far the more common. In the Authorised Version it is regularly translated by the words *kindness* or *mercy*, and in the Septuagint by *eleos* (ἔλεος) pity. Almost half of the instances of its use are found in the Book of Psalms—there it is the mercy that endures for ever [1] and gives hope of redemption,[2] the loving-kindness according to which God may hear the appeal of the penitent.[3]

The other, *Chen* (חן), is more frequent in the narrative books and in Proverbs; in the Psalms only twice, and in the prophets four times. In the Authorised Version it is rendered *grace* or *favour*, and in the Septuagint, *charis* (χάρις).

Between these two terms as descriptive of the characteristic principle of the Gospel, St. Paul in facing the task of theological exposition had to decide; and of the two his determination fell upon the less obvious, the less usual in the Scrip-

[1] Ps. cxxxvi., etc. [2] Ps. cxxx. 7, 8. [3] Ps. li. 1.

tures from which he had to argue, the less ethical, the less religious, the less associated with the idea of redemption: in order to give utterance to the Gospel he would discourse, not of the Divine mercy but of the Divine favour. That he should have so chosen is notable enough, but it is comprehensible and it is significant—he desired to emphasise the gratuitous nature of the Divine love. The word which he set aside (ἔλεος, compassion) expresses something which after all has its occasion in its object. We pity the miserable because of their misery. In a sense, compassion is due and, given the sufficient case of distress, it is even requisite.

The word which he selects for use (χάρις, grace) expresses something which is contingent on the disposition of the person who shows the favour or exercises the grace. The person to whom it is shown may deserve it or may not—all depends on the eyes by which he is seen,[1] on the character or even on the mood of him before whom he stands for consideration. The emphasis is now, not upon the person who finds favour, but upon the spontaneous impulse by which he is met—for which no reason can be given but that it is felt and therefore is shown. St. Paul then, disregarding the authority of Old Testament precedent—for in Christ all things are new, and the Old Testament view of God is inadequate—turns from the term whose stress is on the pitifulness of human perdition, and prefers that alternative term, otherwise less probable and even less acceptable, which finds all the secret of the Divine love in the Divine nature and will—which sup-

[1] The frequent formula as from man to man is, "If I have found favour in thy sight."

poses nothing as to merit or demerit on the one side, but leaves everything to temperament on the other side; there is salvation because God is God, and for no other reason at all.[1] He writes of free grace as the unexplained explanation of the wonderful works of God toward us; this becomes the key-word of his soteriology, and from him passes into St. Luke's narrative, is accepted by St. Peter and St. John and even by St. James, and so is found the pivotal term of the Apostolic preaching and of Catholic definition until now. The history of the word and of its adoption show that two ideas attach inseparably to it and should never be forgotten in its use—(1) that it indicates a personal relation between two—between man and man, or in religion, between God and the human soul; and (2) that on God's side this relation is self-motived, self-determined, self-activated, spontaneous, and free.

We have now to examine its use and meaning in the usage of the New Testament and of Christian theology.

III

In the New Testament the word (χάρις) is of very frequent occurrence[2]—for the idea that runs through all its uses is the very characteristic of the Gospel. Its sense, however, is elusive, and it has generally to be read in light of its context. Etymologically its reference is rather æsthetic than moral or spiritual, to indicate a quality of

[1] See Appended Note A.

[2] It occurs more than 140 times; its verb χαρίζεσθαι 21 times.

gesture or movement, its suavity and rhythm ;[1] and then passes into metaphorical application, and from gracefulness becomes graciousness, the charm of the morally beautiful in conduct and then in character, and sometimes the responsive emotion in the person perceiving that charm, as when our Lord is said to have grown in favour (*χάριτι*)[2] with God and man, or as when St. Paul exclaims " Thanks (*χάρις*) be to God for His unspeakable gift."[3] Then (to omit shades of meaning and delicacies of use) it is the gracious act of giving ; and finally it is that which is graciously bestowed. Always there goes with the word the feeling of spontaneity of bestowal—the beauty is that of generosity—it is largesse without thought of deserving or of earning or of return. What is of works is by definition not of grace.[4]

Theologically, and especially in the theology of St. Paul, grace is that in the Divine Nature which leads God to bestow on man a salvation which originates in Himself and proceeds only by His operation ; next, it is the specific principle of Divine action in accomplishing our rescue, in showing mercy and effecting a redemption to which man has no claim and which he cannot win for himself, but must receive as freely as it is given ; then it is the salvation itself, the pardon, the release, the acceptance in the Beloved ; and lastly, it is the forthflowing of power from God to give effect to His loving purpose in Christ, energising in the soul itself by the influx to it of the Holy Spirit, to transform the nature of the

[1] LXX, Nah. iii. 4, *ἐπίχαρις* ; cf. Prov. i. 9, iii. 22, v. 19, xi. 16.
[2] St. Luke ii. 52. [3] 2 Cor. ix. 15.
[4] Rom. iv. 4, xi. 6. And see Appended Note B.

subject of salvation, to alter tendencies, to raise to a new plane of life with new capacities and capabilities.[1]

It is in this last sense that we have to consider "grace," as meaning ultimately the Divine force exerted by the Holy Spirit, immanent to the soul as life is to the material organism. It describes, not a thing, but a process and an action —or rather an interaction—between Spirit and spirit, God and man, between Christ and those whom the Father has given to Christ.[2] But in conceiving of this ultimate and summing it in a single word, *grace*, much is assumed. The whole content of the Gospel of Redemption is in the background of its idea: the Divine Fatherhood, the perishing helplessness of prodigal humanity, the forthcoming compassion of the Incarnation, the Atonement, the re-creation of manhood in the Resurrection and Exaltation of the Christ, the bridging of the gulf between that new life and this our death by the efflux and influx of the Eternal Spirit, now mediated through the Divine Humanity of our Lord to reach His own as if Christ's very self were extended to embrace them, to penetrate them, and to transform them. We cannot recapitulate all this at every recollection, and yet all this is implied as often as we recall

[1] Weizsäcker, *Apostolic Age*, I. p. 171: "Redemption introduced a new nature into humanity in Christ": And see A. S. Martin, *H.D.A.C.*, I. p. 507: "Grace is a process in man's activity . . . a fresh advance of the human spirit under the impetus of a new Divine force." [A. E. Taylor (*Gifford Lectures*, November 16, 1926) speaks of "the Christian conception of the transformation and completion of nature by grace."]

[2] A. S. Martin, *ut supra*: "Grace comprises three specific moments: a supernatural energy of God, a mystical and moral actuation of man, an immanent economy of Spirit.

our standing in Christ: and we avail ourselves of a single term—a packet-word, if one may say so —to cover the whole conception.[1] The wealth of our faith compels us to use such abbreviations —as when we speak summarily of God's "blessing," and know very well what we mean—yet when we state benediction in words we find ourselves analysing its factors under the invocation of each Person of the Holy Trinity and of the good sought in each, each involving a rich faith and fulness of promise, a whole theology of benevolence and providential care—yet to say the "blessing of God" carries it all to our mind.

IV

The doctrine of grace is inextricably dependent on a theology of the Third Person of the Holy Trinity. What Pentecost means, grace is. Bishop Temple says in so many words and accurately, that grace is "the manifestation of the Spirit"; for the Holy Spirit is the Quickener.[2] The life, however, which He reproduces in the Church and in the soul is the life of Christ. Grace may be conceived of as the effect of the immanence of the Holy Spirit mediated to the Church through the glorified Manhood of the Ascended Lord. Our Lord has Himself indicated a distinction, not always noted,

[1] [This and the preceding lectures had been written before I had the advantage of having seen Dr. T. R. Glover's *Paul of Tarsus* in which (p. 215), after noting that the use of χάρις is "an innovation of Paul's," he says that he "uses it as an epitome of all he saw in Christ and received from Christ," which seems a better way of saying what I had tried to say as above.]

[2] τὸ ζωοποιοῦν: St. John vi. 63; 1 Cor. xv. 45; 1 St. Pet. iii. 18.

between the Spirit "dwelling with" men, in what one may venture to call His natural relation to humanity in moral endowment and conscience, and the same Spirit as to be "in" the redeemed discipleship: [1] a distinction, that is between His pre-Pentecostal relations to all men (for no man is without some voice to say "Thou shalt," "Thou shalt not"), and the post-Pentecostal relation to the body of Christ and its members. But the distinction seems to be more than one of relation: it is a distinction of mode as conditioned by the Incarnation and Atonement.[2] Previously "Spirit was not yet, because Jesus was not yet glorified": [3] could not be, for "Spirit" (πνεῦμα) is the Holy Spirit (τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον) reaching the fellowship of believers through the mediating Incarnation [4] now per-

[1] One cannot insist that this is the distinction which our Lord intends. Westcott takes Him rather to mean the distinction between the Holy Spirit indwelling Christ during the days of His Flesh and the same Spirit given at Pentecost to disciples. And so A. W. Wotherspoon, *Relation to the Incarnation*, Pentecostal Gift, p. 33: "We know Him, for He dwelt with us in Christ." But that interpretation does not seem to me to satisfy St. John vii. 39.

[2] This distinction does not seem to be the same with that made by Canon Lacey, *The One Spirit in the One Body*, where he says (p. 60) "that the life or soul of this Body of Christ is the human spirit of Christ, and that this inherent life of the Church is not to be confused with the further gifts of life received from the transcendent Spirit of God"—a distinction which I am not able to recognise or even to understand. The Spirit who is immanent in the Church is surely the Pentecostal Spirit; and the Pentecostal Spirit is surely the Eternal Spirit of God—but now mediated to the Church through our Lord's Humanity and therefore conveying to the Church and its members Christ's mind and will.

[3] St. John vii. 39.

[4] "Who proceedeth from the Father and resteth in the Son . . . Lord of all Creation and not under any Lord . . . communicated through the Son, and participated in

fected by victory over death. Our Lord had already the fulness of the Spirit, but did not attain to communicate the Spirit to His own until He had made atonement for them.[1]

This is the Spirit whom the world cannot receive: He indwells the Church. The Spirit does not indwell the world—He convicts the world. To the Church He is as the vital nerve-current from the brain, or as the blood-stream from the heart, or as the sap from the vine to its branches. The sunshine which enlightens the landscape pours into the Temple through storied panes and enters tinted by the medium through which it is transmitted. The Eternal Spirit by whom all things live that do live, who effects in each of us the measure of higher or lower vitality of which each is capable, now finds in believing men a subject such that Christ can be "formed in them." To them He has entrance, bearing with Him the vital energy of Christ and His effective presence in will, in impulse, in thought, to grasp the soul and to be apprehended of the soul in measure as for the stage of its growth it is *capax Christi*. The Pentecostal Spirit listens —what He hears in the heart of Christ He speaks

by all Creation." St. John Damascen., *Expos. Cath. Fid.*, I. viii. "Proceeding from the Father through Him: for the Father alone is cause." *Ibid.* ch. xii.

"The Spirit will come to men, not immediately from the Father, but mediately through the Son. . . . He (Christ) will mediate in the mission of the other Paraclete, and thus will baptize with the Holy Spirit as He Himself was baptized by the Father." Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the New Testament*, p. 299; cf. p. 155.

"Jesus first receives and then bestows it (the Holy Spirit)." Denney, *D.C.G.*, I. p. 740.

The Holy Spirit is "possessed by Christ."—Hugh Scott, *H.D.B.*, Extra Vol., p. 318.

[1] See Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, p. 152.

among us—He is a Spirit who takes from Christ's riches and bears to us [1]—a Spirit by whose coming Christ, as if He had returned, "receives us to Himself," [2] embraces us to Him—a Spirit by whom Christ volitionally, emotionally, rationally, as they are able to bear it, lives in His people, both to act and to suffer, and His risen life is the cause of a supernatural life in them.[3]

Yet the Pentecostal Spirit is not Christ. It is true that St. Paul in two sentences which occur in his letters to Corinth uses language which, if it were otherwise supported, might convey that impression.[4] They are not, however, supported; they are isolated and exceptional, verbal intensities, compacted phrases, such as St. Paul is not unaccustomed to throw out in passing to express or impress the idea which for the moment dominates him: as, *e.g.*, in these passages the thought is that, though the Holy Spirit be the immediate Agent, Christ is the Giver of the liberty which the Christian soul receives and of the life which shall finally emerge into resurrection. Reiterated stress on these two passages, as if they were characteristic of St. Paul's doctrine of the Spirit or as if they exhausted his testimony, does not avail to cancel his habitual insistence on the otherness of the Spirit who is given from Christ the Giver of Spirit, which runs through his thinking. The link by which St. Paul's usual manner of speech on the subject passes into these

[1] St. John xvi. 13, 14.
[2] *Ibid.* xiv. 3.
[3] *Ibid.* xiv. 18.
[4] 1 Cor. xv. 45: The last Adam became a quickening Spirit. 2 Cor. iii. 17: Now the Lord is the Spirit:—ἀπὸ Κυρίου Πνεύματος of v. 18 must probably follow the sense to be assigned to ὁ δὲ Κύριος τὸ Πνεῦμά ἐστιν of v. 17. See Appended Note C.

abrupt summations may be found where he says [1] that "he that is joined unto the Lord is one Spirit" with Him. This doctrine is the commonplace of St. Paul's thinking, and he is not careful of being misunderstood by his readers: elsewhere he can pass without pause to identify "the Spirit of God" dwelling in us with "the Spirit of Christ," and finally with "Christ in us," the three phrases being for him equally descriptive of the same fact (Rom. viii. 9–11). The thought is consistent and clear: primarily the Spirit is the Spirit of God; in virtue of Christ's mediation He reaches us through Christ and is known in us as the Spirit of Christ; His interpretation of Christ's mind and His conveyance of Christ's will are so absolutely faithful that the result of His indwelling is effectively "Christ in us." [2] In this doctrine St. Paul is at one with the other Apostolic writers, and his doctrine coincides with that of the discourses recorded by St. John. To himself it is vivid enough to permit him to telescope it as he does in the Corinthians phrases, and to speak of the Spirit as one with Christ, and even of Christ as having come to be the Spirit; in his more deliberate statements he leaves no room for question as to the distinction of the Giver from the Given, the Sender and the Sent.[3]

[1] 1 Cor. vi. 17: It is noticeable that these passages occur in one group of letters. One can sometimes trace in St. Paul an idea for the moment absorbing him.

[2] I have discussed the passages in question more fully in my *Ministry in the Church*, pp. 98–102.

[3] I have noticed recently at least one instance of an inclination to refer to the resurrection Body of our Lord as having become (not "spiritual") but spirit. Now one can at least know what is meant when it is contended that by decarnation Christ has become spirit. Such a statement may be unjustified by the Scriptural evidence; it may be in

St. Paul speaks of Christ as he knew Christ in experience. Dr. Deissmann (*St. Paul*, tr. L. R. M. Strahan, pp. 124, 125) does well to remind us of that. But St. Paul's governing experience of Christ was in the highest degree objective. He knows Him later in the Spirit, but does not mistake the Spirit for Him whom he had seen in the way, Jesus whom he had persecuted.

But if this distinction between the Divine Actors in the economy of grace is maintained, there is no such carefulness to distinguish the operations of grace itself as if assignable some to the One, others to the Other, for what Christ does in the soul is wrought "in His Name" by the Holy Spirit, and what the Holy Spirit does is done on behalf of Christ.[1] The immanence of Christ in the Christian and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit are indistinguishable—the one is effected by the other, and in practice the result may be indifferently attributed to either. Distinctively, grace is "of God" or of "the Lord Jesus Christ," but all diversities of grace-gifts are from the Spirit.[2] Every several grace is set down to the Spirit's operation—power, wisdom, comfort, faith, hope, holiness, renewal, justification,

the face of such knowledge of the matter as we possess; and it may be objected to as throwing Christology into confusion—but it is intelligible. The statement that body has become spirit is not intelligible. Body and spirit are not only distinct conceptions, but are complementary. Explanations of sacramental presence so based cannot be thought legitimate. A spiritual body in St. Paul's sense is not spirit, but body.

[1] "St. Paul does not sharply differentiate the two conceptions in the way that later theology came to do. . . . That a man should have the Spirit of Christ in him was the same thing as that he should have Christ in him."—A. E. J. Rawlinson, *Foundations*, p. 179.

[2] 1 Cor. xii. 4, cf. Heb. x. 29.

courage, and so on. But equally it is Christ Who strengthens, Who is made to us wisdom and sanctification, Who justifies, in Whom we have boldness. Christ is the Resurrection—His is the voice that the dead shall hear and live—yet it is through the Spirit that dwells in them that God shall quicken the mortal bodies of His Saints.[1] It is because at every point of the Christian experience Christ is active by means of the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit is active on behalf of Christ. We need not ask, as has been suggested,[2] whether to think of the Holy Spirit as a separate agent is in that case superfluous. It is by the mediation of the Spirit that the gulf between the Christ in the glory of the Resurrection and ourselves in our mortality is bridged, that the spiritualised humanity of the Ascended Christ attains to act in our sphere, that the effective presence of Christ is conveyed to and can penetrate the separateness of the human self or can blend, as in some unsearchable manner appears to be the case, with the human spirit. Such penetration of spirit is conceivable only for Spirit; the possibility of it lies at the root of the idea of grace. The idea of grace in the soul is always the idea of the Holy Spirit (and therefore of Christ) operative there.

V

We must beware then of thinking of grace as a substantial *ens*—self-subsistent, separable from

[1] See Professor W. Morgan, *Religion and Theology of Paul*, p. 25, where the writer is, I think, right in saying that the functions ascribed to the Spirit are indifferently ascribed to Christ, but mistaken in the inference that Christ and the Spirit are personally identified or identifiable.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 26.

its source, transferable to its subject, and so becoming his possession.[1] It is known to us only as a presence, as the operation in us of a presence, and as the result of that operation. We cannot, except in thought, abstract power or life or faith or hope or love or goodness or fidelity or perseverance—these are qualities which appear only in a person who is made strong, who exhibits vitality, who exercises faith, who is faithful, or who perseveres. Behind the several graces, which are manifestations, is grace itself—in the sense of the gracious action of Christ by the Spirit. Grace emerges in gift, but is more than gift; it is the evidence of a gift higher than itself—"God's presence and His very Self."[2] It lies between Christ and the soul, where Christ and the soul are face to face within the recesses of personality: it cannot be had except in that contact of Spirit with spirit and of self with the Creator of selfhood—the contact of life with life and of love with need; and yet grace is not the contact itself, but what the contact, as subsistent and in proportion to its effective reality, produces of movement or change on the side of man.

In thinking of this we must not merely carry our minds forward to the resulting grace, but always backward as well to its cause, to see behind the gift the hand of the Giver and to realise the giving. To speak of grace is to speak of Christ acting through His Spirit, not as a secondary element in the causation, but as the immediate causer, apart from Whose direct acting grace

[1] "Grace is erroneously regarded when defined as a substance or force or any sort of static and uniform quantum."—A. S. Martin, *loc. cit.*

[2] J. H. Newman, *Dream of Gerontius.*

cannot be imagined. It has no doubt its setting in circumstance; there are channels and means of grace; but these are channels, not sources: they supply occasions for the action of grace, but they do not act. That which is immanent may well be conceived to become energetic in specific directions at definite points and to definite ends, as need appeals or as faith seeks or in response to habitual dependence, habitual effort or aspiration: according as, directed by promise, incited by invitation, the soul submits itself to the Word in search of enlightenment or of correction, betakes itself to prayer for aid to resist evil or for ability to accomplish good, or has recourse to a sacrament for cleansing or for nourishment. Always the responsive benefit is to be realised as gracious, and as immediately from Him Who speaks from Heaven, Who hears prayer, Who stands behind His own institutions; not less immediate because finding its moment in our recourse to methods of faith, not less gratuitous because sought where God has taught us to seek.

Under certain conditions grace may be said, in a common phrase, to be of covenant; but a covenant does not act of itself—its fulfilment requires the action of the covenant-Giver in sequence to pledge and claim. Faith in covenant means only faith in Him Who is able to fulfil promise and by Whom promise is fulfilled. When we speak of covenanted grace and its locus, we should remember that covenant may well be a ground of confidence, but that our confidence is in God Who is faithful. Covenant is not a source of grace, though it may be a guarantee of its bestowal and may indicate points at which it

is to be sought. Covenant can exist only between persons, and its fulfilment lies in their action in relation to each other.

Spiritual operation, except between spirit and spirit—grace, except as from person to person—is inconceivable. What on the Divine side it implies is the blending of life with life, strength with weakness, fulness with emptiness, the self-communication of God Who is incarnate in Jesus Christ, and Who by the Holy Spirit impresses Himself on such as wait upon Him. Deissmann speaks of it as (in St. Paul's description) "the spiritual fellowship between Christ and His own";[1] such communion implying for result, not only the gracious action of Christ, but also the human reaction. For grace may be received in vain:[2] it is possible to do despite to the Spirit of grace,[3] or to fail of the grace of God.[4] Grace, to be effective, demands on our side that sensitiveness to grace which is faith.

One would say sensitiveness rather than receptiveness, because, though faith is in its development both a receiving and a response, it is, in the first place, a willed passivity,[5] the abandonment of resistance, a surrender of self. To believe is to yield—the conviction of faith immediately infers submission But the passivity is itself a self conquest, an effort—greater perhaps than that of any subsequent service. It is harder for the drowning man to hold himself still in the grasp of his rescuer and to allow him-

[1] *St. Paul*, p. 130. Deissmann's word is *pneumatische*.
[2] 2 Cor. vi. 1. [3] Heb. x. 29. [4] *Ibid.* xii. 15.
[5] In Baptism, faith is no less requisite than at later points: but the faith may be that of the Church in proposing to Christ the subject of the Sacrament and in administering the Sacrament. Cf. St. Luke v. 20.

self to be saved, than it would be to exert himself in struggling for life. The work of grace must have a beginning ; and at its beginning it must be wholly of God—initial faith can be only passive and can be only " the gift of God " [1] to one who as yet has nothing, not even the power of response. In every fellowship there is necessarily one who is first [2]—*l'un qui baise et l'un qui tend la joue* ; and God is first always, but at that point obviously and certainly. The recognition of Christ brings with it recognition of the right (ἐξουσία) to become offspring of God,[3] re-begotten to living hope : and therewith induces the yielding of the soul to be gathered in Christ to God. To be in Christ is to receive the Spirit of Christ. At that point enters power (δύναμις [4]) ; union with Christ is established ; life has begun.

VI

Two things lie behind the doctrine of grace : on the one hand the universal human experience that man is unable of himself to deliver himself from the evil, and on the other the almost universal experience that in so far as he has found any deliverance, it has reached him from a source which he knows is not in himself. Professor Paterson in his analysis of the nature of religion reiterates in numerous passages and with all the resource of his rich vocabulary the common

[1] Eph. ii. 8.

[2] Even prayer St. Paul regards as originating with God. Our stammering petitions represent the travail of the Spirit within us—His intercessions—which are interpreted by the Hearer of prayer, not as we utter them, but according to the mind of the Spirit in moving us to pray. Rom. viii. 26, 27.

[3] St. John i. 12.

[4] Acts i. 8.

testimony to these convictions, and intends, I think, to give them his own assent as established. "It is," he says, "the most deep-seated of religious convictions that man as we know him in his natural condition is dependent on the help of God for the attainment of his true well-being, and that this includes the possession of enlightenment and of moral power." In Christ this becomes the consciousness that life in Christ (as Bishop Temple says) is "not man's achievement, but God's gift." To grow up into Christ is not to attain by exertion a new nature, but to assimilate the new nature as given: a nature which exists in the Risen Christ and is bestowed by Him through the Holy Spirit.

The desire for Divine help, the longing for it, the quest and the hope of obtaining it, is common to humanity and is found in the ethnic religions and in Judaism. The forms in which such help is conceivable are obvious—they are by external assistance, by revelation, enlightenment, correction, guidance; or they are interior, by supply of strength, reinforcement of the better elements of character, redirection of will, change of the self. The Christian doctrine of grace is "differentiated from all ethnic or prophetic ideas" (1) by its source in the Incarnation, and by its characterisation as the life of the risen and glorified Christ, extended to believers; (2) by its direct mediation by Christ through the Holy Spirit as the Supreme Gift of whose presence the Christian life is the manifestation; (3) by its mode as the communion, the action and reaction of these two, the exalted Mediator and the soul united to Him by the currents of the Holy Spirit.

The doctrine turns then on these two pivots—the inability of man, and the communicability to man of the Divine resources of power, both to be and to do. The idea most closely and invariably associated with "grace" as a bestowal is that of the impartation of *power*—the power that man has not and that God gives. Our Lord Himself entered on His ministry "in the power of the Spirit.[1] Anointed with the Holy Ghost and with power He worked His works of mercy.[2] He sent forth His disciples with power to heal and save.[3] At His Ascension He bade them attempt nothing till they should receive "power from on high," [4] power after that the Holy Ghost should be come upon them.[5] The note of the Kingdom of God which they proclaimed was power [6]—a power that worked in its membership,[7] for God had given them the Spirit of power,[8] so that they were strengthened with might by His Spirit in the inward self.[9] St. Paul sums up in a sentence his own triumphant sense of the might of the Spirit communicated to him from his Lord—everything was possible to him through Christ who wrought strength in him.[10]

And he was not alone in this consciousness of new possibility. It was not willingly but in despair that creation had found itself to be "subjected to vanity." [11] The pagan world knew itself and despised itself and lay in contempt of its own corruption, "having no hope" in

[1] St. Luke iv. 14, 36.
[2] Acts x. 38.
[3] St. Matt. x. 1.
[4] St. Luke xxiv. 49.
[5] Acts i. 8.
[6] 1 Cor. iv. 20.
[7] Eph. iii. 20.
[8] 2 Tim. i. 7.
[9] Eph. iii. 16.
[10] Phil. iv. 13: *πάντα ἰσχύω ἐν τῷ ἐνδυναμοῦντί με.*
[11] Rom. viii. 20.

anything. It lacked, not enlightenment: it saw only too clearly, approving the better and following the worse: it lacked the sense of ability to follow the better. More miserable than the reproach of one's own sin is the sense that all are as oneself, that the shame and horror of vice is the common inheritance and inevitable lot, so that each "but hates his neighbour as himself." What that unhappy world recognised in the entrance of the Gospel was not merely gospel as fact—not so much a new revelation as a new possibility. It brought not only a salvation but power to be saved; and men fled to it as a hope, an anchor for the soul in their night of storm.[1] Grace and hope are in the New Testament closely associated—God has given us good hope through grace,[2] and this hope is in the consciousness that His grace means for us ability to know and do and bear His will.

This aspect of grace as empowering has abundant testimony. Professor Paterson, as has been already noted, associates grace with the idea of power in various passages of his account of religion:[3] "The Church (he says) has dogmatically affirmed that the experience of regeneration is the result of an infusion of supernatural life and power." "It has been the common belief that by the help of a divine power (man) is destined to come into possession of the best that he is capable of possessing, and of becoming the best that he is capable of becoming." "In the highest

[1] Heb. vi. 18, 19. (In what I have said here I am indebted to suggestion by a passage somewhere in the writings of the late Bishop Paget.)

[2] 2 Thess. ii. 16; cf. Rom. xv. 13; Gal. v. 5; Col. i. 27 1 Tim. i. 1.

[3] *Op. cit.* pp. 52, 86, 137.

religions the chief stress has been laid on the activities of the Divine Spirit, which has been regarded as the source both of intellectual gifts of illumination, and of sanctifying and moralising energies." Bishop Temple writes[1] of "the indwelling Spirit, prompting, empowering," and says that "the presence of the Spirit is proved by the appearance of new powers." "In Christ," A. Deissmann says,[2] "the grace of God is daily vouchsafed to him (Paul, the Christian) anew, and daily he experiences anew the renovating power of that grace." The late Bishop Paget speaks of grace as "an energy" whose operation is as traceable in history as any other, and quotes Bright as saying that "grace is a force in the spiritual order . . . imparting to the will and to the affections a new capacity of obedience and of love": J. B. Mozley says that "grace is power . . . that power by which He works in the wills of His rational creatures," and Liddon that "grace is a real and active force: it is the power that worketh in us." These writers do not always distinguish between the power of God previously exerted in the soul and power which the soul is thereby enabled to exert—the one passes into the other, as a gift passes: it is God's—it is ours by and from God—and still is His, not ours.

The power of God in grace is that of the Creator, in the continuous exercise of prerogative which is His only. In so far as it appears to be an evolution it is creative evolution, a further exertion of the same power to which the soul owes its existence.[3] It is development only in so far as the

[1] *Christus Veritas*, p. 157. [2] *St. Paul*, p. 156.
[3] καινὴ κτίσις, 2 Cor. v. 17, Gal. vi. 15.

created Spirit offers a subject to the flowing energy of the Maker of Souls, which is identical with the everlasting love of the Father of Spirits : an energy which stimulates and heightens the potentialities already bestowed or evoked, but is not limited to their stimulation or exaltation—it renews : it transforms : but it also adds. A perpetual novelty is the very seal and mark of grace in manifestation. It gives what was not there until the giving. The working of grace is not merely that of a voice calling upon the dead to rise; it is with power—bringing from death. Under its operation the soul is not as the plant burgeoning under spring sunshine and shower, putting forth what has been latent in its substance—it is begotten again, regenerated, reborn, recreated ; it becomes a new thing of a new kind, such as man was not till grace entered, a τρίτον γένος—the first-fruits of a new creation.[1]

This is no doubt possible because of what the soul is by primary creation, "in the image of God," "naturally Christian." Humanity regenerated is still humanity. Its regeneration is the realisation of a destiny which is eternal in the Divine purpose, of which Christ is the beginning as well as the consummation.[2] Nevertheless this realisation enters as a novelty. The Pentecostal Coming is as directly a creative vitalising of a body for Christ as was the first breathing of Spirit into the waiting clay of whatever earlier and lower organism. We are God's workmanship, created in Christ Jesus.[3] The new man is after God created in righteousness,[4] begotten again to a living hope by the resurrection of

[1] St. Jas. i. 18.
[2] Rev. iii. 14.
[3] Eph. ii. 10.
[4] *Ibid.* iv. 24.

Jesus Christ.[1] "The Christian life is always a supernatural life," [2] and is so from its inception, and in its inception.

It is usual to find that those who attempt to analyse the New Testament conception of grace should avail themselves of this category of creation. A. Deissmann, as already quoted, speaks of grace as not only a renovating, but as a creative power. Professor Paterson sees Christ proposed as an example to His brethren, and from Him going forth a virtue which created saints after His image. "If a soul which is dead," he says, "is quickened into life it must be due to the Infinite God, one of whose incommunicable predicates is that He is the Creator"; and he speaks of souls "on the way . . . to be re-made after the pattern of a higher humanity." A. S. Martin writes [3] of the Spirit creating or awakening spirit in man, and of God as being in Christ through His Spirit, the Maker, the Creator, of the new spiritual character; Weizsäcker speaks of righteousness (doubtless that which is in Christ through faith) as "a life-creating power." [4] According to Du Bose, "Christ is always described as being personally and creatively in the believer" (*Gospel according to St. Paul*). On the philosophic side Bergson, to whom God is a continuous Creation (rather perhaps a continuous creating), sees "the vital movement . . . thrusting through that work of art, the human body, which it has created on its way, the creative current of the moral life." [5] For moral, read spiritual, and the Christian con-

[1] 1 St. Pet. i. 3. [2] Bishop Temple, *op. cit.* 162.
[3] *Op. cit.*: *sub voce* Grace, p. 509. [4] *Op. cit.* 1. 169.
[5] *Mind Energy*, p. 25 f.; quoted K. E. Kirk.

ception of grace is here at least approached, almost expressed.

It is in terms of *life* that we can perhaps best represent to ourselves this highly elusive conception. Christ came that we may have life and that abundantly.[1] He describes Himself as the Life,[2] and declares that it is because He lives that we also are alive,[3] and are alive in a manner and to a degree which apart from vital union with Him we cannot be,[4] for we have not life in ourselves,[5] but only as, in St. Peter's words, "heirs of the grace of life."[6] Life escapes our definition, and therefore it is not easy for us to define grace: the secrets of the operation and of the communication of life are impenetrable to us, even on the lower plane of the physical where its phenomena are simpler and should be more easily read; we can hardly hope for a clear account, when we speak of the analogous workings and impartings in the obscure regions of spiritual activity. Life is communicable—that we know: life is continuous, always derived from life: and in the spiritual we are justified in inferring a parallel continuity and derivation. The Father only has life in Himself: to the Son He has given to have life in Himself and to bestow life on men,[7] quickening whom He will.[8] It is in terms of vital communication that our Lord has depicted our dependence upon Himself—the branch lives because and so long as it inheres in the Vine: and under a similar figure St. Paul has represented our factual union (of which it is usual to

[1] St. John x. 10. [2] *Ibid.* xiv. 6. [3] *Ibid.* xiv. 19.
[4] *Ibid.* xv. 1–8. [5] *Ibid.* vi. 53. [6] 1 St. Pet. iii. 7.
[7] St. John v. 26. [8] *Ibid.* v. 21.

speak as "mystical") with Christ and our reception from Him of powers for His service. There is one Body of Christ because there is one Spirit of life in Christ Jesus.[1]

VII

It is no doubt in the initial experience of conversion that consciousness of the givenness of grace is most vivid: conscience is aware that it does not convict itself—it is convicted of God: repentance is a gift: faith is a gift: enlightenment presents itself as a vision granted: joy and peace are felt, not to be attained, but to be bestowed. We have the sense, not of apprehending Christ, but of being apprehended by Christ.[2] But the consciousness of God as the agent of His own mercies is not confined to the stages of entrance on newness of life in Christ—the soul is continuously aware that it is God only Who has wrought all our works for us.[3] Our perseverance, if we persevere—our repugnance to sin—our new emotions of charity—the actions in which fresh impulse finds scope—these also we, in our deepest thoughts, recognise as Divine mercies and supernatural effects. By the grace of God we are what we are and become what we may become. We cannot assist in our regeneration any more than in our natural generation. But being alive to God in Christ and Christ's life being active in us, we become seekers for the grace which is prepared for us and which is made in sure ways and at definite points accessible to us. Initiative remains with God—a continuous initiative—

[1] Rom. xii. 4, 5; 1 Cor. xii. 12 f.; Eph. iv. 12, 16.
[2] Phil. iii. 12. [3] Isa. xxvi. 12; Heb. ib.

from moment to moment grace is of God.[1] Deissmann says well that this is the test of a true doctrine of grace: it remains secure in its character of graciousness so long as it is conceived of as in the first place the action of God. But the action of God is designed with a view to the human re-action, and obtains its results in fellowship with the soul on whom Christ by the Spirit acts. The co-operation in that case is not the co-operation which the Church in condemning Semi-pelagianism has refused to admit; for at each point the initiative is with God: the will of man responds to the Divine empowering, the human understanding awakens to the Divine enlightenment: we love because we are loved. At each point it is grace which enables for the receiving and use of further grace. In this sense grace is always prevenient and absolute, anticipating and making possible its own advance—as fire spreads by assimilating what it enkindles. The soul in Christ is like the living scion engrafted, growing downward into the vine-stock in virtue of the life and sap of the stock itself, and upwards into leafage and fruit—but still by the life not its own into which it is knit. To live by Christ, we must abide in Christ: and to abide in Christ, His words must abide in us: we must continue in His love: we abide in His love if we keep His commandments. Such abiding in Christ is, no doubt, the "state of grace" of which theologians speak; and being such, it is evidently dynamic, not static, a fellowship which is mutually willed, involving Divine activity and also a human response, passing into a human activity to which the Divine enables.

[1] Isa. xxvii. 3: "I the Lord will water it every moment. . . . I will keep it night and day."

VIII

But, when all this is said, we have not reached a definition of grace; we have perhaps only found that no definition offers itself, and that the idea connoted is too rich and complex and draws with it for recollection and inclusion too much to admit of any brief summation. Analysis forbids us to conceive of grace as existing *per se* —it can exist only in the immediate energising on the part of Christ by the Spirit, to evoke in the soul the correspondent ability. Nevertheless the language of the New Testament might easily suggest some such conception. Grace, it appears, may be sufficient or insufficient: [1] it may be shared: [2] it may abound or be scanty: [3] it may be given in more or less fulness: [4] it may be multiplied: [5] there may be a first and a second grace: [6] men may be stewards of it: [7] it may be thought of as a gift.[8] It is probable that if St. Paul had thought needful to explain, he would have explained in terms of the indwelling Spirit, of the Christ through Whom the Spirit reaches the Church, and of Their action in the soul: he would have warned us not to think of grace as separable from these conceptions.

The word, as had been said, is best understood as an abbreviation [9]—I could almost venture to say a convention—adopted in order to avoid impossible recapitulations of the plexus of belief

[1] 2 Cor. xii. 9.
[2] Phil. i. 7.
[3] 2 Cor. ix. 8.
[4] St. James iv. 6.
[5] 1 St. Pet. i. 2.
[6] 2 Cor. i. 15.
[7] 1 St. Pet. iv. 10.
[8] Rom. xii. 3, 6, xv. 15; 1 Cor. i. 4, iii. 10; Gal. ii. 9, etc.
See p. 67 f.

which it covers—a term which glances along a progression of truths ; carries always with it a sense of their graciousness ; and fastens at last with emphasis on that in which redemptive action at this present stage culminates—the experience, namely, of power communicated to the soul, by which all things are possible through the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus. The worker, the working, the work done, the subject of the work, cannot, in what is essentially a term of value, be separated from each other : the value is found in the last term of the series, namely, the empowered soul. It is the capability to realise in self a conformity to Christ which ultimately is grace ; but a capability which finally appears in the soul as the result of a concatenation of gracious activities to which man does not contribute, but with which he corresponds. St. Paul, it may be said, is unguarded in his use of the term. But St. Paul is seldom guarded ; he is more concerned to be understood.[1] On the face of it the term carried with it and secured what at every point he desired to enforce—that salvation is of God and not of man ; and otherwise he expects his readers to follow him with some intelligent recollection of his general teaching. In dealing with him criticism has to beware of becoming mechanical, and of handling him as if he thought in algebraic symbols : otherwise higher criticism may become a lower criticism, occupied with words.

For the same reasons which led St. Paul to

[1] [See Dr. T. R. Glover, *Paul of Tarsus*, p. 192 : "Like many men of genius he sees things in snatches ; everything is lit up by a lightning flash and one point after another is gained never to be lost, and the rest have to follow or be left." And compare the last paragraph of his ch. viii., "The Human Paul."]

his use of the term we must follow him in his employment of it, but with due recollection. The radical connotations are to be kept in mind—the initiative of God in salvation—the inability of man—the freedom of mercy—the method of Incarnation—the love of the Atonement—the mission of the Paraclete—the union with Christ—the active communion of Christ with the soul in the Holy Spirit—the givenness of all things that pertain to life and godliness ;[1] further that the Giver is Christ, mediating to us the indwelling Spirit by whom He acts, and that the gift is essentially Christ Himself ; and that the self-communication of Christ depends upon the union with Christ in one life of the Spirit.

The operations of grace are therefore neither mechanical nor logical, but vital. Thus Deissmann (arguing for the validity of a type of "mysticism"—the doctrine of spiritual union with Christ) says[2] that the "directness and immediacy" of the union with the Deity is constitutive for the idea ; and Seeberg speaks of what he calls "mystic experiences" as "the immediate causation of a stimulus of life or will through the Divine energy."[3] Grace is immediate even in the use of means. It operates as life to quicken the soul, and not only as light to illumine the mind : it has other methods than those of the syllogism ; it enables as well as persuades :[4] it works, not upon, but in man—not from without, but interiorly at

[1] 2 St. Pet. i. 3.

[2] A. Deissmann, *op. cit.* (last German edit.) p. 118, etc. See Appended Note D.

[3] *Christliche Dogmatik*, i. p. 42.

[4] "Doth persuade and enable us," Westminster *Shorter Cathechism*, Ans. 31.

the roots of character, there making all things new.

Both Deissmann and (I think) Seeberg, and also N. Soderblöm,[1] desire to rescue the idea of union with Christ as part of the Christian system from interpretation which would involve the Neoplatonic deificative mysticism,[2] and to protect personality and will as elements in relation to it. In virtue of its immediacy it acts, they think, independently of "rational mediation" or at least without such mediation "coming into consideration." But it lies always in the region of personality and never sinks to the sub-personal —it is an action and re-action between two, God and man, of whom God is active and man reactive. The union is not one of absorption—the negating of the personality by self-loss in God—but on the contrary is the reinforcement, the development, of personality, completing the creative work in which our partial and potential personality has arisen and has so far advanced towards completeness.

It may be observed, however, that Seeberg's insistence on grace as stimulus leaves something to be desired. Stimulus of the will is not change of the will, nor is stimulus of the natural a change

[1] Lecture, Keswick, 1924; quoted A. H. H. Kennedy.

[2] There is more than a hint of tendency in the direction of such mysticism in such phrases as that of Athanasius (*De Incarn.* 54), God "became man in order that we might be made divine"; and see Swete's citations, *Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*, p. 397, and his summary p. 409. "Deification," Professor Kennedy says, "has not made itself at home in Christian thinking, but not for want of trial." The suggestion disappeared from Christian theology: it is not clear that the passages in which it occurs were ever more than "poetry of religion." For an admirable statement on the subject, see Inge, *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*, p. 90 f.

of nature: a "setting in enthusiasm and movement the whole inner life" would not necessarily infer the sanctification of that inner life, whose turbulence is already our distress. We have as much need to be inwardly stilled as to be inwardly stimulated: we have to learn to die to the self of self-will and to its past, in order that we may be made alive to God; and that too is the work of grace, by which we may both put off the old manhood with its deeds and also put on the new which is being renewed unto knowledge after the image of its Creator.[1]

To find a comprehensive definition of grace is not easy: we may be helped toward it, not perhaps by adopting Professor Du Bose's summary, but along its lines: "God becoming actively the holiness, righteousness, and life of man; and man, passively as from God, but actively in all else, becoming the holiness, righteousness, and life of God."[2]

Appended Note A

The complexity and elusiveness of the term is illustrated by the variety of its use in so full and elaborate a document as the *Westminster Confession of Faith*. No definition of grace is there attempted—the word appears without explanation in Chapter vii. in the phrase "Covenant of grace"; the covenant so described being of the free offer of life and salvation with promise of the Holy Spirit and of consequent ability to observe it. In ix. 4, x. 2, xi. 3, etc., it expresses the

[1] Col. iii. 9, 10. [2] *Gospel according to Paul*, p. 42.

spontaneous generosity of God's action towards and in man—of grace we are justified and enabled. A "state of grace" (xviii. 1) seems to mean a state of acceptance with God and of harmony with His will resulting in the enjoyment of His help. But the word also denotes specific capacities and activities produced in the soul by the action of the Holy Spirit whose call offers and confers grace (x. 2). Faith is a grace, and there are saving graces which accompany it (xiv. 1, xi. 2). There are acts of grace on the part of God, such as adoption and pardon: and there are responsive graces thereby operative in the soul, such as belief and repentance and obedience. A grace (*e.g.* faith, xvi. 1) is ordinarily wrought through the word, and by the Sacraments and prayer is increased and strengthened.

Appended Note B

The purposiveness and active significance of St. Paul's selection of χάρις (חן) rather than of ἔλεος (חסד) appears from examination of the usage of the two words in the Hebrew Scriptures and in the LXX version from which he derives his terminology.

I. חסד appears in the Old Testament 210 times, or, if chorus repetitions as of Ps. cxxxvi., etc., are reckoned, 240 times. It has the radical idea of *desire* and then of *benignity* or *compassion*. In the Authorised Version it is translated by "kindness" or "mercy," less often by "goodness," "favour," "goodliness," "good deeds"; and twice, by inversion to the idea of evil zeal, by "a wicked thing," Lev. xx. 17, or "a reproach," Prov. xiv. 34. It has a more energetic sense than

חן, and often occurs in the setting, עשה חסד עם, to do or show kindness to.

The LXX renders it almost always by ἔλεος (generally a neuter): but six times δικαιοσύνη; eight times ἐλεημοσύνη: Prov. xi. 17, ἀνὴρ ἐλεήμων; Ps. cviii. (Heb. cix.) 12, ἀντιλήμπτωρ; Isa. lvii. 1, ἄνδρες δίκαιοι. The corresponding LXX is in Isa. xl. 6, δόξα; lv. 3, ὅσια; Jer. xxxi. 3, εἰς οἰκτείρημα; Hosea x. 12, εἰς καρπὸν ζωῆς; 2 Chron. xxxv. 26, ἡ ἐλπίς. It is rendered by χάρις only in Esth. ii. 9, 17 (in v. 17, חן וחסד, the LXX has simply χάριν).

II. חן occurs only 68 times. It has the radical sense of *leaning towards*, and so of inclination or favourableness to, always with the idea of spontaneity. The adverbial form חנם has the force of *gratis*, "for nought," "without cause." It is found most frequently in the phrase מצא חן, to find favour (41 times), or נשא חן, to obtain favour (four times); very often as a formula of address, "If I have found favour" or the like, and therefore chiefly in the historical writings. In the Sapiential books it occurs 15 times, once or twice in the sense of physical beauty. Outside of these it is rare—found only twice in Psalms (xlv. 2 and lxxxiv. 11), and four times in prophets (Jer. xxxi. 2; Nah. iii. 4; Zech. iv. 7, xii. 10).

In the LXX it is regularly rendered by χάρις, (Prov. xi. 16, γυνὴ εὐχάριστος); but by ἔλεος, (Gen. xix. 19 and Judg. vi. 17); in Esth. v. 2 (LXX—xv. 11) the corresponding words are εἰς πραύτητα, and in Prov. xxxi. 30 (LXX—xxix. 48), ἀρέσκειαι.

In the New Testament these proportions are, so to say, reversed—χάρις being found 143 times, ἔλεος only 29 times.

In the Pauline Epistles χάρις occurs 88 times;

5 times in St. Luke's Gospel and 20 times in Acts ; 9 times in Hebrews. Otherwise it is found in St. Peter 11 times and in the Johannine writings 7 times (Gospel 4, 2 Ep. 1, Apoc. 2) ; in St. James once and in St. Jude once. That is to say, that 122 of the occurrences of *χάρις* are in the writings ascribed to St. Paul or in those writings which show his direct influence, and that of the remaining 21 the majority are Petrine.

Of the 29 New Testament examples of the use of *ἔλεος*, 12 are in the Pauline writings ; 6 in St. Luke ; 1 in Hebrews. St. Matthew has it thrice ; St. Jude twice ; St. Peter and St. John each once.

Grace (*χάρις*) may be from God to man or from man to man, or (in the sense of thanksgiving) from man to God. In St. Paul's use it has the first reference at least 71 times ; as an expression of gratitude he uses it perhaps 7 times and to mean a gift or bounty in the interhuman relation, possibly 6 times. 1 Cor. x. 30 and 2 Cor. i. 15, viii. 6, 7 may be considered indefinite.

Appended Note C

ἐγένετο εἰς πνεῦμα is not precisely the equivalent of *ἐγένετο πνεῦμα*, which would be accurately rendered "became Spirit." With the preposition, *γενέσθαι* means to reach a destination—carrying perhaps some suggestion of effort in reaching it. Compare the two other instances of its occurrence (Acts xx. 16; xxv. 15)—Paul did not "become Jerusalem," but, after some delay, "got to Jerusalem" ; and so of Festus, *γενομένου μου εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα*. (For *γενέσθαι ἐν* see Moulton and Milligan, Part II. p. 126—the usage

in that case seems to be that the verb then carries much the same sense as with *εἰς*, but with possibly more stress on the arrival, and less on the way). It is further noticeable that Paul does not repeat his *ἐγένετο* in the second member of his comparison (*ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν*), and the ellipsis may suggest that the writer was not satisfied that *ἐγένετο* would exactly in this connection express his meaning—room is left for the imagination to supply a more adequate word, if that can be found. St. Paul's thought is fairly clear. It is not that the Incarnate has become discarnate, or that the Risen Manhood has evanesced into Spirit—for his immediate point of departure is (v. 44) that body is body, and that there exists a *σῶμα πνευματικόν* as well as a *σῶμα ψυχικόν*; and he includes the resurrection Humanity of our Lord in this statement. He contrasts the Adams of the old and of the new creation, quoting of the former the exact terms of the LXX: into the clay of the natural body God breathed such life as the natural man (1 Cor. ii. 14) possesses; upon the Second Adam the Father poured the Eternal Spirit, to be mediated as Holy Spirit to His redeemed. Instead of "living" (*ζῶσαν*) we have "life-giving" (*ζωοποιοῦν*), instead of *ψυχή* we have *πνεῦμα*. If we are to be literal, we must be literal—St. Paul does not mean that the first Adam "became" a soul, but that he came to possess a soul.

In the 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18 passage Paul does after all balance, or at least qualify, his *ὁ δὲ Κύριος τὸ πνεῦμα*, and *ἀπὸ Κυρίου πνεύματος*, with *οὗ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα Κυρίου* which occurs between those phrases, and may have felt that he thereby

sufficiently protected his consistency. Quotation, one may be permitted to say, is not in all cases tantamount to exegesis, and mere reference to these Pauline expressions apart from their context is insufficient to support the inference of Professor Kirsopp Lake and others, that Paul identifies Christ with Holy Spirit.

Appended Note D

In the vocabulary of Deissmann and of those with whom in this passage he argues, " Mysticism " does not mean, as it probably would to an English writer, intuitional religion aiming at union with Deity by way of enlightenment and purgation—a quest not necessarily limited to Christianity—but is applied to the doctrine of the union of Christ with the believer and with the Church through the Holy Spirit: a doctrine which is expressed in the discourses and prayer of St. John xiv. to xvii., and with which St. Paul habitually operates (Rom. vi. 6–11, viii. 9 ff.; 1 Cor. vi. 17, xv. 22; Gal. iii. 27, 28; Eph. i. 23, ii. 4 ff., iii. 14 ff., iv. 15, 16, etc.), arguing from it as a union actual, vital, and efficient. Obviously this is closely related to the doctrine of grace which it conditions. It is set aside by a school of German theologians, who suspect it as implying a view of grace which is mechanical, non-rational, and non-ethical. Other theologians, of whom A. Deissmann is the most brilliant representative, contend for its validity. Dr. Deissmann distinguishes between a " mysticism " which implies grace as humanly controlled or perhaps even enforced, which he calls *active*, (agirende . . . anabatische . . . treiberische

mystik), and grace as *re-active* (reagirende . . . katabatische . . . charismatische Mystik) in which God comes to man, not man to God—Divine gift evoking human response. He defines this latter legitimate mysticism as "the piety which has found the way to God through inner experience without rational mediation." "The directness and immediacy of the union with the Deity is for mysticism constitutive." The union, that is to say, being spiritual and vital, acts otherwise than by instruction or persuasion *ab extra*. One must not press Deissmann's caveat against "rational mediation" too far; the apprehension of grace is always through faith, and faith implies a cognitive background. For profitable communion, *e.g.*, in the Sacrament, a minimum at least of knowledge must be held requisite. Seeberg makes allowance for this when he says (*Christliche Dogmatik*, Bd. i.), that in the operation of grace, which he regards (inadequately) as the stimulation of the human by the Divine will, "the rational nexus does not come into consideration." It may be entirely in the background—as in the immediacy of a devout communion—but some element of the rational is presupposed, even there. Mr. O. S. Rankin, to whom I owe this note and the relative references in the text, reminds me that rational elements entered into the Divine preparation of St. Paul for conversion.

FOURTH LECTURE

SACRAMENTS AND GRACE—*continued*

I

OBJECTION to this view of grace as vitally and interiorly operative can be taken on two grounds, theoretic and practical, the philosophic and the religious. The former objection revolves round the conception of personality as a closed and unitary entity, evolving (under whatever external influence) its own content, but impenetrable to other selves; the latter, following this theoretical idea, doubts of interference with the human autonomy, is jealous of the dignity of the person, and would limit Deity to the appeal *ab extra*, by revelation, persuasion, or providential discipline; it questions the legitimacy of other methods of Divine working as irrational, non-ethical, magical; and in fact denies their occurrence. In this view grace would appear as a relation of God to His children rather than as an operation, process, or gift.[1] Grace, conceived of as an impartation, may be individual but is not personal; it has no other way of overcoming human resistance than that of "personal persuasion";[2]

[1] "Prayer, word, sacrament . . . as vehicles to convey something into man, however individual they may be, they would not in any moral sense be personal." -Principal Oman, *Grace and Personality*, 3rd ed. p. 176.

[2] *Ibid.* 191.

means of grace are "special means only for enlightening us regarding the true means of grace, which is life."[1] What I think it is here intended to contest, is the conception of grace as merely an exertion of might, to the overwhelming of the human subject: the writer refers (p. 32) to the Augustinian presentation as one of "Omnipotent power," and later (p. 170) remarks that "extremest Catholicism and extremest Evangelicalism are curiously akin, just because both depend on the same conception of grace as arbitrary acts of omnipotence." But omnipotence has other modes of exercise than that of coercion; most thinkers are agreed that omnipotence is self-limited in face of the human free will which it has itself constituted; and this, if true, must be held to qualify, if not to abrogate, Principal Oman's criticism. It is not *qua* power that God is conceived of in His activity towards finite selves, but as Spirit all pervasive, to which no sphere of action is denied; and for the rest the Divine omnipotence, co-operating with Divine love, is the best hope of some who would otherwise despair of salvation. Imparted grace, it may be thought, becomes more than individual, becomes personal, not as imparted but as received —as sought and welcomed and used.

More generally, it may be submitted in reply to all such criticism of the more usual view of Divine grace, that there is no agreement among those who specialise in such matters that the ego is impenetrable to impartation, or refuses access to spiritual invasion. On the contrary there is much authority for an opposite view. Professor

[1] Principal Oman, *Grace and Personality*, p. 241. I am uncertain in what sense the word *life* is here used.

Pringle-Pattison, for example, frankly regrets his use (in *Hegelianism and Personality*) of the term *impervious* to describe the nature of a self or personality; the exclusiveness of the self, especially in its relation to the Divine, was, he has little doubt, "too strongly emphasised in his argument." [1] The individual, in his view, "cannot possibly be regarded as self-contained in relation to that (universal) life, for such self-containedness would mean sheer emptiness." [2] "The currents of the Divine life course through it" (the self). He speaks of the immediate presence within us of "a Spirit leading us into all truth and goodness." [3] Professor Pringle-Pattison is speaking of humanity as such: but what is applicable to man in general can be at least no less conceivable on the Christian hypothesis of a specially given Spirit. "It is," he remarks again, "from the fact that the finite individual is thus rooted in a wider life that those visitings of grace, of which the religious consciousness testifies, become most easily intelligible—as well as those more violent upheavals of the personality as we have known it, in which, as religion says, the man is born again and becomes a new creature. And because, so long as it exists, every self remains in principle thus accessible—the possibility of such regeneration remains open to the most abandoned or degraded." [4] "The filaments which unite the finite spirit to its creative source are never severed. The Productive Reason remains at once the sustaining element of the dependent life and the living content, con-

[1] *Idea of God* (1926), p. 389 n. See also p. 357, where he repudiates "the notion of the personal self as an exclusive entity, simply living out a nature of its own." And see p. 36.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 258 ff. [3] *Ibid.* p. 37. [4] *Ibid.* p. 259.

tinually offering itself to the soul which it has awakened to the knowledge and the quest of itself." [1] In these passages "spirit" is no doubt conceived of in the Stoic rather than in the Christian sense [2]—nevertheless they imply a philosophic background for the possibility of imparted grace.[3] Professor Pringle-Pattison quotes from Bosanquet (p. 264 n.): "There is no hard barrier set that can make our being discontinuous with others or with the perfect experience . . . persons at their strongest become confluent." Bergson speaks a language of his own, and would tell us rather of "impulsions from the deep," or, as already quoted, of the creative current of the moral life thrusting its way through the human body to create, presumably, the soul—obviously not a soul closed to spiritual currents. From the Christian point of view W. H. Moberly [4] warns against conceiving of the relation of self and not-self as "equivalent to that of one solid body in space to another" and against "intellectual prejudices which lead to the ascription of a fixity and exclusiveness to personality which is unwarranted." Dean Inge considers the antithesis between self and not-self to be crude, and to be "one which it should be the common task of philosophy and religion to reduce to its proper

[1] *Idea of God* (1926), p. 255.

[2] [T. R. Glover, *Paul of Tarsus*, p. 20: "Paul's account of 'spirit' is not Stoic doctrine: behind his view is a personal God . . . in their judgment it is a universal force in all nature."]

[3] I am not able to accept in its entirety the theory of the Divine in the interest of which Professor Pringle-Pattison writes; but it may be permitted to cite him as a very competent interpreter of our consciousness of the self as we have it.

[4] *Foundations*, "God and the Absolute," p. 498.

insignificance." [1] Professor A. E. Taylor protests "that it is intolerable presumption in a moralist to assume *ab initio* that there are not influences at work in man's soul (the free grace of God, grace given in response to the prayer of faith, or mediated by the great Christian Sacraments, or, for the matter of that, by many other channels) of which, from the nature of the case, scientific determinism can take no account." [2]

There is then no general agreement among thinkers which would forbid us to conceive of the soul as accessible to Spirit. The function of philosophy is to explain things as they exist,[3] not to dictate what they must be, and it has no right to assert for personality an independence or a closedness to the entrance of God, against which the experience of religion in general bears witness and the human intuition protests as a doctrine of despair, because it denies to the individual the hope of any real advance upon himself: he may then grow, but he need not aspire: he is throughout only what at the beginning he potentially was—"fixed in an eternal state" from the moment of his conception. The denial of communicable grace is really a form of necessitarianism which is disharmonious with the Christian soteriology. So far as it leaves room for a doctrine of grace, it must be of grace as viewed from the Pelagian standpoint. No testimony can well be more spontaneous than that of Christian hymnody, or more considered than that of the Church's manuals

[1] *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*, p. 98. See the whole section.

[2] *Contemp. Brit. Philos.*, Second Series, "The Freedom of Man," p. 303.

[3] Pringle-Pattison, *op. cit.* p. 67: "Is and can be nothing more than the critical interpretation of human experience."

of prayer, and these testify to a consciousness of Divine grace active at all points of spiritual life. The hymns and liturgies are the voice of those who know and who express a wide and long familiarity with the things of the soul and of God. "There is nothing more real than what comes in religion. . . . The man who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness knows not what he seeks." [1]

The dignity and worth of personality [2] are not necessarily lowered—conceivably they may be exalted—by the self-communication to it of the Divine. Professor Pringle-Pattison says with all truth that we "cannot be commandeered"—even the Divine importunity may not force entrance to the heart: [3] grace, that is to say, may be (in St. Paul's phrase) received in vain, or may be refused admission—God will not coerce—"compulsion is not found with God." [4] This applies to man, and is true of man regarded as will—but will is not the whole of man: he is also cognitive and emotional—we can have no scruple in conceiving of God as working on the will through that which in understanding and feeling conditions the will's action. But behind cognition, emotion, volition, is the actual subject, the self which knows and feels and wills, and that in a better or worse fashion and to better or worse ends, according to what that self *is*—according to the characteristics, capacities, qualities, tendencies of its individual nature. Now it is this subject which is primarily from

[1] Bradley, quoted Pringle-Pattison.
[2] E. Williams, *Hibbert Journal*, January 1926.
[3] Rev. iii. 20.
[4] *Epistle to Diognetus*, v.

God, and these adjectival incidents of capacity and so on are the " gifts " with which it sets out. May not then these incidents to its existence be still legitimately the sphere of a continuous creative and recreative action, to the same measure as the incidents of environment are the sphere of providential action ? May not God work there, in the self that is called to will, without coercing the will in action ? The freedom can only be that of the man—and the man is what God enables him to be. Whatever the grace of God to him, there remains to him what is duly his of apartness and independent action—it is still *the man* who wills, though now by the grace of God a better man and with a better will than without God's grace he could be. The case is not one of the invasion of a free personality by a Creator, who thereby infringes His own gift of freedom : human freedom is already " invaded by sin " : [1] the invasion of God is to emancipate and thereby to restore personality. We must be made " free from sin " before we can submit ourselves to righteousness : [2] and this is possible only by exaltation to a new state of life. There is no return to innocence : but there may be a recreation to holiness.[3] For Christ Himself, the winning of immortality for human nature in His own Person involved, not resuscitation but resurrection. Return to the " days of His flesh," though these days had been prolonged for ever, would not have been victory over death, but only escape from death ; the victory required entrance through death to a new mode of being, new for His whole Humanity, both bodily and spiritually,

[1] A. S. Martin, *D.A.C.*, I. p. 512.
[2] Rom. vi. 18.
[3] Eph. iv. 24.

in the communication of which He could become the Author of an Eternal Salvation.[1] That salvation must in us follow the analogy of Christ's deliverance from entanglement in our mortality and guilt; it cannot be a mere neutralisation of sinfulness: it demands that we pass under the power of His resurrection into a new kind of vitality which we share with Him (*συνζήσομεν αὐτῷ*) because He extends it to us. He gives to as many as receive Him ἐξουσία (right, authority from Himself) to become "offspring of God."[2]

The authorisation is gift, but the nature which is capable of being authorised already exists to be invited and to be enabled to respond. Man, that is to say, is naturally accessible to grace: the accessibility is a quality of his personality and proper to it. Christ does not (though in our hymn we say so) "make us Sons of God"—He enables us to become sons: grace is enabling—the human will is at no point abrogated or inactive, but is now permitted a new exercise. For the rest, who can disengage the enabling and the willing which go on concurrently—the faith to be healed and the healing and the rising and walking?

We know nothing of personality as a rounded whole, which must cease to be itself by any intrusion on its completeness. No human personality is complete.[3] Personality is a growth; it is more than selfhood—it is a "highest mani-

[1] Heb. v. 9. [2] St. John i. 12: *τέκνα*, not *υἱοί*.

[3] See Professor James Ward, *Contemp. Brit. Phil.* p. 48 n. "In their (Neoplatonists') system and those of their Christian disciples, unification of the personality is a gradual process, coincident with our growth in grace."—Inge, *op. cit.* p. 99.

festation" towards which we are guided and endeavour. The soul is on the way to it, but does not, as we know the soul, fully reach it. Personality is not self, but self-possession: and none of us entirely possesses himself. The child becomes personal as it grows from the vagueness of infancy towards a determinate character, and this growth is as much creation as its inception in an undetermined ovum. Physical growth ceases and presently gives place to decay, but soul may still grow—must grow or perish; and for the soul also growth is continuous creation. God is not to us only a medium of existence, a plasma in which we float and from which we draw subsistence; that in Him we live and move and have our being is not a spatial statement: He is the cause of our living and moving, and the causation is by a creative will. The self, as yet incompletely personal, becomes personal in measure as it is spiritualised.[1] The development from the lower spirituality which is natural to man (evidenced in conscience, in the sense of responsibility to moral law and so on) to the higher pneumatic which communicates with God, is no less a creative working of the Spirit: and it intensifies personality, advancing it towards completeness. The "soul-making," for which in Keats' often-quoted phrase this world is said to be intended, is not by any single fiat, but by a process of moulding[2] and remoulding, making, remaking, cumulative, perhaps accelerated; that is to say, that it is by processes of which the

[1] W. R. Matthews, *Studies in Christian Philosophy*, pp. 170 ff. And Lötze, *Microcosmus* (E.T.), ii. p. 688: "Perfect personality is in God only; to all finite minds there is allotted only a pale copy thereof."

[2] Bosanquet, *Value and Destiny*, p. 63 f.

soul is the subject, not the operative source or cause.

The central fact about personality is that it is built up round a centre of consciousness ;[1] in Professor Pringle-Pattison's phrase it is a "focus," a focus and not a shell whose content is dependent on external pressure for support of its wholeness and identity.[2] It implies a maintained unity of consciousness, but not inaccessibility to impressions to which consciousness reacts, nor to the operation of forces which modify the conscious subject. The self does not lose continuity, although new capacities appear in it or new traits develop. One may say, "So and so has become a different person" ; but that is only a way of speaking—he is not a different person. I may know that I am changed : possibly I do not know how or why—I am only aware that I feel and will and re-act as once I did not : my consciousness of change and my ignorance of the cause of change do not affect my sense of selfhood—they do not shake my personality—I am still I. Memory, consciousness, volition have proceeded in unbroken flow, though the direction of the volitional current be different. Personality is not infringed by experience, whatever be its source or form.

[1] W. R. Matthews, *op. cit.* p. 167 ; Dr. Inge as well uses the phrase "a soul-centre," *op. cit.* p. 120.

[2] Lötze, *op. cit.* ii. p. 687 : "Selfhood, the essence of all personality, does not depend upon any opposition that has happened or is happening of the Ego to a non-Ego ; but it consists in an immediate self-existence which constitutes the possibility of that contrast, wherever it appears. Self-consciousness is the elucidation of this self-existence, which is brought about by knowledge—and even this is by no means necessarily bound up with a distinction of the Egò from the non-Ego." See the whole chapter, pp. 659–688.

If, as Professor Matthews says, an ideal be an element of personality, it need not be always the same ideal. I leave the false ideal for the true—the less worthy for the more worthy—the lower ambition for the higher: I do not thereby contravene my personality—I asseverate it, and am therein more truly personal. And the process or method by which a new ideal, "that by which I learn to know myself to be one self," has asserted itself to my will does not seem to have anything to do with the value of the ideal for the maintenance intact of my personality. Say that the new ideal has been impressed upon me from without by some shock of disillusionment or enlightenment, or has developed sub-consciously, or has been created for me by an interior sublimation of my self: however it has been reached, this ideal is now mine, and I am still I. It is in the consciousness of receiving from God and of self-yielding to God to receive out of His fulness that the confusion and vagueness of the individualistic self are harmonised and unified to the emergence of the personal. The distracted soul which St. Paul describes as his own in Romans vii. is less a person than the Paul who speaks in Romans viii. The vital and re-creative workings of grace do not in fact derogate from personality—they enhance personality.

II

It has seemed necessary, before attempting to consider grace as sacramentally communicated, to make some examination of the idea of grace generally, because, as Mr. K. E. Kirk usefully points out, much present criticism (having in view what is taken to be an unwarranted doctrine

of sacramental grace) is equally valid against and destructive of the doctrine of operative grace in any association with means or channels, as for example with the Word.[1] Any line of thought which excludes effective grace from the Sacraments would go near, if not all the way, to deny the access of grace to the soul by other paths. To exclude grace in order to correct the views of others as to the Sacraments would be to pay a high price for the victory.

The objection which has to be met may be thus stated—that in conceiving of a virtue in Christ which is communicable and which is to be obtained by recourse to Him in ways of His prescription, we are imagining a transfer which trenches perilously on that idea of grace as a "thing"—that is to say, as being of a nature which follows laws and avails itself of methods which belong to the material rather than to the spiritual. If, however, the analysis submitted in the earlier paragraphs of this lecture is at all accurate, that inference is not necessary. In our habitual experience, no doubt, the external to self is chiefly represented by the material and, in picturing the external, the image of the material is the first to rise to the mind. And this habit of visualising may explain the insistence which is met with in some quarters that grace must, if accepted as a category, be constated as it can be materially imaged. What, however, is really put in question is the possibility of penetration of the self by that which is not self. Now matter is not supposed to be the only external to self. There are, for example, other selves, and in right of their spiritual nature these appear to overlap and

[1] "Magic and Sacraments," *Theology*, Dec. 1925, p. 321.

to penetrate with their influence, and even with their characteristics, the self which is our own. And, besides, there is God.

The use of material phraseology in discussion of this, or of any question, is unavoidable—no words exist which are not of material derivation.[1] But words may be applied symbolically. If we say that an idea has struck us, we do not intend to imply that an idea acts like a physical projectile, or if we say (as Professor A. E. Taylor says somewhere) that precedent thought is the pabulum of original thinking, we do not suggest a bodily inglutition. Grace, although its acting may be graphically presented in similes which are supplied by "things," is not a thing, and is not reflectively conceived of by any one as a thing—though loose talking and careless thinking may sometimes give excuse for the impression that it is so conceived. The spiritual has physical parallels which enable us to speak of the spiritual; and except by availing ourselves of these parallels it is questionable whether we can even think lucidly of the "imponderables." Dean Inge doubts whether philosophy, any more than religion, "can escape this transformation of thoughts into concrete images." "It seems," he says, "as if, while we live here, faith needs the help of the imagination to make its affirmations real." [2]

At least since that "Beginning," which, whether it can be imagined or not, must be assumed, creative action (regarded in the light of the doctrine of evolution) seems to have been typically re-creative—it has proceeded, that is,

[1] "The inevitable spatial symbols are very troublesome." —Inge, *op. cit.* p. 121.

[2] *Confessio Fidei*, "Outspoken Essays," 2nd series, p. 55.

upon what already exists: with "breaks" perhaps, but with breaks in which the line of antecedent development has been still followed.[1] From unorganised matter has come the organised —the merely physical life has been raised to be rational—and this in turn has been raised to be moral, and to be, on the natural plane, a life that already claims to be recognised as spiritual.[2] If now the Power that works in all things goes further and raises this to a yet higher order in which it becomes filial, more actually akin to the Divine nature, capable of apprehending the absolutes which from God penetrate and give meaning to its sphere of existence, it is not obvious that the Creator has thereby lapsed into a method which is incongruous with the truly spiritual, rational, or ethical. It is the work of Spirit with and upon spirit. To speak of grace, so conceived, as gift, influx, infused, poured upon the soul, resident in the soul, used, assimilated, and improved by the recipient, is really not to think of grace as a thing, a fluid, a material, tenuous, or otherwise: it is only that, as Dean Inge words it, faith needs and uses the help of the imagination.

Mr. K. E. Kirk[3] criticises and sets aside the accusation brought in this form against the traditional doctrine of sacramental grace, and he suggests instead the analogy of what he calls the

[1] "We come from our temporal standpoint to regard the whole course of the world as epigenetic; *natura naturans*, further creative synthesis, emerging from the *natura naturata* previously achieved. We call this synthesis creative, because the whole has new qualities and relations, and is thus always more than the sum of its parts."—Professor James Ward, *Contemp. Brit. Phil.*, "A Theistic Monadism," p. 50. See also Pringle-Pattison, *op. cit.* p. 95 n.

[2] See Bishop Temple, *Christus Veritas*, ch. ii.

[3] *Theology*, December 1925.

" tonic " action as between man and man of the stronger personality upon the weaker. This would be, he thinks, to postulate of God " a power and willingness to influence man, akin to that by which man influences his fellows." Suggestion is no doubt a power and one which can be helpful; without implying that grace is limited to suggestion, we may believe that, as the converse of temptation, it is a form of grace. I am willing to recognise that the tonic analogy may carry us a certain way—mind does influence mind, and character does impress character; the moral strength of a friend may brace a soul towards vigour. But it does not carry us far enough—such tonic influence we know to exist, but is generally exercised unconsciously, and its nature and method of taking effect are as obscure as that which it proposes to explain: and further, it lacks the element of effective will and the characteristic *givenness* which attaches to the idea of grace: the analogy is too weak to parallel the travail and the forthcoming of God to bestow something of Himself on His child; all thoughts of grace as merely stimulant are inadequate; if to stimulate had sufficed, then less than Incarnation Cross and Resurrection would have sufficed. It is well to meet critics on their own ground, but not at cost of abandoning one's own ground. The radical precedent for the re-creative operation of the Holy Spirit in grace is the Resurrection of our Lord,[1] Who in His Spiritualised Humanity is the source of the power which works to change us to His likeness, the power of *life* of that new order which is exemplified in Himself.

[1] 1 St. Pet. iii. 18; Rom. i. 4, vi. 4, 5, viii. 11; Eph. ii. 4–8.

III

Sacramental grace is simply *grace*—in the same sense of freeness, as bestowed and not acquired, and as the immediate gift of Christ by the action of the Holy Spirit; not less immediate or less an action than is grace when associated with the Word or communicated in answer to prayer. It appears to be the manner of God that He works by means, and that these means are various. They may be (to use a familiar but convenient distinction) "extra-ordinary" in providential dealings with the individual, or they may be "ordinary" in ways appointed, which no less challenge and exercise faith: they may be as the current of a wind which blows as it lists, we not knowing whence it comes or whither it goes, or they may be as the fixed and sure channel for a flowing River of Life, to which the thirsty, if he would drink, should seek. They may take the form of instructions, corrections, pleadings, or even of visions or revelation, all of which would, I suppose, be allowed by the most rigid standard to be rational and ethical means: but also they may be in the form of experiences through which we are caused to pass, or of actions in which we are made the agents. And such means as these last may be even more energetic than those which assume verbal or intellectual forms. The Disciples, we may believe, were affected to spiritual result by their ministry between Christ and the Five Thousand, or again by the night of storm which followed and by Christ's coming to then through it, as profoundly as by any discourse or parable. Things which reach us through the eye sink deeper than those received

by ear. Bodily contacts may be still more intimate, and bodily acts in which we ourselves participate may leave an impress still more marked. Therefore, when an oath is sworn it is with hand uplifted to heaven, and therefore there may be more reality and more of the spiritual in the mere kneeling to pray, than in the words repeated or listened to as prayer. A man is not a soul in a body—body and soul he is one man ; through the bodily the soul realises itself.

And now, if the bodily experience or action be such that it require the handling of material objects—such that in it the inanimate and its service are part of the symbol—suitableness to affect the Spirit is not diminished : the experience is rather perfected after its kind as an address to the soul through the externally actual. As von Hügel says, " To eliminate the sensible as aids to spiritual life has against it all analogy. The appeal to psychology and history, so decisive in favour of cultus, carries logically with it the admission of *some* sensible signs as contributing, when used by souls in and with the cultus, to the spiritual awakening and sanctification of such souls." Baptism and the Eucharist are complete sacraments, as ordination, for example, is not, because they employ, not only significant action but " sensible sign." Beyond doubt the soul may be reached and is moved and may be changed to new thoughts, emotions, and volitions through appeals sensibly conveyed—there are *lacrimae rerum*, and there are also *gaudia rerum*, both of which " touch the mind." It does not seem rational to debar Him Who has made human nature what it is from availing Himself of these facts. It is to be presumed that He seeks man

by all avenues along which the spiritual in man is to be reached. There is the dialectic appeal to the understanding—so often insufficient: man is not to be saved by enlightenment only. There is the emotional appeal to heart and will, which also so often fails—all day long God stretches out His hands to the disobedient.

But there may be also immediate action, more or less inexplicable in its method, because it transcends our conscious apprehension: we know the grace of God in its results, not in its process—we know it as we know the passing wind by the tossing branches and flying clouds, or as we are aware of its fluctuating pressure on ourselves. Such work of God is wrought at the secret sources of our life, where deep answers to deep. "If," says Professor W. P. Paterson, "there exists an Infinite Being Who is also the living God, it seems absurd to assert [1] that He is prevented from holding gracious communion with finite spirits, because this would disarrange the scientific scheme of thought. Such intervention is certainly possible." [2] It seems no less absurd to limit the number of forms which such communion and intervention may assume, to select one—that form which is through the sensible, a form which in point of fact experience shows to be efficient—and to say "God does not work in that way." We do not know how the Deity acts either in creation or in re-creation; we cannot then pretend to say how He does not act. By the fact of our existence we know that He creates, and by similar experience we know that He re-

[1] Professor Paterson's text has "deny," but that is an obvious misprint.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 141 f.

creates ; the difference being that we may know more as to re-creation, since part of its sphere is within our own consciousness.[1]

Mr. K. E. Kirk [2] remarks that discussion of the conception of grace is in these days confined practically to grace in its sacramental form, and for the reason that the evangelical doctrine of the Gospel as itself a medium of grace has dropped out of sight. I should doubt whether that omission takes place except in the rarefied atmosphere of philosophic religion in certain of its contendings. Of theology as it is taught in the *milieu* best known to me it might be more accurate to say that it tends to regard truth as almost exclusively the means of Divine appeal to the soul, and to minimise (without forgetting) the doctrine that Sacraments are efficacious—the philosophy which sees life whole is unfortunately rare anywhere. The formal teaching with which we Scots are most familiar is that all ordinances of Christ are, as such, means of grace—by which " Christ communicates to His Church the benefits of His mediation," [3] especially the Word, sacraments, and prayer, and that these means are efficacious.[4] It is probably secure to say that such statements are generally verified in experience, and that the conception of grace which they embody is in practical religion universal. It could hardly be otherwise—the Sacraments cannot be isolated, even theoretically, or considered severally from the Word and prayer—nor do the

[1] Compare Pringle-Pattison, *op. cit.* p. 293.

[2] *Theology*, Dec. 1925, p. 321.

[3] Westminster *Larger Catechism*, Ans. 154. (See *Shorter Catechism*, Ans. 88, " communicateth to us the benefits of redemption.")

[4] *Ibid.* 155, 161 ; *Confession of Faith*, xxvii. 3, xxviii. 6.

Sacraments, in order to be judged efficacious, require any attribution of grace which is not demanded in the case of the Word or of prayer. In practice the Word necessarily precedes the Sacraments, and, unless the grace of God accompanied its proclamation, none would resort to the Sacraments, or, if they did, sacrament would be without meaning for them. For the Word, no more than the sacramental Species, has power "of itself" to change the heart; there are many who are very familiar with the Word, who are unrenewed by it—Gospel-hardening is a well-known phenomenon. It is only as the Holy Spirit uses it and as the heart of man entertains it, that the Word is living and powerful—being "mingled with faith in them that hear it":[1] and faith is itself of grace—it is "the gift of God." Prayer also is universally recognised as a means of grace—but again may be ineffective, and for the same reason: we may ask and not have, because our asking speaks only our restlessness, not the groaning of the Spirit in our souls.[2] And as there can be no sacrament without the Word, so there can be no sacrament which does not presuppose prayer—a sacrament *is* on our side prayer, appeal to God, before it is on God's side an answer to prayer. All grace is not sacramental, except in the broad (and true) sense in which the Word is itself a sacrament of truth, and prayer a sacrament of the fatherliness of God's Fatherhood and of the faith of His children. Sacramental grace is simply grace; Word, prayer, and Sacrament are in that relation on one footing, and there is no difference. In saying this I do not depreciate either Word or prayer or Sacra-

[1] Heb. iv. 2. [2] St. Jas. iv. 3; Rom. viii. 26, 27.

ment : but I exalt the grace of God, on which for efficacy all of them equally depend : and in that respect there is no difference.

The purpose of these lectures is to explicate the religious values of the sacramental and to emphasise them : the sacramental is fitted (and, as I believe, designed) to play a large part in the development of the spiritual life as supernatural : but it is as part of a life that they must be estimated, and life in a whole and one. We may analyse it as intellectual, emotional, a life of conscience, a life of devotion and cult—but it is always the life of a *person* who thinks and who feels and who is conscientious and who communicates with God, and this not in separate activities, but as the whole man is engaged in every action of his will ; so that in each action there is something of faith and something of will, something rational, something emotional, something ethical, and possibly something prayerful—for even in mundane affairs a man may walk as one who holds the skirt of Christ's garment and feels a response to his plucking. To a full religious life the cultual and sacramental also is essential. But its place in such a life, however constant and energetic, is not primary. There is the Sacrament and there is that of which it is the Sacrament. In the latter of these stands salvation : and touch with that which brings salvation is necessarily established in knowledge and belief before it can be established sacramentally. The Sacraments are central to the life of grace—they are its shrine and core : but they are contained, embraced, and supported by faith in that which they "signify, seal, and apply." Their place can be spiritually supplied,

as in the case of the "baptism of blood" or of a quest for baptism which is frustrated by intervening death or of the spiritual communion of such as die beyond reach of ministry: but nothing save the gift of faith can supply the lack of faith. He who has faith, but cannot obtain a Sacrament, has Christ: he who has a Sacrament but has not faith, has nothing. The Sacraments do not add to the Gospel—rather they embody and apply the Gospel; or if they add, what they add is that which cannot be written with ink and pen.[1]

IV

It need not then be accepted as a canon of religious thinking that the use of the physical cannot be the means to a spiritual result, that the human soul cannot be affected through a material vehicle, or that, if it can, God refuses to act through such channels. Such a canon, if generally applied, would rule out the greater part of human experience and would leave many things unaccountable; among them, our Lord's method in more than one of His acts of healing.[2] It is impossible, we have been told, to endow dead matter with spiritual property—which may be a truism, but is certainly an irrelevance, for it would be universally held that matter "of itself" can have no consequence in the region of spirit; in virtue, that is to say, of its material qualities, it can have effect only in the region of the material. But when this is said, the question whether grace can operate sacramentally is not touched. If the sacramental element, considered "in itself" as dead matter,

[1] See Note appended to this lecture.
[2] St. Mark viii. 23, etc.

could produce spiritual effect, it would produce its effect automatically, as opium will cause sleep, though it be absorbed unconsciously, precisely as if it has been voluntarily and purposefully absorbed. Does any one suppose that to be the case? For example an early custom allowed the Communicant to carry away with him a portion of the consecrated element of Bread in order to consume it privately in the interval before another celebration: no one has thought that, should a pagan by some accident have discovered what was thus reserved and had consumed it, any spiritual or moral result to him would have ensued. For in such a case no spiritual factor is involved, either on the side of the Giver of Sacraments or on that of the recipient. In other cases, however, the physical may be instrumental to, or may furnish the framework for, a spiritual interaction between Giver and receiver.

The human environment is, in great part and that the most active in the formation of character, a physical environment; its conditions and the resulting experiences are physically determined: it is impossible to say that these do not affect the soul; heredity is a fact of the physical life, and it at least influences our qualities of mind and heart as it does our bodily features. Race, nationality, kindred, parenthood, sonship, brotherhood, marriage, proximity—these relationships, all physical in basis, actually constitute for us our primary moralities, and give us our first discipline in self-restraint, dutifulness, and affection. Home and family are physical things; and they are the mould in which the ethical self takes shape. Vices are for the most part bodily; it is carnality of which Burns has said that it

petrifies the heart. There are sins peculiar to the mind and spirit, which so long as they remain heart-sins only, are known to most of us chiefly as temptation: it is another matter if (as the modern slang significantly enough has it) they materialise in deed. Hate is potential murder, but it is not murder; and coveting is the beginning of theft, but it is not theft. Sin, when it is full-grown, brings forth death;[1] it is "finished" —matured—when it issues in physical accomplishment—when envy speaks in slander or impatience vents itself in a blow. Every passion of good or evil writes itself in bodily feature: every gesture reacts on emotion: body and soul live and throb as one man.

One should be careful then as to drawing too rigid a line between the physical and the spiritual elements in the human constitution or experience, or in concluding that no influence can pass that line or cross from one side of it to the other. Rather it would seem that the physical and the spiritual interact on one another, and that perhaps of the two the re-action of the spiritual to the physical is the more immediate and vigorous. A change of heart in penitence or conversion cannot repair the bodily ravages of vice, and can reverse bodily habits only with labour and painful watching and prayer: the effect of an act of sin to degrade the soul is on the other hand instant, and the demoralising effect of vice keeps pace with indulgence. The spirit is in fact markedly amenable to influences which reach it by physical channels.

That is not, I repeat, to say that matter can "of itself" act on the soul as a drug acts, or that it can "of itself" convey Divine grace. But it

[1] St. Jas. i. 15.

is to say that the physical environment of the soul's life is distinctively the sphere in and through which spiritual consequences for the soul's life are involved and that the incidents of the material experience supply a medium for the play upon it of spiritual forces.[1] There is no reason in the common and rational order of our existence why sacraments should not be recognised as media of grace—there is nothing compelling us to conclude that God does not work in such ways as Sacraments offer.

For after all Sacraments are activities, not material objects.[2] In full form as illustrated by Baptism and the Holy Communion, they involve the use of things such as water, bread, and wine, calling even the earthly into the service of the Kingdom of Heaven; thereby purging all the earthly. But these things are not "Sacraments," unless we revert to an earlier and obsolete use of the word, now in such discussion departed from —they are the "Elements" employed in Sacraments; the Sacrament is their employment as appointed—it is the whole transaction between God and man. It is unfortunate that in popular practice that term (sacrament) should be often applied, not to the action, but to the Element —so that it is usual to speak of reserving the Sacrament, when reservation of the consecrated Elements of its celebration is meant. This is

[1] Thus von Hügel, *op. cit.* p. 162 f. The material, he reasons, cannot benefit the soul "as such and separately," but may be placed somewhere in the totality of life: "through that element [of the material] as through an awakening purifying river" one may pass on to heights, having become thereby a more spiritual person.

[2] H. Townsend, *Doctrine of Grace in Synoptic Gospels*, quoting Professor Nairne, "The true symbol is not an element —it is an act."

done only with regard to one Sacrament—the hallowed water of Baptism, if it remain in the Font, is not so spoken of ; and when this language is used in regard to the Holy Communion, it is the consecrated Bread rather than the Chalice of Blessing which over large areas is alone intended. This may be merely a matter of phraseology and a convenience of speech, but it is misleading, and invites criticism of what is supposed to be, but is not, sacramental doctrine. The Sacred Elements are in the Sacraments media of grace, but not " of themselves," and they are not the Sacrament ; by the Institution they are proposed to us in their use, and it is as proposed to us in the Institution that we can rightly discern and safely interpret them. So far as the Institution carries us we are warranted ; going further, we are thrown upon our own processes of logic, which are much less secure. Having that in mind, and using such a definition of sacramental grace as has been offered, for example by Mr. K. E. Kirk,[1] that " by means of the Sacraments spiritual influence passes from God to man, thereby changing man's nature for the better," the material character of the elements which sacraments use is not incongruous to spiritual religion. " Man's organism," Professor Pringle-Pattison says, " is the very means by which he is put in relation with reality " [2]—it is good, he properly reminds us, for sanity of thinking to hold fast by the bodily aspect of our existence. As for the possibility or otherwise of " endowing dead matter with spiritual property," such a phrase is altogether too concise to afford

[1] Lecture on " The Problem of the Sacraments," reported in *Church Times*, October 30, 1925.
[2] *Op. cit.* p. 122.

a just statement; and a statement which is not just is not convincing—it is not even disturbing. This phrase would not, for example, impinge upon the doctrine of transubstantiation, which eliminates dead matter from the question, and I do not think that it establishes contact with the Lutheran doctrine of consubstantiation: if it comes to grips with any doctrine, it would be with that among the "Reformed" confessions, of which that which I know best does speak of a "spiritual relation or sacramental union between the sign and the thing signified," and of "grace which is exhibited" (elsewhere, "applied") "in or by the sacraments": [1] but the "spiritual property" as there intended is in the thing signified, not in the sign, though in the Sacrament there is a union of these two; and the grace of God cannot be conceived of as a property of matter, although it is easy to conceive of it as exhibited or conferred by the Holy Spirit "in or by" a sacrament. No doubt language less careful than that quoted and expressing thought less exact has been used—may be still in some quarters used. There may be a gross and misstated sacramentalism, as there may be a crude and rashly stated Evangelicalism, or Adventism, or Fundamentalism, which we do not attribute to all Evangelicals, or to all who hold the Blessed Hope, or to all who take Scripture for their rule of faith.

Too much may be made of such phrases as (*aliquid*) *infusum* [2] and the like; no one has said *quaedam res infusa*. The thought is then of the infusion rather of any *aliquid*, which word, if used, would certainly be less fortunate. "We

[1] Westminster *Confession of Faith*, xxvii. 2 and 3.

[2] See Appended Note.

cannot get rid of spatial metaphors,"[1] and Aquinas, it seems, made no great effort to avoid them—but neither do others, and there is no special reason why they should—metaphor is metaphor: Professor W. P. Paterson, who is habitually exact in use of terms, remarks[2] that the Church has dogmatically affirmed regeneration to be the result of an "infusion of supernatural power and life." We may speak of "something" without visualising anything physical or semi-physical, and (if we speak of grace as "something") we should certainly be careful not to do so.

The Sacraments belong to the practical life of Christianity rather than to the intellectual, though (as has been said) they presuppose an intellectual element. Their nexus to our Lord is vital rather than pædagogic. In the practical life, both of the community and of the individual soul, they have immense and profound value. Except for the practised mystic a purely spiritual communion with the unseen is less than satisfying. We have, it is believed, such communion with our departed—yet we long for the sound of the voice and the touch of the hand;[3] the bereaved know it, and the Church since the Ascension has known it. The need is human and real and it requires no apology. Nothing is more spiritual than love, and this need is in the nature of love. "The spiritual generally, whether natural or even supernatural, is always preceded or occasioned, accompanied or followed

[1] Pringle-Pattison, *op. cit.* p. 284.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 52: and as to St. Paul's teaching, "the infusion of the very life of God Himself," p. 452.

[3] Compare Professor W. P. Paterson, *op. cit.* 264: "There is more in the hand-clasp and the embrace than there is in the gladness that is felt in the presence of a friend."

by the sensible—the soul by the body."[1] We grow weary of human voices and of our own, weary of reasoning about the unsearchable, weary of living by faith which so faintly grasps its object and by hope which so slightly attains, weary of groping after the invisible and intangible: when shall we come to God?

In the Sacraments we are given something which, if it is anything, is straight from God: we escape from the human mediation which in other worship, in the church-prayers and in the preacher's disquisition, obstructs almost as often as it helps. Here at last all things are of God: we are busy with God and God with us. Not that grace is more immediate in Sacraments than in other ordinances—it is not—but that in Sacraments its immediacy is more obvious. To the natural mind there is always reasonable hope that good teaching may on its own merits do good to the hearers, and again that if one asks one may receive—nothing supernatural need in either of these cases be supposed. But from the Sacraments nothing is to be expected unless the Finger of God is there. In this aspect they may be even considered to be among ordinances distinctively spiritual in the absoluteness of their appeal to and dependence upon faith. They have this religious value, that they testify that God has other ways to the soul than the dialectic. In belief the soul has contact with truth; in conscience it has contact with law; in Sacraments it has personal contact with the personal Christ; we see with our eyes, we look upon, our hands handle—at least *of* the Word of Life—and the Life is manifest, and we see and declare it.[2]

[1] von Hügel, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 292.
[2] 1 St. John i. 3.

Appended Note

I do not pretend to have anything like a knowledge of the *Summa*, but I have not, in the relevant sections of it, met the exact phrase *aliquid infusum*. *Infusio gratiae* and *infundere gratiam* are employed by Aquinas so often that one need not give references for them ; but it is an *aliquid* to which, if it were used, objection would be taken.[1] Aquinas does have *quiddam supernaturale in homine a Deo proveniens*,[2] and *quiddam* is no doubt open to the same criticism as is *aliquid* ; but the context, which is the desire of the Divine love for the eternal good of His creature—that good which is Himself—makes the pronoun harmless : it is not easy to avoid the use of pronouns, even when writing of an abstract.

Dr. Gore somewhere speaks of one metaphor, where several are used, as " blunting " another : we must in that case look for the idea which in common these various metaphors suggest. Aquinas does not confine himself to a single metaphor in order to convey the idea that grace comes from God. In various passages it is *lumen gratiæ*[3] which is infused, or grace is *sanans* or *sanatio*,[4] or it is *habitudo quaedam*,[5] or *donum gratiae quaedam qualitas est*.[6] But the entrance of light, the operation of healing, are also metaphors physically derived ; yet their use in such connection has high example, and few writers would hesitate to employ them. Elsewhere grace

[1] In the *conclusio* of I.–II. cx. 1 there occurs *certum est gratiam seu dilectionem Dei semper aliquid, nempe id quod ei vult, in anima ejus quem diligit efficere* ; but that is not from the pen of Aquinas, nor does it apply the term *aliquid* to grace.

[2] I.–II. cx. 1. c. [3] I.–II. cix. 7, 1*m*, etc.

[4] I.–II. cix. 8, c, etc. [5] I.–II. cx. 3. 3*m*. [6] I.–II. cx. 2, c.

is *quidam effectus gratuitae Dei voluntatis*,[1] or it is *nihil aliud quam quaedam inchoatio gloriae in nobis*,[2] or it is *expressio vel participatio divinae bonitatis*,[3] or *participatio divinae naturae*,[4] or again *gratia nihil est aliud quam quaedam participata similitudo divinae naturae*;[5] or, in another line of thought, *effectus autem divinae dilectionis in nobis, qui per peccatum tollitur, est gratia*.[6]

These are attempts, not to define grace, but to express Aquinas' sense of what grace is. So far as they are metaphors, they blunt one another—that is, that no one of them should be overpressed, as if it offered a definition. It is from the impression which they conjointly create, and taken along with later passages in which he considers in what sense Sacraments can be said to cause grace[7] or to contain grace,[8] that one may form a judgment whether Aquinas conceived of grace as a thing, quasi-physical, tenuous, or otherwise; or as a work of God by the given Spirit on and in the soul. To me (but I am not expert in his method) it would all go to show that Aquinas found the same difficulty which others have found in defining grace, and does his best to protect himself from being understood in any semi-materialistic sense. Always with him God alone is the *causa causans* of grace, and ordinance is instrumental for its communication. Possibly he means no more than we find in a report, received and recorded by the recent Lausanne Conference without demur, which speaks of Christ as sanctifying men "through the means of grace."

[1] I–II. cx. 2, c. [2] I.–II. xxiv. 3. 2*m*. [3] I.–II. cx. 2. 2*m*.
[4] I.–II. iii. c. [5] III. lxii. 1, c. [6] I.–II. cxiii. 2, c.
[7] III. lxii. 1 and 4. [8] *Ibid.* 3.

FIFTH LECTURE

The Sacraments and the Gospel

THE doctrine of grace as the present action of Christ by the mediated Spirit brings us at once to the Church as the sphere of such action, and to the Church as being in consequence a sacramental entity, embodied by life and expressive of Spirit.

I

It may be judged that Dr. Headlam in his Bampton Lecture and Dr. Gore in his recent *Holy Spirit in the Church* have gone far to demonstrate that our Lord both purposed and created a Society with institutions through which should be administered from Himself grace and power as well as truth. In the light of the mission of the Spirit as at Pentecost, that Society necessarily appears as itself sacramental, the outward sign of Spiritual presence and pregnant with Divine force, so that in its activities on Christ's behalf the outward corresponds to the unseen, the earthly to the Heavenly. As Spirit-informed, it is the organ of a life—a life that is not localised at particular points in its organism or limited to certain moments of its action, but life that is where the organism is and acts where the organism acts—in the Word, the prayers, the absolutions, the benedictions, the offerings, the

councils—so that in all of these the sure mercies of God are busy and the promise is established. The grace of God is not given in doses—we abide in Christ and so we live: it is *life* which we receive, and life is a flow; the Church is not sacramental here and there, now and then, but entirely or not at all. There is no room for the sort of pluralism in which it has been too common to think of these matters, as if for some purposes the Church or the man can be in Christ and for other purposes may be as the world is. God is One and His Name one.

The Church being an actual and substantive Society in a world which is materially stated, that which is committed to it[1] must be embodied in externalised form—otherwise its members cannot have fellowship in what is through it ministered: faith must be clothed in dogma, truth must be uttered in words, prayer must take shape in petition, emotion must express itself in gesture, and the spiritual act be evidenced by bodily act in order to be apprehensible to man, who is himself a sacramental creation, a spirit incarnate; the thing signified demands sign. All of that is implicit in the fact of the Church as dependent on the Word made flesh.

It is not, however, probable that the principle should be equally realised in every illustration of it. In any given example the sign may be more or less adequate, the grace associated more or less definite. There are Divine ordinances of which the effect is necessarily conditioned by the human capacity to use the ordinance to its full

[1] "Unto this catholick visible church Christ hath given the ministry, oracles, and ordinances of God."—Westminster *Confession of Faith*, xxv. 3.

availing. How far, for instance, the Holy Spirit shall act by the Word may depend on its true interpretation by the person who ministers it and on the spiritual power which he brings to its communication: the efficacy of prayer must depend, not entirely on the Divine readiness to hear our petitions, but also upon our success in giving utterance to the travail of the Spirit, upon our concentration on the act of prayer; and it must depend in part on ourselves—who we are who pray. On the other hand ordinance may be such that in it the human factor is at its minimum and the Divine factor at its maximum, in which all is given and we have only to use as we are appointed to use, in which all that is done is of God, on our part only the receptivity of faith being demanded.

There is room, that is to say, for ordinances in which the sacramental character shall be fully realised—in which the thing signified shall be both of the highest and of the most needful and shall also be definitely assured, the sign being certified adequate and reliable—sacraments, that is, which shall correspond to the radical and ultimate requirements of spiritual life and shall possess the warrant to faith (which is sometimes spoken of as "Covenant security") of our Lord's own institution and command; so that in recourse to them, knowing that we seek and take according to the will of God, we may also know that (as St. John says of certain kinds of prayer [1]) we have what we seek—the acts of the Church, as has been said, are all in their nature prayers resting on promise. The Church believes that she has been given such ordinances in what by

[1] 1 St. John v. 14, 15.

an agreed phrase we may safely speak of as "the two chief Sacraments"[1]—namely, Baptism and the Lord's Supper.

The Sacraments must be seen in their context —which is the Faith of the Gospel; else one cannot really see them or know them. They are the least isolated of the elements out of which the Christian experience arises and develops.

As for the number of sacraments, that, if we accept the principle as stated, appears to be merely a question of definition,[2] since the word is not of scriptural but of ecclesiastical application. Without attempting to go into its history, which is well enough known, it may be remembered that it had been variously used—at one time loosely, to describe almost anything of the Church's apparatus, and latterly in a technical sense which has allowed of cataloguing. Dr. Hall in a recent volume[3] says that the enumeration and clear differentiation from other Christian instruments and rites "could not be accomplished until the term *sacramentum* itself had received precise definition." Such definition was not crystallised until the twelfth century. This being so, I am doubtful whether he is justified in claiming so much authority as he does for the

[1] *Scots Confession*, 1560, ch. xxi.

[2] Dr. P. T. Forsyth in his *Church and Sacraments* uses the term in so wide a sense that, if it is to be adopted, there would be no objection that I can see even to such a statement as that all grace is sacramental: he uses it of the Word, the Bible, the Church, the Ministry, the individual minister; and might as well have included prayer. But such a use of words blurs outline; to be sacramental is not to be a sacrament.

[3] *Dogmatic Theology*, "Church and Sacramental System," p. 294 ff.

ultimate list of seven. It is not enough to show that "the doctrines co-ordinated by the enumeration are of Catholic reception," where the question is not of the doctrines or their reception, but of the propriety of placing the rites associated with the doctrine in a class by themselves, in which they are grouped with Baptism and the Eucharist to the exclusion of other rites and instruments. Where all is sacramental it is a simple thing to enumerate institutions or practices which more or less approach to the terms of a definition of the sacramental (for which again authority may be asked): everything then depends on the definition or on the opinion of the enumerator as to their relative importance.

For the practice of enumeration we go back to the pseudonymous Dionysius, whom Harnack places in the latter part of the fourth century—he, writing in Greek, gives the numbers of the "Mysteries" as six: Baptism, the Eucharist, Ordination, Confirmation or Chrism, Consecration of Monks, and Anointing of the Dead.[1] The discussion became active in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, opinion varying from the twelve sacraments of Peter Damian to the simple two "great sacraments," and ending in a general acceptance of Peter Lombard's list of seven. "The Reformers had no definite rule in the matter." The early Lutherans tended to retain Penance as a sacrament.[2] "Some distinguished between greater sacraments and less: others applied the word loosely to such of them as they

[1] Allen, *Christian Institutions*, p. 505.

[2] Compare *Apol. pro Confess. Aug.*: "Vere sunt sacramenta, Baptismus, Coena Domini, Absolutio, quae est sacramentum poenitentiae" (quoted Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* iii. 492).

thought worthy of it. Thus Calvin uses it in connection with ordination and confirmation." [1] Richard Baxter distinguishes between "three sorts of sacraments": in the second sense of the name, in which it is taken to mean "any investiture of a person by ministerial delivery, in a state of Church privileges or some special Gospel mercy," he grants that there are five sacraments, Baptism, Confirmation, Absolution, the Lord's Supper, and Ordination; and elsewhere he declares that "they which peremptorily say, without distinguishing, that there are but two sacraments in all, do but harden them [Papists—opponents] by the unwarrantable narrowing of the word." [2] "All were at one in setting above and apart from the other the ordinances of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, as having been instituted by Christ Himself and obligatory on all His members." [3]

This demarcation is plain enough; Rome itself admits it when it distinguishes between the two which are instituted by Christ *in specie* and are therefore immutable in form and matter, and those instituted by Him only *in genere*, which are therefore subject to variation in method of administration. The distinction of Baptism and the Lord's Supper as alone "generally necessary to salvation" is still more obvious and familiar—all Christians are not required to marry or to receive ordination. There is something therefore to be said for the practice of reserving a word for those two chief things which the Westminster Confession calls *the* Sacraments, and not

[1] Dr. Thomas Leishman, unpublished MS.
[2] Paget on "Sacraments," *Lux Mundi*, 6th ed. p. 425.
[3] Dr. Leishman, *ut supra.*

much is to be said against it, so long as the sacramental nature of the Church and of the whole apparatus of grace is kept in mind.[1] Baptism and the Lord's Supper are in fact not exceptional features in the Church's system ; they are rather points at which the formative idea of the whole becomes graphic and the secret method of the Spirit, followed throughout the economy, is embodied in final and interpretative simplicity. They are the points in experience at which the far-spreading stratum of the rock on which our life is borne crops above the surface in visible peaks ; but the rock itself, which at these points comes to sight, underlies the whole area of life in Christ.[2]

Baptism and the Eucharist stand by themselves, not only as of direct Dominical institution, but also as *perfect* sacraments. They possess the " sensible sign " ; they claim matter itself as an instrument of spiritual action and in this respect are uniquely related to the Incarnation ; thus they take seizin of the physical world for the service of the spiritual. A whole philosophy of the universe and, in detail, a Christian sociology, is implied in the fact.

[1] We are in need of a word under which those ordinances may be grouped which approximate to the character of sacraments without being perfect sacraments in the sense in which Baptism and the Holy Communion are perfect sacraments. There *is* a distinction, which disappears from view in the use of such a phrase as " the seven sacraments," or if we speak " peremptorily " of the sacrament of Ordination or of Confirmation. I should like to suggest " Sacramentals," if it were not that *Sacramentalia* is already sometimes used elsewhere too indiscriminately, and to include things for which we have no occasion.

[2] Cf. *Pentecostal Gift*, p. 114. Paper by myself.

II

But also they stand by themselves in this, that together they are all-comprehensive and by themselves cover the content of the Christian life: there remains no sphere for any third which shall be comparable. Everything soteriological bears upon one or other of two intentions: upon entrance into Christ or upon life in and by Christ; it is for rescue and the impartation of a new life, or it is for the preservation and continuance of that life and for its nourishment towards fulness.

On the one hand there are such doctrines as of the Divine love and desire for man, of election and vocation, of Incarnation and Atonement, of penitence, forgiveness, acceptance, justification, regeneration, prevenient and imparted grace, conversion; on the other hand there are habitual penitence, habitual recourse to the Atonement, the habitual renunciation of self, hunger and thirst for righteousness and holiness, the filial life with, on the Divine side, the sparing pardoning restoring love of God, the mediation of Christ, the Communion of the Holy Ghost, the nourishment of spiritual life, the law of the Spirit of Christ, and beyond all the Blessed Hope—"Until He come." Baptism corresponds to the one of these intentions of the Gospel, the Holy Communion to the other.

At the same time it is to be recognised that the "spiritual part" of both sacraments is the same: it is "Christ and His benefits,"[1] not something of Christ's in Baptism and something else of Christ's in Holy Communion—but in each of them it is to Christ Himself that we are come, person to Person, self to the Saviour, Who gives

[1] Westminster *Confession of Faith*, xxvii. 1.

Himself according to need, but is Himself undivided. In any analysis therefore of the content of each Sacrament, the same terms reappear and are repeated—the love of God, the free mercy of God, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Resurrection, the Heavenly Priesthood, the Mission of the Spirit: and on man's side penitence, faith, and self-surrender. The difference is in the subject of the Sacrament as Christ finds him—in the wilderness or in the fold: the difference, that is, between entrance and abiding, between life from the dead and grace for grace. But in either case it is Christ to the soul.

These two intentions—to bring into Christ and to support in Christ—are completely represented in the sacraments of the Font and of the Holy Table. This does not mean that these two are therefore in themselves so adequate that other ordinances conforming to their type should be superfluous—the life of grace is a *continuum*, proceeding through a manifold and orderly detail which at all points must be unified by characteristic principle, and we cannot isolate these details for separate consideration; it means that other institutions, themselves in nature sacramental, either depend on these two, or lie within the field which these two dominantly occupy and are subsidiary to them. To accept for the moment the scholastic enumeration of such ordinances, as to, for instance, Ordination—the whole system, including Baptism and the Eucharist, demands in some form (I do not here discuss the form) a ministry: Confirmation is closely related to Baptism as its sequel or its completion: the convulsions of the Christian conscience of the early centuries as to post-baptismal sin testify to

the need for sinful men of some reconciling link between Baptism and the Table of the Lord : the safety of the Christian society is constantly bound up with a realisation of the sacramental nature of Matrimony ; and the question of the relation of grace to physical disease and its healing is even at present of some urgency. These and the like matters all lie within the fellowship of which Baptism is the Sacrament, and are in nature and purpose incidental to the protection and support of that abiding in Christ of which the Eucharist is the Sacrament.

Baptism and the Eucharist have then a several character of their own which justifies their being called *the* Sacraments, in the sense of their excellency, pre-eminence, and scope ; but not in any sense which would sunder them from the vital unity of the system of ordered life in Christ of which they are the crown and explication. As such they interpret the distinctive method of the system and determine its character. In their light we read and understand the dispositions and appointments which regulate the manner of our communion with God and with one another, and which show the Church as other than a *turba fidelium*—as an organism, " fitly joined together and compacted " [1] as a Body for its Lord. They import into worship and into ordinance generally, or at the least they immeasurably enhance, the sense of the supernatural and gracious with which the Christian community administers for Christ and with which the Christian soul moves forward, from a beginning which states itself in terms of Baptism towards and through an experience

[1] Eph. iv. 16.

which, as expressed in cultus, centres in the showing of the Lord's Death and in feeding on His Body and Blood. We should have little or no conception of the sacramental significance either of the Church's ordinances generally or of material nature or of the secular life, unless our understanding of these things were opened and our spiritual imagination trained by intercourse with the two great institutions in which we find symbol and reality blent into one. Those persons who in thought and practice dwell most closely by the sacramental centres are not the least likely to move with reverence and care among the things of the Kingdom of Heaven, to practise the presence of God in common life, to add charity to love of the brotherhood, to continue in self-discipline, or to be givers of that which is just and equal in the relations of the world's traffic.

I suggest that there is a high religious value in this interpreting and educative function of the Sacraments: in the light which they cast upon other sacred things, and in the sanctity which they teach us to recognise in the secular, the bodily and the natural; since from them it appears that common things may be instruments and vehicles of the Divine, and that "great consequence may attach to humble means." [1]

III

I have spoken of the two intentions, one or other of which is subserved by all Christian belief, and of the two great Sacraments as respectively related to these: in this relation these Sacraments have a supreme religious value, which I may call

[1] Professor W. P. Paterson, *op. cit.* p. 450.

their evangelical value. They summarise the Gospel: they enshrine the Gospel and safeguard it. In them Christ has erected at the centre of the Church's life pillars of witness on which He has inscribed His Gospel in its double aspect, as it addresses an unsaved world and as it addresses those who are added to Him and who are being saved. Round them and under their shadow He has gathered the Church of God, as a host rallied to its banners. "They are not so much parts of Christianity as they are Christianity itself"[1]—made visible, legible, as an inscription in the living rock. The faith of the Gospel, as has been said, embraces these two fundamental positions—the one a heralding and a call, the other a salvation; the one a rending and a transference from that whole which is "the world" to this whole which is Christ, from the lost life to the life of acceptance and hope—the other an abiding in Christ, sheltered under His sacrifice and nourished in His fulness: the one a death and resurrection, the other a progress in the power of the Resurrection; these two aspects of the Gospel the Sacraments severally embody for our possession, "signifying, sealing, applying" them.

And they embody these, again to quote Professor Allen, "in forms which are not dependent upon human speech for their significance," but are permanently fixed in action and in matter and in formula. Our philosophies vary with the development of thought; our terms shift their sense; there is a classical mind, a mediæval mind, a modern mind; but the Sacraments do not change; their symbols are as unalterable as the things in Heavenly places which they signify;

[1] Allen, quoting Coleridge, *Christian Institutions*, p. 400.

in them Christ confronts us as the Author and Finisher of Salvation and establishes before us what is the heart of that matter. He makes use of ourselves in fulfilling them, and in the act we know what He does. By them the Church is doubly anchored to the primary deposit of the Gospel as it speaks to those who are without and to those who are within; and so long as the Sacraments hold their place in her life, however she sway with currents that drag and tides that beat upon her, she is held to the conception which they embody, to which as matter of history she always returns; evangelic revival from whatever decadence is as constant as the need for it is recurrent. It is difficult to explain away the witness of the two Sacraments—there are three that bear witness, the Spirit, the Water, and the Blood: and the three agree in one.[1] And it is difficult to engage seriously in the Sacraments without consciousness of what that witness indeed is. It is also difficult for any Christian community, practising the Sacraments, to frame its statements of doctrine in obvious inconsistency with their fundamental implications, and as matter of fact it may in a broad sense be said that that does not happen; where room for denial of these implications is desired, doctrinal statement must be dispensed with. The community which is informed and regulated by the content of Baptism and of the Holy Communion is, to the measure of its conformity to them, a witness to the Kingdom of God on earth, holy, Catholic, and Apostolic. It stands in the Lord and cannot escape from the Faith. And for the individual these Sacraments so contain the Gospel that, where

[1] 1 St. John v. 8.

any man with vital apprehension and consent of soul abides in baptismal consciousness and with understanding belief and intention shows the Lord's Death and takes from the Lord His gift at His Table, that man has believed and believes to the salvation of his soul—not as having been baptized and communicated, but as having in Spirit and truth lived through, and as continuing in, what Baptism and the Eucharist import.

Sacramentalism, unhappily, appears to be compatible with undue accretion in practice and with an overpressed logic in doctrinal inference which may lead to unjustifiable positions (as, for example, the harsher predestinationism, or at the opposite pole the doctrine of a "treasury of merit"), or it is compatible with an undue facility in concession to popular influences and demands, which have so often swayed authority to unfaithfulness; if one cares to use hard words, one might even say frankly that it is compatible with the presence of corruption or of superstition; but it can hardly lose sight of those presentations which are fundamental to the Apostolic Gospel and are at the root of Evangelicalism—such as the universal human need of a supernatural salvation, the free initiative of Divine love, the factual Incarnation, the Sacrifice of the Cross, and its reconciling power, the new life of the Resurrection and its communication through the Mission of the Holy Ghost, or the forgiveness of sins through our Ascended Lord's heavenly priesthood. In these is the power of God to the soul, and where they endure reformation and revival are natural phenomena, always at hand however delayed.

The Sacraments are the theology of the common people and their practice is the credal confession of the laity in a living consciousness which is not always reached in recitation of the Catholic formulæ of faith. As a man thinks of the Sacrament, so it is likely that he will be found to think in matters still greater. Professor Robert Flint used to say that the spread of a low Sacramental doctrine in any region of the Church was the usual symptom of drift towards lowered conceptions of the Person of Christ. If, as recent tentative research into the mind of "the Churches" for a basis of reunion has revealed, there exists an agreement wonderfully general, if sometimes guarded, in the asseverations of the Nicene Symbol, it is not (unfortunately) the Creed as a formula which is the bond of this unity in the faith—but, far more, the unity of faith is the effect of common Sacraments and their testimony: everywhere and by all, Christianity is read in their light and is held according to their emphasis. There is always the Water and the Name, always the Bread and the Cup and the word of the Lord concerning them: always the Spirit taking the things of Christ and showing them to us: the three (I repeat) bearing witness, the Spirit, the Water, and the Blood, and therefore the Church also agreeing in one. It is not we who have kept the faith; our Saviour by His all-wise institutions and their teaching has kept us in the faith.

It is manifestly in virtue of their expressiveness and representative character, that is of their symbolism, that the Sacraments exercise this guardianship over the matter of our belief. And this leads to two considerations: in the first

place, that the Sacraments are not arbitrary. It is sometimes suggested that as dependent on institution and representing a Divine fiat they carry a signature of authority which, merely as significant and rational, they do not acquire. Nothing could well be less true. To us their warrant as Sacraments rests undoubtedly on institution. Institution is pledge: there is, for example, no promise to prayer so vigorous as the simple command to pray. But the form of the institution itself rests on the congruity of the Sacrament to its purpose. Whatever more they may be, in the first place Sacraments are symbolic; they represent as well as apply, and they apply what they represent. Now symbol cannot be arbitrary—it is chosen always because it is significant. One might as well speak of an arbitrary parable or of an irrelevant simile. The Sacraments speak, and they speak intelligibly, and they are given in the first place for their obviousness of meaning; they are what for their purpose they must be. In the second place, if they are given that they may symbolise truth as well as that they may convey grace, the exactness of their symbolism must be of an importance which can be measured only by the degree of importance which we assign to truth itself. I think that it is Dr. Denney who has said, in relation to the verbal expression of truth, that to change the word is to change the doctrine. Still more to change the symbol is to change the sense conveyed; to tamper with a sacrament is to modify its testimony. If the testimony of the Sacraments is testimony to the Gospel in the essentials of its verity, this is a grave matter.

IV

The implications of Baptism are comprehensive. They involve, in their reference to the Divine, love as the nature of God—the all-embracing benevolence which cannot pass by the lost or endure the perdition of the sinful, but refuses no sacrifice, even the most desperate, for their rescue: they involve the love of the Father, the grace of the Son, the communication of the Holy Spirit—and thus, in the unity of Divine action which the universal formula of Baptism declares, they hold before the Church continually its fundamental faith of the Holy Trinity: they involve the Divine initiative in salvation, the prevenience of grace, the absoluteness of grace, the fulness of grace, since in Baptism God alone is active, and God withholds nothing. Further, all of Christ in the amplitude of belief is implied in Baptism for the remission of sins; for it stands certain that all sin is against God and that God only can forgive sin or so deal with the matter of human sinfulness that sin can be taken away. The Deity of Him by Whom the eternal mercies of the Father have been brought to effect, the Incarnation, the availing Sacrifice of the Cross, the constitution of a new nature and a new life for men by the Resurrection, the Heavenly Priesthood which administers grace, the fulfilment of the promise of the Father in the Unspeakable Gift through the glorified Lord—all of this is carried in the significance of Baptism: for apart from these conditions no such Baptism as is ministered among us could be imaginable, and by its ministration the existence of these conditions is continually held before us. The present efficiency of the

Holy Spirit invoked in Baptism, the newness of life which He imparts, the Heavenly constitution of the Society into which union with Christ infefts, the judgment of the world out of which God's mercy calls and severs us, the promise of such aid as our weakness needs from Him Who is able to keep us from falling—all of this also is implied and the faith of it is imposed on our consciousness. If we "examine ourselves" in relation to Baptism, as St. Paul has exhorted us to do in relation to the Holy Communion, I think that we shall find that through it such belief is implicit in our religious thinking and constitutes our predisposition to recognise the Catholic formulations, as satisfying our instinctive demand for the explication of belief. The Sacrament, as it continually meets us, meets us with the question, "Know ye not?"[1]

On the side of man, Baptism implies the universal human need, the fact of sin and of its "death," which must be finished in each, that each may live. None may enter but by this way of mersion into death—Christ's death becoming to him his own death to self and to the past;[2] nor except by emergence, quickened together with Christ by the Holy Spirit, the radiating "Glory of God" through Whom Christ was raised from among the dead,[3] into a new creation in which life is righteousness and holiness.[4] The world is such that, judged by Christ's death, it must pass away—the redeemed are called out of it into the Kingdom of Heaven: every comparison by which Baptism is expounded—en-

[1] Rom. vi. 3 f., etc. [2] Rom. vi. *pass.*; Col. iii. 3.
[3] Rom. vi. 4, viii. 11; comp. Heb. xiii. 20.
[4] Eph. iv. 24; Rev. xxi. 5.

grafting, adoption, building, naturalisation, death and resurrection—carries the same idea of severance from the natural (the scion from its parent plant, the child from its original family, the stone from its bed-rock in the quarry, the citizen from the allegiance of his birth, the dying from his whole known experience), and of association into that which is strange to its nature, so as to become part of it, and (except as in St. Peter's simile of the Heavenly Temple, and even of that the stones are " living stones ") to share in its status and live in its life. The Baptismal renunciations as well are implicit in the Sacrament before they are demanded of the candidate. Further, the candidate seeks Baptism, comes to Baptism, satisfies (so far as he may) the conditions of Baptism, yields himself to be baptized—and at that point his part is done ; what follows—viz. the Baptism itself—is given, not achieved. And therein is finally and absolutely indicated his inability and his entire dependence on God's spontaneous goodness, unmerited grace, and redeeming power ; but also the assurance that, if he be obedient, grace shall not fail him. And since vital union with Christ involves vital union with all that is in Christ, the baptized knows himself to be placed of God in a fellowship which is the sphere of the operation of the Holy Spirit, membership in which supplies the opportunity, as Baptism constitutes the vocation, to the exercise of grace, both passively and actively, both as long-suffering and as charity.

Into Christ and into the Body of Christ—on that side, as rescue, Baptism summarises the faith of the Gospel, and forbids us to vary our belief from it : but more—it trains us to believe, and holds us to unity of belief.

V

The credal value of the Sacrament of the Lord's Body and Blood is perhaps even more evident and, since contact with it is an habitual feature of Christian experience, the value is the more effective. Declaredly it *shows*, and that not only "the Lord's Death," but therewith all which the redeeming death imports. This it exhibits and expounds as well as applies. Baptism demands this further Sacrament, as birth demands shelter and nutrition, and without it would hang in the air, inconsequent and inexplicable. Since the content of each Sacrament is Christ and the whole Christ, the fundamental implications of the Eucharist are again those of Baptism. The Holy Trinity is again made evident—the Father Eternal Whose will is accomplished in the Son and Whom we approach through the Eternal Sacrifice offered by the Son: the Eternal Son through Whom that will fulfils itself: the Eternal Spirit, in Whom its fulfilment embraces the Redeemed: and no less the Unity of the Trinity Whose consentaneous action the Sacrament reflects. And again, as in Baptism, the Love everlasting, the givenness of salvation, the free unlimited and unsearchable grace which saves. And again, as in Baptism, the Eternal Christ Who is given, Who comes from God and goes to God[1]—the Divine Christ in Whom Very God is reconciling the world to God.[2] And again the Incarnation—behold the Body and the Blood: again the prevailing Atonement, the Resurrection, the Exaltation, the Heavenly Ministry, the Pentecostal effusion:—each of these

[1] St. John xiii. 3, xvi. 28.
[2] 2 Cor. v. 19.

is involved and proposed in the Sacrament of the Holy Table as in that of the Font.

But in the Holy Communion these presuppositions are presented to a new and different effect. In Baptism we have them as obtaining for us entrance to a new creation: in the Holy Communion we have them as enabling us to live under its conditions. Baptism takes us into Christ "just as we are": we are then men forgiven, but we remain sinful men. Ideally, as St. John teaches, what is born of God does not sin and cannot[1]—yet the forgiven man sins; it is the same teacher who warns us that if we say that we have no sin we deceive ourselves.[2] We are what God has made us, having received the right to become His offspring—and yet we are what we are. That we should continue in the standing bestowed upon us, of which Baptism is the Sacrament, involves an endless repetition or rather prolongation of that primary act of grace and mercy by which we have been received to that standing. God gave His Son for us: He has united us in one life with that Divine Humanity; and now, as thus accepted in the Beloved, He bears with us; knowing us as we are, yet for Christ's sake dealing with us as with sons, in chastisement and in love; still forgiving, strengthening, training: judging by what He foresees for us rather than by what just now He finds in us. This is the manner of the love which the Father has bestowed upon us:[3] and the whole secret and way of it is shown in our showing of the Atoning Death and in the response which it sacramentally obtains.

[1] 1 St. John iii. 9. [2] *Ibid.* i. 8. [3] *Ibid.* iii. 1, 2.

The Christian life, already constituted as a life of sonship and of access by prevenient and actual grace, in which all is of the Divine action and gift, proceeds in two movements—the approach of man to God by the new and living way opened ;[1] and the approach of God to man by the same way, with fresh gift and blessing. These two movements are reflected in the two stages of the sacramental action of which we speak as the Consecration and Communion. The two are inseparable : for we do not consecrate except to communicate, and we cannot communicate until we have consecrated ; but they are distinct in their direction as prayer and its answer are inseparable but distinct, being indeed complementary the one to the other. They are one Sacrament, because their sequence is inevitable and secure in our Lord's Mediation. The two stages of the action correspond to the double aspect of that Mediation—for man to God, for God to man : all is in Christ and through Christ —our seeking to God for whatever end, God's forthcoming to us in whatever form of His bounty.[2]

This Sacrament is therefore distinguished from that of Baptism by its complexity as contrasted with that simplicity ; for the act of God in Baptism (which is only God's act) is summary and complete, as birth is once and for all, however long and full the life which dates from it ; but also and still more in this, that in the Eucharist we ourselves become active and " minister to the Lord," [3] as the Lord has said, " This do " : *we* show—and that which we show is the Lord's

[1] Heb. x. 19 f., xiii. 15, 16. [2] St. John xvi. 23 seq.
[3] Acts xiii. 2.

Death with all that it comprises and has effected and imports ; and also this, that we who do this are those for whom He died : for, behold, His Body and His Blood are by Him put into our hands that with them we may show. Children of God, yet poor sinners, we have boldness to enter into the Holiest by the Blood of Jesus. " If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves : if we confess our sins " [1]—here is before all things the supreme confession of sin : we ourselves show it, that if Christ had not thus died we had perished ; we are such that for us this atonement was needed and only under its shelter we can draw near to God ; " between our sins and their reward " setting His Passion. It is further the all-inclusive prayer : it is the oblation of all possible praise and adoration : [2] and since we do it in the fellowship of the Church which is also the priesthood of humanity, it is the most comprehensive intercession. It shows Christ's sacrifice, once for all perfected and all-prevailing. It shows His Ministry in the Heavens. It manifests His presence and action among us by the Holy Spirit—for it is He Who Himself pleads His death and we are in this only His instruments. It anticipates and heralds His fulfilled Kingdom—for we do this " till He come." [3]

Now, when we have shown, our part is done : we have confessed, we have believed, we have pled, we have given God the glory : the Body and the Blood have spoken for us and have witnessed : penitence, faith, worship can go no

[1] 1 St. John i. 8, 9.
[2] Westminster *Confession of Faith*, xxix. 2.
[3] 1 Cor. xi. 26.

further—we can only wait before God for His response. We find the response when the Holy Things are taken from the Table where they have been left before God, and are given to us to be our food. It is the answer to our showing—absolution to our penitence, reassurance to our faith, the Bread of God which comes down from Heaven for our hunger, the Cup of Life for our fainting. In what it had been given to us to do, showing His Death, Christ was at our head, our Priest and Intercessor, presenting us to God, showing His wounds and offering us to God in Himself, the availing Sacrifice ; we came, following with Him, co-operating, doing here (or He doing by our means) what in our belief He does in the Upper Sanctuary. All this is Godwards : it is Christ Who by us has ministered before the Father. Now He has turned us-ward—and to us He ministers in God's behalf, speaking peace, bestowing Himself, blessing us in the Father's Name.

VI

Thus in the Sacrament of Holy Communion the whole Gospel of life in Christ is rehearsed. It would be difficult, I submit, to overestimate the religious value which in this view it possesses. Together and in their sequence Baptism and the Holy Communion cover the ground of Christian doctrine and Christian experience—they conserve and they interpret. It is common to speak of the Eucharist as "dramatising" the story of redemption : it would be at least as true to say that together the Sacraments dramatise the Creed. They state in significant action its content, and hold the Christian consciousness (of the Church

and of the individual members of the Church) in, often unconscious, harmony with its positions. Their enduring statement, the same for age after age, is more important than any restatement. One seldom encounters in Holy Scripture the idea that the faith is subject to expansion or extension, or that new truths await discovery: there is much said of keeping the faith, holding it fast, watching over it, delivering it as it has been received.[1] The modern mind is after all, as the human mind ancient or modern, a thing fluttering and variable —*animula vagula* (not always *blandula*)—the Sacraments are constant: the "living Church" must interpret always to its own generation both the faith and its statement—the Sacraments embody what it has to interpret.

And for the Christian experience — every Minister of Christ is minister of Word and Sacraments, and needs none to teach him that, ministering in the Sacraments, he stands at the centre of his function; in holding forth that which is broken or lifting before God that Cup, he knows what his word preached must be. While for the average Christian it is in his communion that he recognises himself for Christian and knows that he believes and what he believes.

[1] There is Christ's saying (St. Matt. xiii. 52) as to "things new and old"—but He Himself seems there to be the "scribe instructed unto the Kingdom"—or if His disciples are included, their treasury is the "understanding of all these things" which He has spoken. The "all truth" of St. John xvi. 13 must be read with ch. xiv. 26: it is the truth of "that which I have said unto you."

SIXTH LECTURE

Baptism in Relation to some of its Religious Values

I

It remains to consider certain values distinctive of each of the Sacraments. Two of these seem to be of high importance for their evangelical significance—namely, the regenerative aspect of Baptism, and the re-presentative aspect of the Eucharist. There are, however, certain questions relating to Baptism, historical and practical, of which something should be said, since they affect, not perhaps the theological, but certainly the religious value of the Sacrament, in the consciousness of the Church and of those who are baptized.

Professor A. C. Bouquet tells us that "there is no certain evidence that Jesus Christ during His earthly ministry ordained anything like what the Church of the succeeding ages has chosen to call the Sacramental System."[1] This may be taken to mean that the institution of Baptism is commonly referred to St. Matthew's account of the post-resurrection incidents,[2] and is not found in any account of our Lord's pre-resurrection sayings —and that the Last Supper, even if interpreted sacramentally, would not give "a system"; the

[1] *The Christian Religion and its Competitors To-Day* (E.T.), p. 73.
[2] St. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20.

Last Supper falls within the pre-resurrection narrative and is so far matter of history, while the delivery of the Baptismal charge belongs to the Resurrection life and, whether authentic or not, can give only a "truth of faith." The practice, however, of distinguishing between truths of history and truths of faith is obsolescent: faith grounded on the unhistorical is not faith: the Resurrection either is or is not historically true. If it is not true, there is nothing in the matter to discuss; certainly there is then no truth for faith in its supposed incidents. But if the Resurrection took place, its incidents are as much parts of history as those of the earthly ministry: as incidents in the experience of the witnesses they are incidents on the earthly plane as much as the incidents of the night of betrayal. The distinction which Professor Bouquet implies and which is often explicitly drawn is one which, if the Resurrection be admitted, cannot be maintained.

What would be certain evidence? Can it at this distance be obtained otherwise than as we have it? If more statements similar to St. Matthew's did exist, they too would equally be set aside as reflecting a later consciousness. As for a sacramental system, within Christ's earthly life there are suggestive sayings as to the nature of marriage, as to discipline and absolution, as to ordination, which easily bring these at least within the category of ordinance, and so within the sacramental character; while the Sacraments proper have a background in such discourses as those to Nicodemus [1] and to the multitude by the lakeside,[2] which goes far to account for their

[1] St. John iii. 1–15. [2] *Ibid.* vi. 32–57.

acceptance as perpetual and regulative institutions. As to Baptism, it is difficult to explain its immediate [1] and invariable requirement as the means of admission to the Christian fellowship, unless it had been prescribed in some such manner as is described by St. Matthew.[2]

It has become usual to assume that in the earlier practice Baptism was into the name of Jesus, and that the formula of St. Matt. xxviii. 19 is of at least the second, if not of a third, generation. Its terms, however, are such as meet us often enough in our Lord's discourse—He was accustomed to speak of the Father and to speak of the Son and to speak of the Holy Ghost:—was it irrelevant that, if He spoke at all in any farewell interview, He should speak as St. Matthew represents Him to have done? St. Luke, where he mentions instances of Baptism,[3] uses a different phrasing: but it is by no means certain that his phrases imply a formula. Baptism "in the name of the Lord" or "into the name of Lord Jesus" may very well be a summary description of Baptism administered with the formula of St. Matthew's narrative. It is not likely, nor is it consistent with literary form, for which St. Luke has much regard, that he should repeat in full at every account that so and so was

[1] Acts ii. 37–41.

[2] The baptisms alluded to in St. John iv. 1, 2 are not to be connected with the later Christian sacrament but with that of the Baptist. They seem to indicate a spontaneous effort by the Disciples of Jesus to extend the summons to repentance to Galilee, to which John had not penetrated.

[3] "In (ἐπί or ἐν) the name of Jesus Christ," Acts ii. 38; "In (εἰς) the name of the Lord," *ibid.* viii. 16; "In (ἐν) the name of the Lord, *ibid.* x. 48; "In (εἰς) the name of the Lord Jesus," *ibid.* xix. 5.

baptized. We ourselves speak habitually of Christian Baptism, not of Trinitarian, or of Baptism into Christ, although when we baptize we follow the prescription of the First Gospel. St. Luke, it must be remembered, as he writes is not thinking of formulæ but of conversions. Further, this usage of language is confined to St. Luke [1]: and the sources of the First Gospel may be as authoritative as some of those used by St. Luke.[2] St. Paul's question to the disciples of John at Ephesus,[3] "Unto what then were ye baptized?" seems to imply that if they had been baptized in his sense of the word, they must have heard of the Holy Ghost: and, if so, presumably of the Father as well. In any case, Baptism "into the Name of Christ" would imply Baptism into the doctrine of Christ, and if used (as at that point it would be) in simplicity of intention and without thought of restricted doctrinal content, may be held identical in sense with that of St. Matthew. For this reason I should not be confounded though, like Bishop Gore, I were to feel myself compelled to change my opinion and to think with him that "the evidence is fairly convincing that in the beginning only the single name was used."[4] But I am not convinced: St. Paul's language of appeal to Corinthians (1 Cor. i. 12, 13) shows only that in Baptism a Name was certainly invoked, and no doubt is the

[1] St. Paul's "baptized into Christ Jesus" (Rom. vi. 3), "baptized into Christ" (Gal. iii. 27), "buried with Him in Baptism" (Col. ii. 12; conf. Rom. vi. 4), refer to union with Christ by Baptism, not to the form of its administration.

[2] See C. H. Turner, *Theology*, April 1925, p. 221, "Must have been both primitive and authoritative."

[3] Acts xix. 1–7.

[4] *The Holy Spirit and the Church*, p. 125 n. 2.

ῥῆμα which in writing to Ephesus he assumes to go with the Washing; it does not show what the name was—the fact that St. Paul instances his own name, which was, at least as he quotes it, a single name, by no means implies that the Name into which the Corinthians had been baptized was also a single name. The form of his argument compels him to write as he does: no inference of the sort which Dr. Gore accepts from Dr. Armitage Robinson can be drawn from the unstudied sentences of so impetuous a writer as St. Paul. Any of us, Trinitarians as we are, might, I think, paraphrase St. Paul's appeal to-day, and write "Calvin" or "Wesley" instead of "Paul." At the most he may only re-echo the abbreviating usage which St. Luke employs in Acts. If "in the Roman Church for some centuries there was no Baptismal formula pronounced by the ministrant," that would seem to have been a departure from earlier custom[1]: and, even so, the questions of the ministrant proposed the threefold Name (a fact which itself requires to be explained and has its most obvious explanation in the Matthæan formula) and the Baptism proceeded upon that. St. Paul's question (Acts xix. 3) seems conclusively to imply a ῥῆμα universally used, which contained allusion to the Holy Ghost.

This does not seem to me to be a question merely of words. No doubt Baptism into a single Name, used (as in the first days it would be, but hardly would be now) with pregnant intention, would be valid Baptism—"into Christ" would then mean what we mean by "into the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the

[1] *Didache*, vii. 3; Justin Mart., *1st Apol.* lxi. 10, 13.

Holy Ghost" ; yet it would hardly be the same to us to think that the "form" of our Baptism is not of our Lord's delivering, nor is even St. Paul's ῥῆμα, but is an ecclesiastical conflation of various scriptures. We should then have lost something which had for us a value.

I am not able to accept any account of the Sacrament of Baptism which treats it as continuous with Jewish lustrations or with the baptism preached by John, or even to follow the somewhat, but insufficiently, guarded language of Dean Inge [1] or of Bishop Gore [2] on the subject ; and less careful language has been used by others.[3] The facts of course are not in question—the Jews had "baptisms" of persons and of things,[4] and especially for the admission of proselytes ; John,

[1] "It is necessary to consider what is the significance of the facts that Christ Himself accepted baptism from the Baptist : that He authorised the rite of baptism, which was so closely connected with the mission of the last of the prophets."—*Cont. Ver.* p. 282.

Dr. Inge goes on to say that the most salient difference between the baptism of John and Christian Baptism was that the baptism of John regarded the individual only, while Christian Baptism admitted to membership of Christ's Body. But if John's baptism is to be connected (as probably it should be) with that of proselytes, it suggested restoration to the true Israel, and so had corporate reference. The most salient difference surely is that the one baptism was before Pentecost and the other after Pentecost.

[2] Dr. Gore's phrase in his *Religion of the Church*, p. 45, is "Baptism as taken over by the Catholic from the Jewish Church," and in his *Holy Spirit and the Church*, p. 54, it is that "Jesus Christ took over the ceremony of washing . . . from the Jewish Church as the ceremony of initiation into the new Israel."

[3] For example, Dr. Marcus Dods (*H.D.C.G.*, 1. p. 170) seems to speak of St. Paul's baptizing those mentioned in Acts xix. 1–7 as "rebaptism," "renewal of baptism."

[4] St. Mark vii. 4, 8.

preaching repentance, baptized for "the remission of sins"; and the disciples of Jesus for a time continued this baptism[1] (it is not clear that "Jesus authorised" their action); and finally Baptism appears in Acts[2] as the Christian Sacrament, and its institution in the First Gospel.[3] The word "washing" (*βαπτισμός*) as descriptive of a symbol, covers no doubt all of these. But the same symbol may be employed with different intention, and so to symbolise different things—as imposition of hands may be the sign of confirmation or of ordination and of ordination to various functions. The baptism of John on the more probable theory implied that Israel had fallen from the covenant and that the penitents who desired to return to it and be forgiven were to be dealt with as proselytes from without; it implied confession of unfitness for the Kingdom which was at hand, and a desire to be fit and ready for it, but it was not and could not be an entering of that Kingdom, since that existed on earth only in the person of our Lord, until Pentecost brought union with Him and thereby membership of the Kingdom. The Baptism of John was a prophetic symbol, and as prophetic it was authoritative, but it was not in the theological sense a sacrament: it had no content of grace: John baptized with water, but not with the Spirit.[4] Like the Rabbinic custom of accompanying the circumcision of proselytes with a baptism, it lay on the natural plane within the older and passing economy, and while it had significance it had not power, for "Spirit was not yet."[5] To Jesus Himself the anointing of

[1] St. John iv. 1, 2. [2] Acts ii. 38. [3] St. Matt. xxviii. 19.
[4] St. John i. 26–34; cf. ch. iii. 5. [5] *Ibid.* vii. 39.

the Spirit followed the rite and was not in the rite,[1] but came upon Him in token of the Father's good-pleasure in His act of self-consecration to human redemption, numbering Himself with the transgressors.[2]

It seems needless to ask for a source from which our Lord might have derived the Sacrament. Baptism (washing) is the simplest and most obvious of symbols and possibly the most universal. It is safer to think of the baptism of John and of Christian Baptism as two examples of its use—perhaps historically connected, but theologically and Scripturally contrasted rather than identified, set in opposition rather than derived the one from the other. It is the manner of St. Luke, the most purposeful and concise of writers, to indicate origins by giving a single incident, or sometimes closely connected incidents, which link ecclesiastical practice to Apostolic example and authority, and then to mention that matter no more.[3] He is tender of stating with any appearance of slight the position of Apollos when he came to Ephesus "knowing only the baptism of John" and was taken in hand by Aquila and Priscilla;[4] but neatly enough he goes on at once from his reference to Apollos to the case of the twelve in the same city, who were in the same position as that in which Apollos

[1] St. Mark i. 10. [2] Isa. liii. 12.

[3] *e.g.* the laying on of hands by Apostles, Acts viii. 17, 18; the manner of making Church officers, ch. vi. 1–6; the terms of Church membership, ch. ii. 42; the Christian use of wealth, ch. iv. 34, ch. v. 1–11; the admission of the Gentiles, one incident but for its importance thrice related, and so of the calling of the Apostle of the Gentiles; the presence of the Presbyterate in every Church, ch. xiv. 23; the nature of that office, ch. xx. 28–35, etc.

[4] Acts xviii. 24, 25.

had been, and to St. Paul's dealings with them. It seems evident that the intention is to mark how the Baptism of John was regarded, and that it was not in the Christian sense Baptism. There was, it further appears, a " doctrine of baptisms " —the plural is to be noted—important enough at that stage to be reckoned among the primary teachings of elementary Christianity [1]: the baptisms with which it was concerned can hardly have been other than those of John and of Christ, and the " doctrine " of them the inferences to be drawn from their severalness. Not all who were baptized by John followed Jesus or passed on into the Church. There are evidences of jealousy between them and the disciples of Christ from the first: [2] some of them continued the Baptist's Mission after his death; a sect tracing itself to them long maintained itself, and is possibly still represented by the Sabæan Christians of Chaldæa. There is perhaps some hint of the controversy in St. Paul's emphasis on " one Baptism." [3]

In view of all this one hardly feels that to say that our Lord took over Baptism from Judaism is an exact form of statement: a thing taken over is still the same thing; but except in external form the Baptism of John is not the same thing with Christian Baptism, which lies in a region in which old things are passed away and all are become new. The sacramental value of Baptism is not impeached by Dr. Gore's phrase " taken over "; but, again from the point of view of subjective impression, it makes some difference whether we think of the Sacrament as a Divine Institution or as a Jewish rite continued: while

[1] Heb. vi. 1, 2; cf. ch. v. 12. [2] St. Luke v. 33, xi. 1.
[3] Eph. iv. 5.

the appeal of those who set aside the Baptism of infants and rebaptize—the appeal to "follow Christ into Jordan"—gains much of its force with not a few devout persons from a mistaken identification of the baptism which our Lord in His own person accepted with the Baptism which He bestows upon us. A baptism of repentance is obviously inapplicable to infants.

With regard to immersion in baptizing—where it is demanded, two grounds are alleged for its necessity: one that of Scriptural precedent, the other that of symbolic adequacy. As to the first of these, the Greek word for baptism does not imply immersion. The circumstances of such baptisms as are recorded in Scripture make it difficult to suppose that, so far as these are concerned, immersion was in all cases practised or even that it was the rule. Immersion is nowhere stated or prescribed. Reiterated reference to "the example of our Lord" fails, because His baptism is an instance of the baptism of John and not of the Christian Sacrament, and because there is in that case no more evidence of immersion than in other Scriptural instances. The earliest directions on the subject (*The Didache*, second century) provide for Baptism by affusion in case of need. The earliest representations of Baptism in Christian art suggest affusion rather than immersion. The demand for immersion as a condition of valid or sufficient Baptism is not adequately supported on the historical ground, and it is contradicted by very long tradition and by many ecclesiastical decisions. The appeal to symbolic appropriateness has at first sight more

force—at least to our minds, since we practise interment, and to us burial and resurrection may be best dramatised by submergence and emergence. But such was not the universal "manner of the Jews to bury," nor by any means the general practice of the world in which Christianity was promulgated. Where means permitted, the cave tomb or the built tomb was preferred: our Lord was laid, not in a grave, but in a rock-cut sepulchre. Rome used both cremation and the structural tomb. The Northeners erded their dead in superficial barrows. There were doubtless grave-burials as well everywhere, for those who could have no better; but to the Hellenist mind, death was not associated with a yawning grave and a dead man lowered into it, as death is in our habit of thinking. Burial was rather a "hiding"—as indeed the English word may by derivation mean.[1] The argument from symbolism fails to convince, either that St. Paul by "buried with Christ" must have intended to imply immersion, or that it imposes immersion as the necessary mode of Baptism. One may, on the other hand, grant that its symbolism when used is impressive; yet one might claim some religious value for the alternative of affusion:[2] it is enough that the primary and essential content of Baptism is not burial but cleansing—the "washing away

[1] The root is common to the Old High German, Danish, Icelandic, and Swedish, and has in all the sense of putting out of sight, covering, protecting by concealment.

[2] Cf. Acts ii. 17, *ἐκχεῶ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πνεύματός μου*; Titus iii. 6, *οὗ ἐξέχεεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς πλουσίως*. Cyprian (*Ad Magn.* 12, 13) vindicates the validity of affusion and reassures those who have been so baptized, and he goes on (14) "*Spiritus Sanctus . . . super credentem totus infunditur.*"

In the Armenian order immersion is followed by affusion (Smith, *Dict. Bib. Ant.*, *sub voce* "Baptism," p. 93).

of sins " : [1] and that this is equally symbolised by either method of administration.

The Scriptural authority for the Baptism of children is too well known to need repetition here. The weightiest may seem to be that word of the Lord [2] to those disciples who thought that His blessing was for mature (and repentant) sinners, and would have sent children [3] away until they should have reached that stage of development ; who found that He was much displeased and were warned that, contrariwise, it was themselves who must change and become such as little children are, if they would enter the Kingdom : the little child is held out to us as its ideal citizen. There is no certainty that the " households " simultaneously baptized, of whom St. Luke and St. Paul tell us,[4] contained children ; but if in no case they did, the coincidence would be remarkable. The *οἶκος* of a person of substance as Lydia was, the *familia* of a Roman officer, as Cornelius, and probably as the Philippian jailer was, embraced more than a " family " in our sense of the word does. It may be thought that such Baptism is of the nature of concession ; ideally the Gospel calling is to a world lying in darkness, and the ideal subject of Baptism is no doubt the hearer who has believed and has turned to the Lord. Possibly there is some hint of this in our Lord's " Suffer ye " : [5] the blessing of the little ones was dependent on the bringing of them by their mothers ;

[1] Acts xxii. 16 ; 1 Cor. vi. 11 ; Heb. x. 22.
[2] St. Mark x. 14, 15.
[3] According to St. Luke (xviii. 15) *βρέφη*—infants.
[4] Acts xvi. 15 33 ; 1 Cor. i. 16.
[5] *ἄφετε*.

the Baptism of children is a thing consequential upon the discipleship of others and on the faith of the Church. But in the general view of Christians it is a necessary consequence: they cannot think of themselves on one plane of existence and of their children on another; they in Christ and their children left behind in the world: they called and their children ignored. On the contrary, they are convinced that birth of Christian parents — nay, that birth within Christendom—is a call to be Christ's. Neither can they think of the Church as without the children, far less as excluding children. These two practices—of baptizing children and of restricting the Sacrament to be "believers' baptism"—mark two different conceptions of the Church, on the one hand as a "substantive corporation" continuous from its foundation and constituted by providential election to grace, or on the other hand as a self-associated company of individuals who have appropriated the offer of salvation. In the former case the Church precedes the individual; in the latter the individual precedes the Church. The former view characterises the type of religion known as Catholic; and its influence has gradually, but now for long, extinguished the practice of delaying Baptism to adult age, and has made the Baptism of Infants the rule. In so far as Infant Baptism witnesses to this view of the Church as the Garden of God, the nursery of believers, the school of faith,[1] it has in itself a religious value; for thus it seems to

[1] "Would it not (the refusal of baptism to infants) reduce the Church to the permanent condition of a missionary Church only, amid a quite Pagan Society?"—P. T. Forsyth, *Church and Sacraments*, p. 201.

most Christians that Christ and His Apostles have spoken of the Church. The Minister of the Sacrament can testify of the intense realisation of the grace of Christ, of the love of God, and of the reality of the communion of the Holy Ghost, of the preciousness of souls, and of the joy of the Lord on their ingathering, which has been stirred in himself in administering this Sacrament to children ; and he will testify also of its power in the experience of those who are sponsors for their offspring. He knows how many are by the act of sponsorship recalled to consciousness of their own baptismal standing and of its obligations, and who find at the font to which their child is brought a new desire to walk worthy of their own calling. It is perhaps for us, who have never known what it may be to lack that bond to Christ and to all that is His—difficult to realise what it would be to stand outside, left to ourselves to seek or to postpone or to neglect allegiance to Him : difficult therefore for us to estimate the religious value to ourselves or to our children of a consciousness that from the beginning and always we are His : the value is too great to admit of estimate.

II

The propriety of the term regeneration to describe part of the content of the Baptismal contact, and its meaning when so used, require consideration. *Palingenesia* (the Greek equivalent) is only barely part of the Scriptural vocabulary. It occurs but twice in the New Testament—once in a cosmic application ; [1] in the other instance it is

[1] St. Matt. xix. 28.

certainly baptismal,[1] but on a single example of use not too much can be based. Its cognate *γεννάω* occurs in the spiritual sense repeatedly in the Johannine writings, and in the Nicodemus conversation the baptismal reference is admitted. *Ἀναγεννᾶν* is used by St. Peter,[2] defined as "by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead," and as "by the Word of God," which need not exclude the agency of Baptism, but does not require it. The Baptismal application of the word regeneration has, however, entered so deeply into theological practice [3] and is associated with so much discussion, that its consideration cannot be evaded, even if that were desired. Orthodox Calvinism took the position (its doctrine of the elect permitting no more) that in the case of the regenerate, regeneration normally takes place in Baptism,[4] but so that all baptized persons are not undoubtedly regenerate [5]—a limitation which goes far towards vigour of assertion as to cases other then the excepted.

It may no doubt be to our manner of thinking difficult to assign to Baptism all that for example Westminster, or for example St. Paul, assigns to it, unless we have clearly in mind that Baptism

[1] Titus iii. 5. It is not found in the LXX, but Josephus has it (*Ant.* xi. 3, 9), *παλιγγενεσία τῆς πατρίδος.*

[2] 1 St. Peter i. 3, 23; cf. ch. iii. 21, and Eph. v. 26, *τῷ λουτρῷ τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν ῥήματι.*

[3] In the Westminster Standards, for example, Baptism is described as "a sign and seal," or as "a seal" of regeneration—in the *Confession of Faith*, ch. xxviii.; in the *Larger Catechism*, Ans. 165 ("regeneration by His Spirit"); and in the *Directory* twice, in the Instruction, and in the Prayer before Baptizing.

[4] See Dr. John Macleod, S.C.S. Conferences, *Divine Life in the Church*—Baptism, p. 137 ff. [Hitt, 1895].

[5] The Scripture given as "proof" is Acts viii. 13, 23—the case of Simon Magus.

is by both regarded as entirely the act of God,[1] and therefore as, on God's side, effective and sure. There are on our side conditions of faith confession and vow : but these are not Baptism nor parts of Baptism : they are steps in surrender to that which we may seek, but which God alone can give. The passivity of the subject of Baptism is summed up in the final comparison of it to death : the rest, the rising from death, the absolution, the adoption, the grace, are sovereign acts of Deity. If this view is accepted as that of the sacred writers, assent to their conclusions is facilitated. For difficulty of assent arises from the assumption that the term regeneration is one to be used only in connection with converting, repentance, assurance of salvation, or with some other movement of life in response to God. These, however, are activities of ours, and the use of the word regeneration is not intended to suggest anything of ours. No one, so far as I know or can imagine, has taught Baptismal conversion or Baptismal salvation.[2] Conversion, repentance, faith are movements of life in us : but generation is antecedent to life—it is the act which precedes and initiates life ; and if we speak at all of regeneration, our thought must follow that analogy. God is first : something of His anticipates everything of ours, our believing, or repenting, or turning to Him—something which makes it possible for us to believe or repent or convert ; and that something on God's part, whatever we define it to be, is what in this use is meant by regeneration. Its use then implies no claim for magical

[1] " Baptism is not simply the individual or the Church doing something, but God."—Forsyth, *op. cit.* p. 210.

[2] See Bishop Temple, *Christus Veritas*, p. 236.

operation: it is an assertion of the Divine initiative and for the supremacy of grace; it is a form of the doctrine of sovereign election to the Christian opportunity: it is (as the Westminster Fathers knew) part of the apparatus of Evangelicalism and the basis of a powerful appeal to the soul. In that aspect the term is justified, and gives with precision what for the statement of an important conception is necessary. It involves nothing and pledges nothing as to the response of the baptized or as to the use of grace given: in the natural life many a graft withers, and many who are born die before they in effect live, many sons are unfaithful and prodigal, and naturalised citizens have been known to betray their allegiance; yet the birth, the adoption, the naturalisation have taken place. Von Hügel speaks of the prevenience of God as meeting in us something of our own, and says that there is no "exclusively divine act within our souls";[1] but on an earlier page[2] he has quoted with approval St. Augustine—"The whole of me that Thou has made, and everything out of which Thou hast made me, springing from Thy prevenient goodness." Is not St. Augustine right? The gracious disposition which in us meets with grace is itself the gift of God. It is "of our own" as being in us and by our will—but whence is this predisposition? Lydia attended to the things spoken of Paul because the Lord had opened her heart to attend.[3] God is inevitably first—no man can come to Christ except the Father draw him.[4] Few things in religion, as every mission-preacher knows, are more urgent upon the soul than the

[1] *Eternal Life*, p. 160.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 92.
[3] Acts xvi. 14.
[4] St. John vi. 44.

sense that God is drawing it, that the net encloses it.

There is a question whether regeneration, defined as above, operates subjectively by change of environment, or also by immediate communication of grace. Both views are, I think, held by persons who affirm the doctrine. All the comparisons which are used to elucidate Baptism—grafting, adoption, and so on—have this common feature, that they import detachment from the natural and incorporation into that which is not of nature; and in so far the emphasis of these similes is on the new fellowship. Whatever besides Baptism may be, it is at least introduction to the Spirit-filled society of the Body of Christ and its influences. One can understand the view that the elevation of the scene of life to that plane, adequately even if not exhaustively, satisfies the idea of a rebirth, and may meet the implications of the New Testament on the subject. Even Judaism spoke of its proselyte as new-born.

The simplicity of this reading, the fact that it identifies regeneration (in the sense defined) with something that unquestionably happens, and that it accords so well with the practice of infant baptism, goes far to recommend it, and it is at least part, and a large part, of the truth. It tends too to reconcile with theory the fact that unbaptized children may, and often do, show gracious motions and a spiritual development, as evident as any that we hope for from those who are baptized, and such as seem to indicate them to be beyond question partakers with us of the grace of God. It is because they breathe with us the Christian atmosphere, and share with us

our days and their fulness of Christian influence.[1] Their want of Baptism is often by sheer ignorance or inadvertence. They themselves are probably unconscious of it: the Lord Christ is to them Saviour and Good Shepherd, as He is in the thought of the Christian child. If any are of the soul though not of the Body of the Church these surely are. They too are dependent on Baptism, because they are dependent for the Spiritual life which they have on the embracing agency of the Church; while the Church itself is dependent as a society on Baptism, and without it could not endure as it does in faith and life.[2]

On the other hand there is the question whether the transfer to this new and higher atmosphere of development may not—at least to faith—imply something more. For Baptism is not only a privilege—it is also an election and a vocation. It is "the Sacrament of responsibility." One cannot but ask oneself whether the all-merciful and faithful God, Who bestows the election and thereby imposes the vocation and the responsibility, will not assuredly also therewith give whatever grace may be, if used, sufficient to enable for the demand.[3] I would not myself judge that to be the attribution of any magical property to Baptism; it would seem to me to be only a natural, perhaps a filial, confidence, or at least a strong hope, in the justice and goodness and love of the Deity. It will remain a matter of

[1] Cf. Heb. xii. 22–24.

[2] See Bishop Temple, *op. cit.* p. 235: I am indebted to him for suggestion of what I have said above.

[3] "Christ receives the child to Himself. Of course this affects the soul of the child; but the effect is germinal."—Bishop Temple, *ibid.* p. 236.

faith, possibly of pious opinion, because it is incapable of being demonstrated and the relative statements of Scripture can perhaps be otherwise read. Prevenient grace, if it occurs, must work mainly or entirely in the region of the subconscious, to which no examination of origins can extend [1]; at the same time the difficulties in the way of rejecting belief in such assistance seem to me to be greater than any difficulty in accepting it. There are, besides, places of Scripture which associate reception of the Holy Ghost with Baptism, and these may be thought to give to faith some warrant in the matter.[2] Few Ministers of Baptism fail to invoke the Holy Spirit in prayer for those whom they are baptizing or to commend them by Benediction to His communion, possibly without in all cases analysing the implication of such acts; so to pray and so to bless is the natural course in Christ, and they follow it. But it implies all for which I contend.

III

Discussion of Confirmation does not perhaps in strictness fall within my subject; but it is so closely connected with Baptism that it cannot be entirely omitted. I confine myself to its religious value. In doing so, I desire to recognise the rite as of vast prescription and Catholic authority, of a utility which it is difficult to overestimate, which amounts almost to necessity; to advocate

[1] Hall, *Dogmatic Theology*, viii. 283: the effects of grace, Dr. Hall implies, become apparent in that of which we are conscious; but the manner in which factors operating upon the mind do their work escapes us because "they operate beneath the threshold."

[2] Acts ii. 38; St. John iii. 5; 1 Cor. xii. 13; Col. ii. 12, 13.

its general and explicit administration, and to plead that in all quarters of the Church it should be clearly defined, exactly prescribed, and that in a form determined by Scriptural precedent—for to those who are confirmed much of its religious value depends on these conditions being satisfied.

At the same time I desire to safeguard myself from seeming to assent to overstatements as to its position in the Church's scheme of ordinance and as to its Spiritual content; and also with regard to the position that administration of the rite is, by Scriptural implication or by universal custom or tradition, either peculiar to the Episcopal office or reserved to it.

It is impossible to enter here on a discussion of all these matters,[1] and I confine myself to a brief statement of historical facts, and of conclusions to which I have been for myself led.

1. There are two instances recorded by St. Luke (Acts viii. 14–17, xix. 1–7) in which Apostles laid hands on the baptized in sequel to Baptism, and they "received the Holy Ghost," or "the Holy Ghost came upon them," with evident manifestation.

2. There are passages of Scripture which may or may not refer to such a laying on of hands (Heb. vi. 1, 2; 1 Tim. v. 22—of which the former is the more important).

3. There is nothing more, Scriptural or Patristic, until about the close of the second century; the accounts of Baptism given by Justin Martyr [2] and by the compiler of the *Didache*,[3] have no

[1] For further, but still very inadequate, examination of some of them, I may be allowed to refer to a contribution to *The Pentecostal Gift* (Maclehose, 1903), pp. 128–139. And see Excursus following.

[2] 1*st Apol.*, lxi.–lxv. [3] Ch. vii.

mention of such a practice. In that given by Tertullian [1] the baptismal washing is immediately followed by anointing with oil, " and in the next place the hand is laid upon us, inviting the Holy Spirit through benediction."

4. In the East generally, the imposition of hands has been disused : anointing is administered by the Presbyter or Bishop who baptizes, as part of the Baptismal Service.

5. In the West, both imposition of hands and anointing continued for at least a time. Later, imposition of hands, except as represented by the extension of hands in benediction over a company, was dropped [2]—but anointing continued ; the administration was more or less strictly reserved to the Bishop ; and it became separated from Baptism and was delayed to years of discretion.

6. At the Western Reformation the rite was maintained by Anglicanism and Lutheranism and by some of the Reformed. In Anglican use reservation to the Bishop was continued ; anointing was given up and the laying on of hands restored : administration was delayed, generally to adolescence and was related to admission to Holy Communion. The Reformed in most quarters substituted examination and some formal admission, with or without public profession and benediction.

[1] *De Bapt.*, vii. viii. This treatise probably belongs to his earlier period.

[2] As to disuse of imposition of hands, see *Responsio* of the Anglican Primates, x., and *Confirmation* (S.P.C.K., 1926) : T. J. Hardy, " The Latin Rite," p. 271. By " a general imposition of hands," this writer seems to refer to the words of the third rubric, as given : " *Then, with his hands extended towards those to be confirmed.*"

7. The Anglican Primates (Benson and Maclagan) in their *Responsio* to Leo XIII.'s condemnation of Anglican Orders say in effect that both the matter and the form of Confirmation are so uncertain that to insist on any one rule would throw all Christian ordinance except Baptism into dubiety.[1]

I do not see how there can be certainty in the matter, but the available evidence leads me for myself to believe (1) that the practice is Apostolic in origin, and further (2) that it has been continuous through the period of which we have least record and has been general from the first; (3) not however as regarded to be an element of Baptism or essential to it; but as its proper sequel and as complementary to it, and incident (in normal usage) to its administration: (4) that the substitution of anointing for the laying on of hands compromises its claim as an *institution*: (5) that in intention it emphasises union with the Body of Christ as involved in union with Christ, and of gift added to grace received in Baptism, being distinctively associated with endowment for service: and (6) that as to administration it has been regarded as separable from Baptism both in time and in respect of the minister of it, and that where so separated would probably

[1] See the English translation, reproduced by Bishop John Wordsworth, 1896: ix. "The matter of Confirmation is not so entirely certain [as that of Baptism or the Eucharist], and we at any rate do not at all think that Christians who have different opinions on the subject should be condemned by one another. The form again of Confirmation is uncertain and quite general; prayer, that is to say, or benediction more or less suitable." x. "If, therefore, the doctrine about a fixed matter and form were to be admitted, the Romans have ministered Confirmation imperfectly for many centuries and the Greeks have none."

be administered by whatever ministry most clearly represented the Church corporate (*i.e.*, who was προεστώς).

To give reasons for these tentative conclusions would require a lecture by itself or more than one. But, apart from questions of Apostolic precedent or possible continuity, such a practice must be looked for and such a rite must in any case have developed—(1) in immediate connection with those adult Baptisms which in mission work predominate and are typical; or, (2) with even more obvious necessity in connection with such Baptisms as those of the Philippian jailer—which were "straightway." In such cases some formal infeftment into the Christian fellowship and its inheritance must have followed and have confirmed in his place the neophyte: Paul himself had needed a Barnabas to guarantee him to the Apostles and Ecclesia.[1] In such cases, the separability from Baptism would at once appear.

This latter is the case most nearly analogous to the circumstances of our own usage. Baptism being administered in infancy, the occasion for the further and related rite becomes urgent—I will even venture to say that it is a plain requirement. I have no question in my mind as to the Baptism of infants; I believe it to be according to the will of our Lord and inherent in the nature of the Church; but the Church in so baptizing undertakes responsibility and becomes chargeable in a sense and to a degree which does not seem to be universally realised or implemented. Baptism as a dedication by parents, as a sentimental formality, Baptism as a social decency,

[1] Acts ix. 26, 27.

a customary propriety, an incident of childhood, a duty, a "family-ordinance," indiscriminate Baptism, is not agreeable to the New Testament presentation of that Sacrament. One may admit frankly that the concession of Baptism to infants creates difficulty in applying to them as baptized all that, for example, St. Paul has to say of the content and effect of the Sacrament; but it is at least less difficult to apply it to a Baptism which in due course is to have its complement in an action wherein the baptized person, now spiritually conscious, volitional, instructed, is again brought face to face with his Baptism, realises its content, hails and embraces the Divine love which in Baptism laid hold on him, knows himself in Christ and casts himself upon His salvation, grappling to the life into which by the grace of God he finds himself included; an action in which he confesses Christ before God and the Church and in face of the world, and offers himself for the Church's recognition as Christ's, declaring that he believes what the Church believes, knows to what the Name of Christ binds him, takes Christ's yoke and burden for his own, and is ready to bear his part in the Church's calling, its labours and joys and sorrows; an action in which the Church, challenging his faith and claiming him for its own by its resolved deed, seals upon him the Divine acceptance and blessing, crowning his Baptism with the invocation upon him of the Holy One Who is not only the worker of life in us, but is also the source of strength and gift. All this is necessarily included with or accompanies adult Baptism. Who could baptize man or woman without calling on the Holy Spirit, not only to quicken together with

Christ, but also to establish in grace and to endue the baptized out of His manifold wealth of gifts? Such prayer and such blessing is the natural and therefore the right sequel and completion of adult Baptism. But Baptism is always Baptism, and its completion should always follow; the baptized child is waiting for that while it grows from unconsciousness to understanding and is taught in faith and godliness and is approaching that crisis of self-determination which is inevitable to the soul, made in God's image and endowed with the heritage of free-will. Such completion is natural, growing out of the Sacrament; and it is that which is natural and spontaneous, not the arbitrary or fanciful, which the Church has to crystalise in ordinance and to formulate in rite. Even if we regard Confirmation as not of the "two pence," entrusted to be spent, but of the "Whatsoever more thou spendest"—yet, that too, "When I come again I will repay thee." [1]

And being so related to a Sacrament, which as such is necessarily clothed in symbol, the sequel and seal of it should be by express sign: rite should complete rite. The Benediction which gives, as it were, seizin in the Baptismal inheritance should be as significantly expressed as the Washing which it recalls and seals. The Church can hardly be too careful to make self-explanatory an act which is to revive or even in a measure to create a Baptismal consciousness, and which is to rehearse for the adolescent the Baptismal experience, so far as on its subjective side that is possible—that the rite may, as it were, date itself in the history of that soul and engrave its work

[1] St. Luke x. 35.

upon the heart. And if in such invocation the Church knows (as who will question?) that it asks according to the will of God, it is justified in believing that what it asks is done and that its act is an effective means of grace.

Baptism is radical to the Church's sacramental life—radical at the lowest reckoning to her social and organised existence. But in our practice Baptism easily falls into the background of her actual self-realisation. St. Paul's appeal to Baptism and its inferences will then be to her something that needs explanation — almost apology—and may represent little or nothing of her actual appeal to souls. She may baptize and then drop the subject of Baptism. She may attempt to develop a sacramental consciousness for the first time at the point of approach to the Holy Table; and in doing so will introduce a confusion to trouble the mind of her baptized children and to beset herself in all her way with them. It is no answer to them or to her own conscience to say that Baptism as set forth in Scripture is invariably the Baptism of adults—that is by no means certain, and if it were, the plea as used would be perilously near to being an argument for restriction of Baptism to adults. If to baptize infants is to reduce it in their case from being an effective sacrament of the Gospel to be a sentimental custom, a domestic solemnity, we had better take heed to our ways. We can baptize our children only in the faith that what they receive is Baptism *sans phrase*. Nor can the Church with relief to herself fix responsibility in the matter upon parents or other sponsors: she is herself the mother of us all, and it is she who, in virtue of her own action, is herself the eventual

sponsor. It is her ethical justification and her spiritual comfort in so baptizing that she should devote herself actively to a sponsor's duties, and do not rest until she has guided her child to know himself in Christ and has sacramentally completed what she has sacramentally begun. It is for her to see that, not her teaching only, but also her pastoral actings correspond to the facts and meet all the needs of the developing soul for the perfecting in grace, and to see that in her co-operating ordinance also the soul should find such provision; and that the Giver of all gift may find in it the occasion for the exercise of His bounty.

Baptism can be but once in any lifetime and in the common case it lies in a past of which we have no consciousness—but (as Dr. Forsyth has reminded us [1]) so does the Cross; and the Cross is the power of God to every one who believes. But to be salvation the Cross, as Dr. Forsyth also says, must be remembered and taken home—it must be to faith a continual present, ruling life. Baptism also is "once for all"; yet it is fundamental, and the sense of it is constitutive of the Christian experience as designed for us. In Baptism, as in the Eucharist, there is a timelessness. It also is conversant with the eternal and we move in it, as in a present, continuously. The "Improvement of Baptism" is the business of a lifetime.[2]

It is then for the Church to create and sustain

[1] "If you object that Baptism can mean nothing to the child because he knows nothing of it, must you not object that the Cross means nothing to him because, while he was even without life, Christ died for his ungodliness."—*Op. cit.* p. 162.

[2] Westminster *Larger Catechism*, Ans. 167.

in her baptized children the knowledge of what Christ has done to them.[1] All her relations to them should be rooted in it, all her instruction should start from it, and all her appeal to them, religious and ethical, should like St. Paul's be reasoned from it; the completion of its Baptism should be consistently presented to the child's mind as the objective of its training. The text of its instruction should be the "doctrine of baptisms"—prevenient grace, decision, conversion, the Christian vocation and the endowment for it, the fellowship in the Body of Christ, God's purpose in the Church as Christ's instrument. The whole emphasis of preparation should be laid—not at that point on the Holy Communion and its import—but on Baptism and its call. Let that matter of Baptism be settled, and then "all things are yours,"[2] every right and privilege and duty of those who are in Christ, and therewith that "access to the Holiest."[3]

Confirmation then should be regarded and should be presented to the baptized, not as an independent rite, but (as it historically is) as a part—not of Baptism—but of the Baptismal administration which, as an inference from Infant Baptism, is delayed to years of understanding and responsibility. Such a presentation would secure for it the valuation which is proper to it and the support of the Christian intelligence, to which in this as in all things, the Church should render a reason.

As Confirmation is on the one hand a goal, so on the other hand it is a point of departure. Preparation for that to which it opens the way should

[1] St. John xiii. 12. [2] 1 Cor. iii. 21.
[3] Heb. x. 19 ff.

begin from it. That connotation which interprets it as looking forward to Holy Communion rather than as looking back to Baptism is unprimitive. It is confusing to candidates and distracts their mind from the proper subject of occupation; it encourages the tendency to be busy with self-profession, which needs no encouragement; and it represents Confirmation rather as an act of ours Godwards, than as an act of God us-wards which holds forth, even as Baptism does, the absoluteness of grace and the givenness of salvation. Preparation for it should therefore be dissociated from preparation for Holy Communion, in which we are co-operative with our Lord.[1]

One religious value of a Confirmation explicit and fully administered, is that it affords opportunity for that open confession of Christ before God and man to which the Christian instinct impels, which our Lord requires, and which the Apostle declares to be "unto salvation."[2] If instruction and the preparation of the neophyte have obtained their due result in decision and an embracing of salvation, this instinct becomes a demand which it is perilous to ignore. If the Church does not within its own order satisfy the demand, the opportunity may be sought and afforded elsewhere in another form: it is to this instinct, which may be thought an impulse of the Spirit, that the practice of re-baptism mainly appeals. Where the Church meets the impulse with opportunity, the decision of an hour may the more probably become the decision of a life.

[1] St. Matt. x. 32; St. Luke xii. 8. [2] Rom. x. 9, 10.

Appended Note

Professor T. R. Glover points out that, while in two of his Epistles (to Romans and to Ephesians) St. Paul gives something like a formal account of his teaching, in the former of these he has only one explicit reference to Baptism and none to the Eucharist, while in the latter he refers to neither. This silence, however, does not mean that he disregards the Sacraments or ignores their place in the Christian system; in other writings he makes evident what importance and effect he assigns to Baptism, and in 1 Cor. xi. he reveals his awful sense of the sanctity and of the potentiality of the Eucharist—while St. Luke's narrative makes evident how constantly both Sacraments entered into his practice. In the two Epistles to Rome and Ephesus he is so far silent of them, because in these he is dealing with the exposition of doctrine and not with the institutional. It is not his manner to treat of the embodiment of the faith in worship or ordinance unless where there is something to correct; Christ had sent him to evangelise (1 Cor. i. 17); and, unless in case of need, evangelism occupied him.

There is nothing in 1 Cor. i. 14–17 which minimises Baptism; St. Paul is not there thankful that he had not baptized—he is thankful that, since at Corinth he had not baptized, it could not be said that at Corinth he had thereby put his own name on any. Baptism derives nothing from the personality of its minister—preaching does; Silas or Timothy could baptize as well as Paul, but could not so effectively declare the Gospel—to preach the Gospel was Paul's charisma and mission, and to that he specially devoted himself.

EXCURSUS AS TO CONFIRMATION

I

An interesting and important Volume I of a work entitled *Confirmation: or the Laying on of Hands*[1] has lately appeared—as to which a not unsympathetic reviewer remarks that almost everything that any one wants to know on the subject is contained in it except a clear definition of what Confirmation is; and he adds that this is the crucial difficulty of the subject both theologically and practically.

It would be presumptuous to hazard a definition which the group of scholars issuing the volume named have not attempted—but one may venture as far as to say that any description which is to cover what the word Confirmation is generally taken to cover and to exclude nothing that is meant to be included might have to run in some such way as this: "Confirmation is that which with express sign and with appropriate words may be done by the Church as part of the administration of Baptism or in sequence to that Sacrament, in witness to and in view of the dependence of the baptized upon the Holy Spirit for grace and strength to bring forth the fruit of their union with Christ, and in order to their endowment with spiritual gifts for Christ's Service." This is

[1] *Confirmation: or the Laying on of Hands*, I. (S.P.C.K., 1926).

cumbrous, but it is not easy to see what of its meaning can be omitted.

For the description or definition must be such as to allow the Church to administer the action either by the Bishop, as in the West, or by the Presbyter, if he be the baptizer, as in the East ; it must permit the sign to be imposition of hands, as in primitive and in Anglican use, or to be the extension of hands towards the confirmands, or to be unction ; it must permit that the subject be an infant, or a child of seven, or an adolescent : it must allow the act to be considered as to be immediately associated with Baptism, or as to be separated by years more or fewer :—to be associated in the one case with the attainment of spiritual sensibility and in the other with attainment of personal responsibility ; and it should cover also variety as to the relation to Holy Communion on which much depends, and if possible cover also difference of interpretation (and therefore of intention) as to whether it is primarily a renewal of Baptismal vows or is essentially an invocation of the Holy Spirit—a human act or an appeal to God to act. I am uncertain whether it is proper to speak of Confirmation as a rite, since most theologians (but not the Roman, who regard it as a separate sacrament) incline to think of it as a part of Baptism,[1] or as a complement of Baptism, or (as in a recent statement) as one step in a complex sacrament of " Initiation." [2] But what is common to the act—whatever shape it take, with whatever matter or form or ministrant and for

[1] " The rite is one " : Dr. A. J. Maclean, *Confirmation*, " Up to the Reformation," p. 26.

[2] *Essays, Catholic and Critical*, " Origins of the Sacraments," N. P. Williams, p. 376 (S.P.C.K., 1926).

whatever subject—is in the first place a relation to Baptism, and in the second place a reference to the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity. Even of the latter one cannot say that agreement is quite universal, since in at least one important section of the Church, the Anglican, while the reference to the Holy Spirit is explicit in the prayer which is the "form" of administration, the emphasis in approach to it, and still more in general or popular understanding of it, has been at least as much upon the ratification and renewal of Baptismal obligations and upon future faithfulness to them as upon the need of the baptized to receive by the Holy Spirit grace for grace. Where it follows on Infant Baptism and with delay to years of understanding or of discretion —a delay which in that case is only reasonable— it is desirable to annex to it this further significance and to associate with it as a preliminary requisite such a profession and pledge by the confirmand; but such a preliminary is not historically or in the universal practice thus associated. In itself the act appears as an invocation of the Holy Spirit to establish His work in Baptism, to increase grace according to need, and to include the baptized person in the dividing of His gifts.[1]

That this invocation is an act associated with a rite rather than in itself a separate rite is suggested by the fact that in early practice there seems to have been no separate name for it. As Dr. Maclean tells us,[2] no special name was needed or could be expected so long as it was not separated from the administration of Baptism.[3] In the

[1] 1 Cor. xii. 11. [2] *Op. cit.* p. 26 ff.

[3] Dr. Maclean says (with explanation) from "Immersion," *op. cit.* p. 26; but is the substitution of that term safe?

West a technical word for it appears only in the fifth century: in the East it begins to be spoken of as "the Seal" (σφραγίς)—a term which in earlier use[1] denotes simply Baptism: so I venture with all deference to interpret the references which Dr. Maclean's abundant and exact scholarship most conveniently supplies. This may not amount to much, but it conveys an impression of the light in which the act in question was regarded; as something (unction, in the instances given) which was done in the Baptismal administration rather than as an independent rite. A rite would certainly have had a name.

The history of Confirmation, as continuously traceable to the present, begins with Tertullian (*De Bapt.* vii. viii.), who describes the service as in Western use: on issuing from the font the baptized was "anointed with a blessed unction"; "in the next place the hand is laid on us, invoking and inviting the Holy Spirit through benediction." He derives the practice of unction from the "old discipline" of the Mosaic anointing of

[1] In the *Apost. Const.*, iii. 17, which Reuss assigns to the third century, the seal is apparently signation with the cross, and is placed between the oil which symbolised the Holy Ghost and the ointment which is the confirmation (βεβαίωσις) of the confession; but in iii. 16, Baptism, as distinguished from the following unction, appears to be the Seal. vi. 22 explicitly calls the unction the Seal: Reuss assigns this later section to the fourth century. Even there, "if there be neither oil nor ointment, water is sufficient, etc."—*i.e.* that simple Baptism suffices; the word *baptize* is limited to the washing. Dr. Maclean refers to Cyril, *Cat.* iii. 3, as probably showing that Cyril knew Confirmation as σφραγίς; and that may be implied in his use of σφραγίζειν in connection with it. The phrase is μέλλει τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον σφραγίζειν ὑμέτερας τὰς ψυχάς. *Chrisma* is, of course, merely descriptive; *per benedictionem perficere debebit* scarcely gives *perfectio* as a technical name for Confirmation.

priests, and that of imposition of hands from the action of Jacob in blessing his grandchildren, and he does not allude to the Apostolic precedents in the Book of Acts. Both unction and the laying on of hands continued in the West; but in course of time seem to have been in a manner blended. In Roman practice, the inevitable contact of hand with head in the process of unction has been pointed to as satisfying the definition that it is *per impositionem manuum factam ab Episcopo cum unctione Chrismatis*. The extension of hands towards those to be confirmed, however, probably represents the imposition as originally used, as the prayer accompanying the act suggests,[1] though it is at the anointing that the words *confirmo te* are spoken. In the East the imposition has disappeared entirely—in a general sense it had done so before the fourth century had ended: unction alone is used. The Church of England at the Reformation disused unction and reverted to imposition of hands, no doubt desiring to follow the Apostolic precedent, which in the Alternative Service of the new ("Deposited") Prayer Book is now expressly invoked.

In the West Confirmation, now regarded as a rite by itself, was, by degrees more or less rigidly reserved to the Bishop as its "ordinary minister"—though exceptions have always been allowed,[2] which could not have been allowed had the power to fulfil the act been regarded as inherent in and peculiar to the Episcopal office. "The exception tests the rule" and shows it to have been and to

[1] *Tunc extensis versus confirmandos manibus dicit: O omnipotens sempiterna Deus, emitte in eos septiformem Spiritum tuum Sanctum Paraclitum de coelis.*

[2] See Bishop J. Wordsworth, *Ministry of Grace*, pp. 59, 82 n., 90 n.

be one of ecclesiastical order only.[1] Reservation was possible, when the confirmation came to be regarded as separable from Baptism, as a rite in itself, and it was probably insisted on in order to preserve the right of the Bishop in all Baptisms and to maintain his touch with the flock.[2] The separation would no doubt be suggested, as has been said, by the paucity of bishops and by the size of many Western dioceses, but something must also be allowed for the practical temper of the West, which would see in it an opportunity for the personal acceptance of baptismal obligations, which is expressed in Roman and Anglican rubrics. The idea that the reservation is to Bishops as Apostles,[3] and because in the Scriptural

[1] See the anon. *De Rebaptismate*, 10. The writer assumes that Baptisms are by bishops, discusses the position of persons baptized by bishops of evil life or heretical opinions, and takes Baptism "by an inferior cleric" to be the exception, "by the necessity of the case." In Milan in the fourth century bishops were the sole ministers of Baptism; see Bishop J. Wordsworth, *Episcopate of Charles Wordsworth*, p. 61 and note. But such reservation of Baptism as well as of confirmation was not general, or was not maintained.

[2] Jerome puts it rather differently: "Nevertheless in many places we find that to have been done rather for the honour of the Episcopate (*sacerdotii*) than for a law of necessity."—*Dialog. adv. Lucif.*, ch. ix.

[3] There are passages in Cyprian which might seem to suggest this identification: *Ep. ad Lapsos*, "The Church is founded on Bishops"; *ad Rogantianum*, iii. (Oxford edition), "The Lord chose Apostles, that is Bishops and overseers"; and of course the *De Unitate* in so far as he reasons from the unity of the Apostolate to the unity of the Episcopate. But I do not perceive that he implies more than analogies, in respect that the Apostles were in their time the representative ministry and centre of authority, as was in Cyprian's time the Episcopate. As the Apostles claimed obedience, so might the Bishops. The idea does not exist in the mind of Ignatius: if it had, he could not have failed to adduce it in support of his commendation of the Episcopal office. The Bishop in his conception presides in the like-

precedents only Apostles are mentioned as laying on hands to confer the Holy Spirit, cannot, in light of Eastern practice and of Western exceptions, be maintained. In the East the minister of the Washing is also the minister of the Anointing: not the less so that he anoints with chrism which has been Episcopally consecrated. The requirement that chrism should be so consecrated preserves the dependence of the parochus upon his diocesan; it is an intervention which maintains a link between the Bishop and his clergy and the faithful [1]; but it is not administration of the rite by the Bishop, and it should not be seriously instanced as reconciling Eastern practice with the Western doctrine that only Episcopal Confirmation is Confirmation.[2]

Evidence as to the ecclesiastical practice begins then about the end of the second century. The sub-Apostolic writers—always witnesses of first importance—are silent on the matter. Between

ness of God (*εἰς τύπον Θεοῦ*), and the analogue of the council of the Apostles is found in the Presbyters (*Ad. Magn.* vi.). Nor is it discoverable in Clemens Romanus: *ἐλογίμοι ἄνδρες* are not the equivalent of Apostles. The *δεδοκιμασμένοι* succeeded to their *λειτουργία* (*Ad Corinth.* xlii. xliv.); it is not said, to their office: if that could have been said, it would have come into the argument with some cogency. The Apostle of the *Didache*, whatever he was, certainly is not the same with its Bishops (ch. xv.). The identification does not then seem to be derivable from primitive tradition. It is not easily reconciliable with the Roman doctrine of the *duplex sacerdotium, simplex et majus*.

[1] See *Confirmation*, "Sacrament of Chrism in Eastern Orthodox Church," p. 282 (Mr. R. M. French): "The prerogative [of consecrating the chrism] is regarded as a symbol of the primatial dignity of the patriarchal throne of Constantinople."

[2] I should rather say Anglican doctrine: Rome confines itself to the statement that the bishop alone is "the ordinary minister" of Confirmation; and Thomas Aquinas is content to show *ab Episcopo conferri . . . debere*, *S.T.*, III. lxxii. 11.

St. Luke and Tertullian there is a gap in testimony of at least four generations, say one hundred and twenty to one hundred and thirty years. For this interval we have two accounts of Baptism, dating from the first half of the second century, viz. in the *Didache* and in Justin Martyr, neither of which alludes to any such sequel or accompaniment to Baptism or intermediate step between the font and the Holy Table. It does not follow that there was no connection between the Apostolic laying on of hands, of which we have two instances, and the later practice described by Tertullian. Not much can be attributed to the silence of Justin; he wrote to sketch the Christian position and practice, as these might interest or satisfy his Emperor—and a benediction or an invocation of the Holy Spirit would do neither. It is less easy to explain away the silence of the *Didache*, especially on any theory which assigns the function of laying on of hands specifically to Apostles; for the *Didache* represents Apostles as still circulating in the Church and aims to exalt them. What the silence of these authorities does go to show is that the laying on of hands, if continuously practised, was not felt by them to be of such importance that it need be referred to.

After all is said of tradition and Church practice, it is to Holy Scripture that, in a matter so grave as Confirmation is made in some accounts of it to be, we must go for authority; it is a sound canon that what is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an article of the Faith; and that on which reception of the Holy Spirit is said to depend is certainly made an article of the Faith.

There are two recorded instances in which in sequel to Baptism there was imposition of hands which was followed by illapse of Holy Spirit, manifested by gifts thereby conferred.[1] Taken by themselves these instances are too few to convey with any certainty that all baptisms were so supplemented and to the same effect. Taken with other considerations, there is some reason to think that Baptism had normally, when practicable, a corresponding sequel, reminiscent of Apostolic precedent and intention; I do not see that with safety more can be said. In both of these Scriptural instances the laying on of hands was by Apostles; but again the induction is too narrow to justify the conclusion, either that only Apostles laid hands on the baptized or that only Apostles could to that effect do so or that Apostles laid hands on all baptized—the last of these suppositions being especially difficult. Dr. Gore[2] says that Acts assures us that they did, but the passages cited by him hardly seem to afford such assurance.

There are besides two passages in the Epistles, Heb. vi. 1–2, and 1 Tim. v. 22, which may refer to this imposition of hands: or on the other hand to some other use of that symbol. The former of these passages counts over certain alphabetic matters of belief, and phrases are piled upon one another to characterise them (the section runs from v. 11)—rudiments, *στοιχεῖα*, *principia*—the word of the beginning of Christ—the foundation —milk as for babes. It is not the importance of these articles on which stress is laid, but on their initial character; foundational in the sense that to lay a foundation is the beginning of to build,

[1] Acts viii. 14–17; xix. 1–6.
[2] *Church and Ministry*, p. 235 (5th edition).

not, I think, in the sense of *essential* which the word "fundamental" carries to our ears. From v. 12, τοῦ διδάσκειν ὑμᾶς, the thought seems to be of oral teaching delivered to fresh converts; and these are instances of its necessary topics, "characteristic subjects of teaching" as Westcott says—the last four articles named giving "typical representations of outward ordinances and specific beliefs," but certainly not exhaustive of either. The point of the enumeration is not to enumerate the necessary, but to instance examples of the primary. Those instanced are repentance, faith, the doctrine of baptisms, the laying on of hands, and eternal judgment. I should willingly be persuaded that the laying on of hands intended is in sequence to baptism—to be sure of that would be to have a number of questions decided. On the other hand it seems to me somewhat more probable, though far from certain, that the reference is to ordination—more likely that the writer should name as typical a distinctly different ordinance than that he should double his reference to the baptismal. Or it might with perfect relevance refer to the reconciliation of penitents—though for this writer that interpretation is probably excluded by what he says, x. 26–35. Or it may have the more general reference to Christian employment of the gesture in various benedictions and impartations; Westcott seems to lean to this understanding of the phrase rather than to approve the limitation to Confirmation. That limitation is very generally inferred from an assumed conjunction with mention of Baptism. The conjunction, however, is not with Baptism, but with "the doctrine of *baptisms*," a different matter; the plural

βαπτισμῶν is important and significant; for a doctrine of baptisms we must look to Acts xix. 1–9.[1] The clause ἐπιθέσεως χειρῶν is not more closely connected with the preceding βαπτισμῶν διδαχῆς than with the following ἀναστάσεώς τε νεκρῶν; the copulative is the same in each case and does not group the one pair of clauses more closely than it does the other, but rather marks them as each an independent and parallel member of the series.

The Timothy passage χεῖρας ταχέως μηδενὶ ἐπιτίθει slightly strengthens the likelihood that in Heb. vi. 2, ordination or else reconciliation is meant; for in it the imposition of hands can hardly be baptismal. The exhortation is that whatever imposition is intended by it be given cautiously and with delay—and that could hardly be said of what is supposed to have followed upon Baptism immediately and as matter of course; and it is at least probable that in the two passages phrases so similar denote the same thing.

If all this is accurate, the passages in the Epistles add nothing to the narratives of Acts, or at least nothing certain: we are left with the incidents at Samaria and Ephesus as the only secure ground for inference.

One reason for serious hesitation in accepting the Hebrews passage as intimating a necessary complement of Baptism is that to do so is to rank the imposition of hands among things instituted, not merely *in genere* but *in specie*, determined as to the "matter" if not as to the "form," and would imply the insufficiency or even invalidity of any *completorium* otherwise ministered; for in that case the "first principle" is *this* and not an "extension of hands" towards the subject of the

[1] See *ante*, p. 162 f.

action, and certainly is not unction. One cannot say that the laying on of hands in Heb. vi. 2 is baptismal and that therefore the supplementing of Baptism by it is a first principle of the Gospel—but that it need not *be* laying on of hands—that something else, for example anointing, if done with the same intention, may be done instead and will do as well.[1] If the implication of the title of the volume referred to is accepted and if Heb. vi. 2 refers to the sequel to Baptism, grave conclusions follow : what these are, the Anglican Primates in their *Responsio* to Leo XIII. very plainly and, one may think, irrefutably, state : the Romans have in that case, to say the least, "ministered Confirmation imperfectly for many centuries, and the Greeks have none." One shrinks from what would shut us up to that conclusion, or compel us to look for Christians who have the indwelling Spirit of Christ among those only, relatively few, who have received Confirmation in the form supposed to be indicated for it by the author to the Hebrews.

The assumption that only Apostles laid hands on the baptized is almost as difficult as it would be to suppose that only Apostles administered Baptism. Twelve men could not be everywhere. To take St. Paul's own case—he was baptized at Damascus ; he met no Apostle for three years ; was he for these years without the full grace of the Spirit ? Ananias imposed hands on him, but before Baptism and for a physical reason—that of

[1] The full title of the work referred to in the first paragraph of this note, *Confirmation : or the Laying on of Hands*, seems to be definite as to what Confirmation in its outward act is, and to make it difficult to maintain much which the book otherwise contains.

his blindness. If there had been a second imposition the proportion of narrative, not to say its doctrinal importance, would have required its mention. If Ananias, "a certain disciple," did "confirm" him, the act of confirming was not confined to Apostles. Again there is the case of the Ethiopian who was baptized by Philip, who was not an Apostle. He went his way rejoicing to regions where he would find no Apostle: either he went without the Spirit, or he received the gift by the hands of Philip, or Baptism by itself can suffice to bestow the Spirit. "Unknown facts"[1] might explain these difficulties; but facts to explain them are not known, and they remain difficulties. But they are more—they are examples of a treatment of the subject in the Holy Scriptures generally, which conveys the impression that the "sequel of Baptism" has not the definitive importance sometimes attributed to it, and that it is not a first principle of Christianity or a necessity of grace.

The assumption that the term "Baptism" in Scriptural or primitive use includes the laying on of hands and is so to be understood when Baptism is named, cannot be supported, and to assume it in order to show that laying on of hands is necessary to a complete Baptism is to reason in a circle. St. Paul's language in 1 Cor. i. 14–17 is conclusively inconsistent with the assumption, so far as his vocabulary is concerned—and if it does not hold for St. Paul, it does not hold for the citations which are really important. Presumably he laid hands on many at Corinth, but we have his

[1] *Confirmation*, Dr. Lowther Clarke, "The New Testament," p. 24.

testimony that he did not " baptize " there. Or, to take a single example from later usage, Firmilian (*ad Cyprianum*, 7) speaks of " the power both of baptizing and of laying on hands " :—to baptize is one thing, to lay on hands another. No doubt, if laying on of hands or unction normally followed the administration of Baptism as a significant incident in the service, it would as such be present to the mind of one who spoke or wrote of Baptism : speaking of the rite as administered, this part of the rite would be taken for granted and not particularised—and this, as Professor Lowther Clark says, frequently. That is true ; but such a usage of speech would not imply a dogmatic valuation.

Professor K. D. Mackenzie[1] gives an admirably clear analysis of views as to the work of the Holy Spirit in Baptism and subsequently in Confirmation ;—according to him there are two main views of the effect of Baptism. On the one hand, " it may be believed that in Baptism not only is the soul forgiven, regenerated, and united to the Body of Christ by the action of the Holy Spirit, but also that it is actually and personally indwelt by the same Holy Spirit." On the other hand it may be believed that the effect of Baptism is that, while it " bestows regeneration and forgiveness of sins, joins us to the Body of Christ and gives us a share of His Divine and Human Natures, all these gifts are to be thought of as actions from without, His personal indwelling being reserved for the moment of Confirmation." Of these two views the former in one modification or another has been commonly

[1] *Confirmation*, " Relation of Confirmation to Baptism," p. 285 f.

held by Anglican Sacramentalists, by the Tractarians, seems to be implied by Eastern Service Books, and is the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas and of the Council of Trent :—a very considerable consensus, approaching to *ubique*, if not absolutely *ab omnibus*. The other view has been, it is said, represented " in modern times " principally by two theologians, both justly venerated—Dr. A. J. Mason, and Fr. Puller ; but it has also the very important adhesion of Bishop Gore,[1] of Dr. A. C.A. Hall[2] (less confidently), of Dr. F. J. Hall,[3] and I think of Mr. N. P. Williams.[4] This is weighty support—but the weight seems to be rather in the supporters than in the argument or in the evidence adduced. And for the older and more Catholic view there are the estimates reached, for example, by Dr. Darwell Stone,[5] Prof. K. D. Mackenzie,[6] and Dr. H. M. Relton.[7]

The citations for the more novel view are mainly patristic, and if patristic citations could by themselves establish it, a case is made out which would call for very careful examination.[8] But it will be

[1] e.g. *Church and Ministry*, 5th ed., pp. 236 n. 2, 243.

[2] *Confirmation*, p. 87.

[3] *Church and Sacramental System*, p. 304. Professor Hall refers to Thomas Aquinas, but I do not think finds support from him ; according to him it is *sacramentum quo homo quasi quamdam spiritualis vitae aetatem perfectam et robur suscipit*, *S.T.*, III. lxxii. 1.

[4] *Essays, Catholic and Critical*, " Origins of the Sacraments," *e.g.* p. 411.

[5] *Holy Baptism*, p. 77.

[6] *Confirmation*, " Relation of Confirmation to Baptism," p. 293 f. Prof. Mackenzie's " Conclusions " in *Confirmation*, pp. 292–4, are not to be easily set aside.

[7] *Ibid.*, " Theological Implications " : I think that I am right in so understanding him.

[8] And if it were made, patristic citations of a different implication might be discovered—as, *e.g.*, Cyril Jerus., *Cat. Myst.* iii. seems to regard the Washing as the Seal of the

admitted that the Scriptural is of dominant importance; and if a view cannot be supported from it or is inconsistent with it, that view must fail to be approved. I do not find much citation from Scripture in what Dr. Mason or Fr. Puller write on this subject, and those passages which are adduced do not seem to be convincing, unless interpreted in light of the theory which they are to prove. In the usage of the Apostolic age Baptism is simply baptism in the proper sense of *βαπτισμός*; and where a sequel is described, it is not included in the term Baptism, but is described as a sequel. In Acts viii. 16 the one term certainly does not include the other. The Baptist's disciples at Ephesus (Acts xix. 1–7) received Christian Baptism and St. Paul's imposition of hands is separately mentioned. In Heb. vi. 2, if the passage in its mention of that act describes the sequel to Baptism, the two are distinguished, not identified. Where St. Paul speaks of Baptism we may believe that he means by it what St. Luke, his disciple, means by the same word in his narrative. The theory that Baptism does not include the gift of the Spirit of course requires that St. Paul should by "Baptism" mean more than St. Luke means—that he should mean Baptism with the imposition of an Apostle's hands

Spirit: "The Holy Ghost is about to seal your souls. . . . Regard not the Laver as simple water"; and again (xx. 6): "Let no one then suppose that Baptism is merely the grace of the remission of sins or, further, that of adoption, as John's was a baptism conferring only remission of sins: whereas we know full well that, as it purges our sins and *ministers to us the gift of the Holy Ghost*, so also it is the counterpart of the sufferings of Christ." Cyril is here speaking of the Baptismal washing; in the next lecture (xxi.) he deals with Chrism. There may seem to be a discrepancy between xx. 6 and xxi. 5: probably due to the rhetorical form of the latter.

besides. Where is the evidence of that? I can find none, unless that St. Paul certainly regards what he calls "Baptism" as conferring the Spirit. To take that as proof that he must mean to include imposition of hands, because the Spirit is not given except by laying on of hands—the object being to prove that the Spirit is given only by imposition of hands—is obviously to beg the question at issue. St. Paul's usage is demonstrably other — for example, in Col. ii. 12, 13: what he speaks of there is the washing with water—it is the entrance to the laver and the issuing from it: we are not only buried with Christ in Baptism, but *therein* we are risen with Him (iii. 1) and are quickened together with Him—made alive with His life: and this Spiritual resurrection is to result in Heavenly affections and our walking in newness of life (Rom. vi. 4)—we are to think of ourselves as alive unto God. It is in continuance of the argument from baptismal resurrection (of which the symbol is in the Washing, and not in any sequel) that he goes on in Rom. viii. 11, "He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies *by His Spirit that dwelleth in you.*"[1] Such expressions go far beyond the negative side of Christianity, and imply much more than a preparation to receive the Spirit. Tertullian is of another opinion and is followed by other early writers:[2] but the Scrip-

[1] So in Tit. iii. 5, the work of the Spirit in the "laver of regeneration" is *renewing* (ἀνακαινώσεως πνεύματος ἁγίου); a word reminiscent of the resurrection symbolism and of ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς, rather than of the symbolism of benediction or of illapse. To St. Pet. (1 iii. 21) "Baptism" is washing ("the putting away of the filth of the flesh")—it is not the washing and a sequel to washing.

[2] Not by Jerome: "If the Holy Spirit was only obtained

ture cannot be broken, and one would prefer to be with St. Peter and St. Paul and with the Catholic consensus of West and East and (more or less generally) of the Anglican Book of Common Prayer, which Professor K. D. Mackenzie finds on the whole supporting the view that Baptism is the Sacrament of an indwelling Spirit.[1]

It is for consideration that patristic writers are not always dogmatically careful of their expressions —a fact which calls for care in arguing for dogmatic purposes from these expressions. Much of their writing is controversial or hortatory or dehortatory and tends therefore to be rhetorical. In the same way the language of rituals, concentrating for the moment on the act in hand, is apt to insist upon and to exalt that particular act, and cannot always parenthesise in order to observe the proportion of the faith. To accumulate from those sources strong and isolated expressions is therefore perilously easy: and the context of doctrine may be required to interpret or even to temper them.

The use of aorists,[2] where the communication of the Spirit to converts is referred to, no doubt indicates a definite occasion of reception—one remembers that when the R.V. appeared we used to talk of its "baptismal aorist": but is there anything to show that the occasion so denoted is not that of Baptism, but of Confirmation?[3]

by the prayer of the Bishop, those men must be in a deplorable condition that were baptized in villages and castles and remote places by Presbyters and Deacons, and died before the Bishop could come to visit them." *Dial. adv. Lucif.* ix.

[1] *Confirmation,* "Confirmation and Baptism," p. 289 ff.

[2] I think that it reduces the Baptism referred to very nearly to the equivalent of the baptism of John—a baptism of repentance. It is thus in contradiction to St. Paul's teaching, Acts xix. 4.

[3] See Appended Note A.

The communication of the indwelling Spirit of God and of Christ "is the culminating point of redemptive action in the present dispensation." Dr. Gore does not go too far when he calls it the essence of Christianity. To make the doctrine of it depend on a voluminous accumulation of adminicles of probability in the interpretation of possibly allusive citations of Scripture is to ask us to believe the incredible. The elaboration of argument by which it is asserted is its own confutation. Such is not the manner in which the Gospel is declared or its first principles apostolically taught—it is not of the simplicity which is in Christ Jesus.

I venture these remarks in face of an array of scholarship for which I have a deep respect, because I am convinced that ascertainment of a primary requirement of Christianity cannot be dependent on refinements of scholarship; because the hope of anything in the Catholic Church approaching to a consensus of doctrine or practice on the subject of Confirmation seems to be excluded by its inclusion among things which are of "the essence of Christianity"; and especially because, for reasons stated in the fifth lecture of this series I most earnestly desire to see its reception extended, and feel that too high-pitched statements about it and extreme valuations of it are likely to prevent such extension. There are barriers enough without the elaborated erection of yet another. The effect on my own mind is not to establish but to disturb, though not to change, its attitude of reverent regard for the rite.

II

There can be no certainty in the matter; but in the third century the practice seems to exist in the Church with general acceptance. There was precedent for it in Scriptural record. It seems unlikely that in the interval it had been disused. Apart from precedent some such sequel to Baptism is natural—in some circumstances it is inevitable. Tertullian may be the first to mention it, Cyprian the first to connect it with Apostolic example; but I should strongly incline to suppose that the practice had been in some sense and to some degree continuous.

Chiefly for this reason:—St. Luke has purpose in every detail of his story, and one purpose is to indicate origins of Christian practice as Apostolic. To do so was not to confine future practice in every case to Apostles. Ordination is mentioned once (Acts xiv. 23), and not again: it is thus that the Apostolic ministry as known in the Church began, but to ordain was not therefore a function limited to Apostles—it was continued by the Ministry it initiated. Similarly the laying on of hands after Baptism is traced to Apostolic instances (Acts viii. xix): it does not follow that the intention of the writer is to confine this any more than the imposition of hands in ordaining to the personal intervention of Apostles—on the contrary the intention is, I believe, in like manner to warrant a practice which was general. It existed as an ordinary ministration, else St. Luke would not have called attention to its ministration in the first place by Apostles.

While, however, this sequel to Baptism probably existed and was held in perhaps increasing

regard, Baptism itself was regarded as the sufficient sacrament, potentially communicating all grace as well as capacity for "grace for grace," constituting a subject for further operation of the Holy Spirit. If necessary, this opinion could easily be elaborated textually. To hold a different opinion might seem to be to assert a third chief Sacrament, generally necessary, and to confuse the whole sacramental system.

The crucial distinction which I venture to think underlies and explains the relation of the "sequel" (and completorium) to Baptism itself is the distinction, often overlooked, between *grace* and *gift*. Our Lord was from His conception indwelt by the Holy Spirit:—when He came up out of Jordan the Spirit descended and rested upon Him, to bestow, not grace, but endowment. He returned from the wilderness "in the power of the Spirit," and began His ministry and its mighty works. The distinction between grace and gift makes this comprehensible.

There is that in which all Christians are alike: they are alive to God in Christ and "have all things that pertain to life and godliness": of this, which is grace, Baptism is the Sacrament, the Holy Spirit the Agent.

There is also that in which one Christian differs from another—one is Apostle, another prophet, another speaks with tongues, and so on. This is gift, not grace. But gift is also an operation of the Spirit—"the same Spirit." It is likely that every Christian has gift in some form, but no gift is essential, and without any gift a man might be a good Christian. But grace is essential.

Baptism is the Sacrament of grace, as dis-

tinguished from gift; and as grace is not negative only, so neither is Baptism. It affects not the status only, but the self of the subject. It connotes not only remission of guilt but engrafting into Christ, which is more than a negation of evil. It marks the bestowal, not of innocence, but of life with the potentialities of life, of which capacity to receive gift is only one.

We must distinguish fruit of the Spirit[1] from gifts of the Spirit.[2] Fruit arises out of life; gifts are the equipment of life—they are not of the receiver but of the Giver. Grace is indwelling—gift is held and used; it is not of personal character. If any operation of the Spirit is *ab extra*, it would be gift, not grace: Balaam and Saul prophesied. The *fruits* of the Spirit are graces—love, joy, peace, and so on, and are each and all necessary in some measure to the Christian character, and as such are required of each; the *gifts* of the Spirit are (so to speak) detachable from the man: he may have or not have, as is given him. No man is to be blamed because he is not a counsellor or prophet or worker of miracles; but he will be blamed if he is not loving, cheerful, tranquil. The distinction is between what one should be and what one can do.[3]

It is suggested that as Baptism is the Sacrament of new life which simply makes a Christian, so the Laying on of Hands appears to be associated rather with specific and individual endowment—ability which is, if not distinctively, at least eminently, ability for service in the Christian

[1] Gal. v. 22, 23. [2] 1 Cor. xii. 4.

[3] Of the complementary parables of the Virgins and the Talents, the former seems to treat of grace, the latter of gift.

community. St. Paul (1 Cor. xii.) treats of gift in that aspect and estimates it as it subserves edification of the Body of Christ. Grace makes a better man; gift makes a more useful man.[1]

It is fairly evident that the χαρίσματα of which St. Paul speaks[2] are of the same type as those which attended the Apostolic laying on of hands (Acts viii. xix.)—"manifestations of the Spirit" (1 Cor. xii. 7) diversely given "to every man" πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, that is for οἰκοδομή,[3] edification of the Church; they were gifts, not graces. Such endowment may well have been normally sought and given by the same action which Apostles had used.[4] *Normally*—for we must not forget that (Acts x. 44 f.), as *teste* St. Peter, the Spirit may be

[1] *Sic enim exigit militaris ordo, ut cum imperator quemcunque in militum receperit numerum, non solum signet receptum sed etiam armis competentibus instruat pugnaturum: ita in baptizato benedictio illa munitio est: dedisti militem, da ei adjumenta militiae.*—Euseb. Emissenus, *Hom. de Pentecost.* See also the *Orthodox Confession*: χύνουνται ἀπάνω εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ χαρίσματα τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος (Ἐρώτησις ρδ').

[2] Rom. xii. 4–8; 1 Cor. i. 7, vii. 7, xii. 4, 9, 31; 1 Tim. iv. 14; 2 Tim. i. 6.

[3] Cf. 1 Cor. vi. 12, etc.; 2 Cor. xiii. 10, etc.

[4] We could not, however, conclude that the gifts sought or given were always or characteristically such as are mentioned in association with the Apostolic action in the two recorded instances; those selected for mention would naturally be such as would be apparent to the onlooker. In Rom. xii. 6, St. Paul's list of gifts begins with prophecy, but goes on to such things as giving, ruling, showing mercy, and in 1 Cor. vii. 7, the gift is continence. These, no doubt, are graces common to the Christian character. But in individual instances one or another of them may be so exceptionally developed that it is manifest as a specific gift, personal and distinctive. All Christians have faith—but faith may be a personal charisma (1 Cor. xii. 9): it is then the "all faith" of 1 Cor. xiii. 2, which can remove mountains. All Christians have love; but in St. Francis love was above that which is natural—it was his "gift."

given apart from any rite. If we do forget this, we shall be perplexed by some things which are evident in the Christian life around us.

I have said that, apart from precedent, such a practice would be natural, and might well have arisen without institution or precept. I do not assume that there was no precept or that precedent was without influence. But the administration of Baptism can hardly at any time have been limited to the barely valid—its essential action must always have been framed, as that of the Eucharist has been, in accordant devotional setting. No doubt Baptism has always been imbedded in congruous acts of faith, prayer, and benediction. Who now, however undirected by prescribed form, is not impelled and accustomed to follow Baptism with solemn blessing? Who, praying over the newly baptized, must not pray that the same Spirit Who quickens may also endow, to the end that the baptized may be abundant in good works, coming short in no gift? As it is now, so it must from the first have been. And in so solemn and individual application (as in the reconciliation of the penitent) Benediction would naturally receive its full expression in customary symbol, and the hands of blessing be actually laid on the person to be blessed. As the liturgy framed itself upon the lips of celebrants and became stereotyped in act and phrase, so would an order in baptizing. This is natural. To speak of Confirmation as natural is not to disparage it. The Sacramental is always the natural, not the arbitrary.

There is also the case in which Baptism immediately followed Conversion. Such instances may have been frequent in the earlier days—St.

Luke indicates several, that of the Ethiopian, of Lydia, and of the jailer at Philippi—not without intention; St. Luke wastes no words. But in such cases some introduction to the Ecclesia must have followed. Paul (it is possible to imagine) brings with him to that farewell gathering at Philippi (Acts xvi. 40) the last person to be looked for there, the town jailer, an alarming intruder. But Paul says, "I baptized him last night—will you receive him?" and bids him kneel and prays for him and lays on him blessing and leaves him with the brethren. That is how things happen in real life. And such a sequel would in any such case be right; for however personal to its subject, every baptism concerns the Church as well; and the baptized may claim the Church's recognition and blessing and prayers—always, but most certainly when he claims his place in its fellowship and share in its heritage. Then the Church, confessing him for one of her children, must bless him from God and invoke upon him the Holy Spirit to strengthen him for his race and conflict and to equip him for God's service. This, let us remember, is analogous to the common case of one who has been baptized as an infant and later presents himself, or is claimed by the Church, for the fulfilment of his calling.

If we attempt to envisage circumstances in the primitive Church, it may be possible to see how along such lines it would almost inevitably be led to an established practice of following Baptism with an act which, let us again remember, was seen by Tertullian and by the Church of Spain[1] a century later, and still later by Augustine and by

[1] Can. Eliberit. lxxvii.: *per benedictionem perficere.*

Eusebius Emissenus, as a benediction. Among those circumstances the Apostolic precedent would be dominant and the obvious fitness of things would, we may surmise, secure that it should be followed. But the Apostolic action was itself the outcome of the nature and requirement of Baptism as the Sacrament of a new life which has still to be lived; the communication of life does not exhaust the function of the Paraclete—He is also the Giver of gifts. There is place and need for such a supplementary action or rite as may both recognise this and may offer an occasion at which, in response to prayer and invocation, it may please that Holy One to impart His bounty to the individual proposed to Him. Such an action is congruous to the theology of the subject, which should take account of the distinction between the communication of life and the bestowal of specific endowment—the one common to all who are engrafted into Christ, the other personal to the individual, but both effected by the same Spirit. It is the manner of the Church, as has been already said, where it knows that it prays according to the Will of God, to assume that what it does with such prayer is done; and of this prayer over the baptized it has the warrant of Scripture concerning gifts of the Spirit which are divided by Him as He wills, but passing none by.[1] The Church therefore is, I venture to think, within right, even apart from precedent which may well be thought to possess continuity, in formulating the practice, in clothing it in its proper symbolism of express act, and regarding it as an effectual means of grace, a veritable access to the fountain of Divine bounty. With the Apostolic precedents and having regard

[1] 1 Cor. xii. 11.

to St. Luke's apparent intention in recording these, as well as to the fact of age-long tradition and the probability of some continuity from the beginning, the Church has not only the right, but, I submit, the duty to do so. Yet not so as to place the rite on the level of a chief sacrament, or as an *instituted* part of such a sacrament (for if it be so, great and venerable sections of the Church are in a precarious position), nor as if to lack the rite were necessarily to lack the gift.[1] Such a valuation of it seems excluded by the fact of variations in its administration and especially by the changes from imposition of hands to unction, which down to the sixteenth century had become practically universal.

III

Emphasis then must be laid, not on what is local or variable, but upon what is universal and constant. This is (1) the recognition that the grace of Baptism is initial, prevenient to fruition of the possibilities which Baptism constitutes. The baptized are admitted to the communion of the Holy Ghost, but manifestly the office of the Spirit to them does not end there. He is continuously the power of all development and growth in Christ; and especially He is the Giver of equipment for the calling of the Christian. (2) And further it is the benediction or prayer by which the Holy Spirit is invoked upon the baptized person that he may receive grace for grace, and that he may be included in the distribution of the Spirit's gifts. And (3) it is with the use of a symbolic action,

[1] We may speak of "Confirmation by the Laying on of Hands," but to speak of "Confirmation *or* the Laying on of Hands" is hazardous.

making evident the spiritual intention and marking the act—in the sight of God and in the consciousness of the person who is its subject. More than this cannot be said without reflecting on the practice of one or more of the Churches which claim to confirm validly: we cannot specify a particular symbol to be used, or a verbal formula, or a ministry of the rite (by Bishop or by Presbyter), or an age of competence to receive; for as to each of these there is variety, yet what is done in each practice is included in the general usage of speech as "Confirmation." But in primitive or early times the intention was always clear, and referred to the need of the Holy Spirit to carry on the work which in Baptism is begun. This is still evident in the rituals of the Eastern and of the Unreformed West, and in that of the Anglican it is more than suggested in the prayer before administration and in the formula of administration. The intention was to seek and to obtain from God, and therein was congruous with the Baptism on which it followed, for Baptism is wholly the Act of God, and not of the baptized. In this intention the essence of the rite consists: what by prayer and invocation and benediction embodies and certifies the intention is Confirmation. It is best certified by the use of appropriate and significant symbolism in action, and to use such symbolism for that purpose is the practice of the Church throughout long centuries—but since in that there is variety, no one symbol or action can be held to be prescribed. The Eastern practice of administration by the minister of Baptism in immediate sequence to the Sacrament probably in that respect represents the primitively normal, proper in the Baptism of adults, and continued when

infant Baptism became the rule. The East is conservative, mystic, and regards the sacramental from the viewpoint of dramatic significance as well as from that of efficacy. In the West, more utilitarian and more guided by practical sense, the interval between Baptism and Confirmation, due probably in the first place to a growing rigidity of reservation to the Bishop and by the need to attend his convenience, developed into a tarrying for years of responsibility and of exercised reason and conscience; and this in itself suggests the recognition and acceptance of responsibility by the Confirmed. That again at the Reformation developed into the fully stated idea that the rite intends the renewal and confirmation of the obligations accepted for the Baptized by their Sponsors; as for example appears in the preface to the Anglican Order of Confirmation and in the Bishop's question to the confirmands. The age for confirming was accordingly raised from years of responsibility to years of self-determination, and the rule that Confirmation should precede admission to the Holy Communion was appended. To the Western mind generally the delaying of Confirmation seems the proper inference from infant Baptism; and as between the ages of responsibility (in Roman use not earlier than seven years) and of self-determination or adolescence, as in Reformed practice, there are obvious reasons of circumstance and nature for preferring the latter. As among the various practices which exist, the Anglican is to be commended for this and for its use of the Scriptural symbol of the imposition of hands. That the ministrant should be of that office in the ministry which most evidently represents

the Church corporate is also fitting. The rule that Confirmation must precede Communion is as a domestic rule obviously within the Church's discretion, but in light of the practice of the Unreformed West cannot be called Catholic. The rubrics which require presentation to the Bishop for Confirmation would, if exactly construed, exclude from Communion the Orientals.

The subject is so complicated by historical interferences with doctrinal valuations that I find it most difficult to express a view of Confirmation as second only to Ordination in its approximation to the fully sacramental character, which shall not be less than just to the Oriental administration or to the practice of various Reformed and of various Protestant Communions. But even if Confirmation be thought to be only an ecclesiastical provision (I myself count it for more), it has the presumption that it originates in Apostolic example. It has possibly and even probably subsisted in the Church from the beginning. It embodies in rite what we are assured of as to the Spirit's operation to strengthen according to need and to endow according to vocation. It is so apt to the doctrine of Baptism, to the doctrine of the Spirit's bestowal first of grace and then of gift, and to the course of human development and experience, that in some form it must in natural course have developed, had nothing in Apostolic activity suggested it. Its intention is so agreeable to promise and to such statements as those of St. Paul as to the Spirit's distribution of charismata and as to grace according to need, that in following it the Church is warranted in counting upon the Spirit's response to its appeal, and in

holding it forth to her children as a veritable means of grace.

But further—the practice of Infant Baptism demands such a complement, formal, unmistakable, significant (one had almost said) as Baptism itself. Dr. Major [1] may go too far in saying that it is " the justification and the only justification of Infant Baptism " ; but it would not, I think, be too much to say that any part of the Church which, baptizing in infancy, disuses this rite, requires in so doing a justification which it will not be easy to find, and accepts a responsibility which might very well be felt intolerable. At the same time it is to be recognised that God is not tied to His own ordinance, and still less is to be measured or confined in His gracious destinations, by the Church's promptness in stewardship or by its wisdom in adaptation to opportunity. The soul taught of God knows its own needs and the source of its supply, and for itself, whether such help as Confirmation gives be provided or not, will turn to God in crisis, and will ask, and will receive. Quickened with Christ in Baptism it has capacity to receive both further grace and also gift. One cannot think that in such case the Holy Spirit should be withheld because the Church has in so far failed of adequate pastorate. That is not to say that the Church's ministration in the matter is superfluous, any more than it would be to say that, because in want of access to the Eucharist spiritual Communion is possible, the Eucharist is therefore superfluous. If the Church door is locked a man can pray at the door, but the door should not be locked. A lad who is, for example, being prepared for his first Com-

[1] *Modern Churchman*, September 1925, p. 418.

munion may realise the gravity of the moment, the peril of his conflict, his need of invigoration and of capacity for adult service. He may seek from God, and he may obtain, both blessing and increase of grace and fresh endowment. Or he may not. It is for the Church to do what can be done to ensure that he does so realise the promise of the Father and does so seek and does receive. The utmost is not done unless the Spiritual transaction is represented to him in sacramental symbol—unless the moment and the occasion are offered to the Holy Spirit for giving and to the human soul for receiving.

Appended Note A

One finds oneself at every point of the argument for the view which Professor Mackenzie calls "the other possible view,"[1] questioning, doubting, dissatisfied with the interpretation given to texts and with the inferences from them. One feels oneself to be in contact with something novel in doctrine and un-Catholic—with a treatment strained and excessive and with a conclusion which conflicts with the manifest fact as exhibited by Christian history and Christian biography and by Christian life as we see it round us. The advocacy of this view is often too eager and so fails to convince. It proves too much. It is too confident in a very difficult matter, and is apt to have an effect on the mind opposite to that which it seeks to produce. The impression given is rather that of a resolved thesis which has to be demonstrated, than of a conclusion reached by the impartial weighing of evidence. There are

[1] *Confirmation*, p. 285.

too many slender links in the argument such as "presumably," "possibly," "probably," "no doubt," "we may surmise," "we may suppose," "may well have meant," we are "justified" in this or that; too much appeal to what is "likely," too frequent reasoning from an "if." It is difficult in treating of such a subject to avoid such phrases entirely; but the seldomer they have to be employed, the more nearly is a writer entitled to conclude with "it has been shown." The challenge to prove a negative,[1] especially in the absence of any possible evidence, is to be used with caution. If any one chooses to believe that Confirmation was formally ministered on Pentecost to the three thousand baptized on that day, he may without blame do so. It may have been as he thinks, and no evidence to the contrary is likely at this date to appear; if it was so, some record of the fact might have been expected—that is all that can be said one way or the other.

In Mr. N. P. Williams' contribution to *Essays, Catholic and Critical* ("The Origins of the Sacraments"), the eagerness and confidence which elsewhere weaken the presentation of the more novel view of Confirmation, develop in a somewhat startling way and add novelty to novelty. The "Washing of Regeneration," which has hitherto been esteemed one of the two great Sacraments, now appears as a stage in a complex rite of Initiation, the other two members of the rite being Penance and Imposition of Hands. There is no mention of unction—it is doubtless excluded by a theory which ranks Confirmation with the βαπτισμός and makes it an essential part of initiation into Christianity; and that is one of the difficulties of

[1] *Confirmation*, "Laying on of Hands in the N.T.," p. 22.

Mr. Williams' theory—for the consequences of excluding Confirmation by unction are, as has been said, extensive and perplexing. If, on the other hand, Confirmation by unction is admitted, the Scriptural difficulties of the theory become overwhelming; there is meagre ground for supposing that in this relation Scripture knows anything of unction as a material symbol.[1] The claim that the Apostolic initiation includes Confirmation as part of one triple Sacrament limits it to administration by the symbol which is known to Scripture.

But, further, it requires that *μετάνοια* (repentance) be understood as a rite, subordinate to, but balancing the Washing and the Laying on of Hands—it becomes Penance, understood as confession (of sin—not of Christ). It is not said to include judicial absolution as well, but confession alone without a view to absolution is scarcely what is meant by Penance in the technical sense, which is expressly the sense here; for Sacramental Confession as now used is, it is said, this initiary *μετάνοια*, *penitentia*, "penance," transferred to deal with post-bap-

[1] There are passages, 2 Cor. i. 21 and 1 St. John ii. 20, 27, which speak of an unction. Dr. A. J. Maclean says that they "may be figurative only," and I venture to think that they are. The *χρίσας* of the former of these is parallel with the previous *βεβαιῶν*, which, being an emphatic present, cannot refer to Baptism; and this makes a literal or ritual allusion in *χρίσας* the more improbable. The *χρίσμα* of the Johannine text is not *τοῦ Ἁγίου*, but *ἀπὸ τ. ἁγ., ἀπ' αὐτοῦ*, and is not of a particular occasion, but abiding (*μένει*) and continuous in action (*διδάσκει*). The *μένει* here is reminiscent of *ἵνα μένῃ* (St. John xiv. 16) and is *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*. The *Orthodox Confession* instances the Corinthian text, but claims only that the use of Chrism instead of imposition of hands is agreeable (*συμφωνᾷ*) with it. Rome makes no apology (Can. Trid., Saec. Sept., *De Comp.* ii.).

tismal sin. In Roman theology the Sacrament is one *quo infunditur absolutio a peccatis*—contrition, confession, and the purpose of making satisfaction, being its conditions.[1] Mr. Williams does not supply any instance in which μετάνοια appears as a ritual act or as equivalent to confession of sin, unless Matt. iii. 6 (Mark i. 5), which states that those who received John's baptism did so "confessing their sins." Evidently to come to a baptism of repentance is itself a confession of sins—the baptism of John was distinctively ethical and the fruits expected from it were those of practical reformation.[2] To seek Christian Baptism involves no less a confession of sin. Repentance is its necessary preliminary; but it is not a ritual act nor part of a rite. The word μετάνοια is not known to be capable of that meaning—it describes "an experience, not an act"[3]—in the Old Testament, a change of mind, but in the New Testament, a change of will and of the heart—a grace given by the Ascended Lord: "a saving grace whereby a sinner out of a true sense of his sin and apprehension of the mercy of God in Christ doth with grief and hatred of his sin turn from it to God with full purpose of and endeavour after new obedience." This is more than confession with a view to forgiveness—it is "unto life."[4] If we are to go upon preliminaries to Baptism, it is not easy to see why κήρυγμα is not also to be reckoned a fourth step in the "scheme" which is said to run through all the New Testament allusions to

[1] *Catechismus ad ordinandos*, II. iv. De sacramento penitentiae.

[2] St. Luke iii. 10–14.

[3] W. Morgan, *H.D.B.*, "Repentance."

[4] Acts xi. 18.

the subject: "How shall they believe unless they have heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher?" The sacramental character of preaching is more obvious than that of repentance.

It is admittedly no ground of criticism that in the New Testament *μετάνοια* generally imports an interior state—not Baptism or part of it, but the motive impelling to seek Baptism and qualifying for it; since a word may have a technical as well as a customary sense. But it would be desirable that some instances from Scripture or from primitive writers should illustrate the statement that it has a technical sense as part of a rite.[1] There is at least one such passage (Herm., *Mand.* IV. iii. 1, 2; *ἑτέρα μετάνοια οὐκ ἔστιν εἰ μὴ ἐκείνη ὅτι εἰς ὕδωρ κατέβεβηκεν*) which might be cited, but it does not suggest a ritual act any more than Heb. vi. 4–6, on which it is based. The equation, *μετάνοια* = *penitentia* = "penance" (sacramentally understood and capable of being related with Sacramental Confession as now ministered), is not demonstrated. Mr. Williams may be thought to give us, not so much a theory as a point of view—for he has no new facts, but only a new way of describing facts already common property—namely, that Baptism was given on profession of repentance and was, at least from the second century, normally followed by imposition of hands or by unction or by both. The only possible reasons why his classification need be deprecated would be that it involves an arbitrary and unverified application of the important and well-

[1] I can find no reference to a technical sense for it in Moulton and Milligan, or in Grimm, or in any of the usual manuals.

understood word *μετάνοια*, and that it carries still further the depreciation of Baptism as Catholic theology has known it, so that Baptism becomes one of three elements in a rite, instead of one of the two grouped together by some other writers. Both treatments, that of, for example, Dr. Mason and that of Mr. Williams, are too subjective to admit of the probability of either of them winning general acceptance.

Appended Note B

Is Confirmation sufficiently administered in the usage of the Reformed Churches? While a full form with imposition of hands has in some regions survived, the more general practice is that of examination followed by admission to Holy Communion. This could not satisfy any definition such as has been attempted above (p. 186 f.) it is a judicial act of authority, not a ministration, nor meant to be in itself a means of grace. In the Church of Scotland I do not think that *law* requires more. But the usage is more; it is very general to follow examination and approval by public interrogatory, confession of faith, renewal of baptismal obligations, prayer for the Holy Spirit, and solemn benediction—*manibus extensis versus eos*; in some parishes, with actual imposition of hands. Where this is done, I believe that it can be maintained to be Confirmation which ought not to be iterated. As regards the Ministry (in which it agrees with the East) and in the action or matter (in which, except for unction, which is an addition or else a substitution, it substantially agrees with the Roman). But this is not universally done, nor is it, where done, ade-

quately prescribed or regulated,[1] and it is, I think, defective in intention, agreeing in that rather with the Anglican Preface than with early teaching on the subject. Stress is on Confirmation of vows rather than on Confirmation of the soul, and on good intention in the confirmand rather than on invocation of the Holy Spirit.

There are, that is to say, defects in the administration, but such as, when they occur elsewhere, seem to be found compatible with acknowledgment of validity. The fully satisfactory order for Confirmation, in which every desideratum is supplied, is not found in use anywhere. In the future this may make the adoption of an identical rite over Christendom the easier.

How is it that a practice (if one may not assume that it is an ordinance) primitive, Scripturally suggested, in one form or another universally recognised for at least thirteen centuries, rationally demanded, practically of intense value, retained by Anglicanism and Lutheranism, came to be disused by most of the Reformed and in particular by the Church of Scotland which certainly aimed to conserve the really Catholic? Was it that the rite had become overlaid with obscuring ceremonial—that the imposition of hands with

[1] I say "adequately," for there is authorisation. The latest Manual issued "By Authority of the General Assembly" (*Prayers for Divine Service*, Blackwood's, 1923) contains a "Form and Order for the Confirmation of Baptismal Vows and Admission to the Lord's Supper." It lacks any rubric as to *manibus extensis*, but I think corresponds generally to the above statement of what it has and has not.

[2] Calvin approved it, though his interpretation of it was narrowed by his general position: "We should like to see that rite everywhere restored by which the young are presented to God after giving forth a confession of their Faith."—*Tracts*, vol. iii.

its Scriptural background had given place to chrism, which has in such a relation no New Testament exemplar, so that its doctrinal import and its primitive authority were not recognised, and that it was therefore allowed to lapse along with other benedictions and unctions which were thought superstitious? Was it that the reservation to the Bishop, being held for matter of course (the Western Reformers probably knew little of Eastern practice), led to its passing with diocesan Episcopacy? Or was it let go under Knox's influence and to propitiate his dislike for symbolism generally—the Sacraments of Baptism and of the Lord's Supper excepted? Or was it more probably from a combination of these causes? In any case the loss was incurred, and thereby the Church of Scotland set for herself a problem in her relations to youth which is still unsolved, but which—if one may interpret the indications—is ready for solution.

SEVENTH LECTURE

The Holy Communion: (1) The Consecration

It is impossible to hope that in a single lecture one can even refer to all the religious values of the central sacrament of the Christian life, the comprehensive sacrament of all the way of God with His redeemed and of all their experience under His dispensation of grace. I select two values of which to speak, which correspond to the two great stages of the rite which we call respectively the Consecration and the Communion; namely, the showing of Christ's death and the receiving of His nourishing Gifts: that in which we approach God and that in which God responds to our approach: that in which Christ our High Priest goes before us and we follow, co-operating in His action, and that in which Christ turns to us and gives to us from God:—two movements in which Christ's double mediation, for man to God and for God to man, is completely expressed. As to the first of these I desire to suggest the evangelic value of the Sacrament in witnessing to and safeguarding the faith of Christ as having by the sacrifice in death taken away sin, to the Atonement as the basis of fellowship with God, and to the "living sacrifice" of the worshipper as the method of such fellowship. As to the second, it will be necessary to consider the content of Gifts which are given as nourishment, since on the

receiver's consciousness of that will, at least in great part, depend, not necessarily his reception of what God wills to give him, but the degree and quality of his spiritual re-action to it.

I

In more than one of his sermons Eugéne Bersier has dwelt on the universality of sacrifice as a chief element in human worship, and on the depth of the instinct impelling to it. "Everywhere [he says] beside the Sanctuary you find the Altar. . . . And what is the Altar if it be not the place of sacrifice? Sacrifice—behold the centre of all serious religion" [1]; and again, that the human conscience has so well understood its debt to God that "it has always put sacrifice at the centre of all religions." [2] We must expect that the final and summary religion which fulfils all true instinct and answers all spiritual need should embrace this element in its cultual provision. What then we must therefore seek, we find in the Institution of the Eucharist.

One may take it, I think, that the "simple memorial meal" idea of the rite is abandoned. Nothing could well be less simple than present treatments of the questions of its significance and effect; it is their variety, complexity, and philosophic difficulty which, in the interest of ordinary religion and of the average Christian, call for simplification by concentrating on the agreed, and (if one may use such a phrase) upon the obvious. Among things agreed and obvious one may begin to recognise the sacrificial aspect of

[1] *Sermons*, vol. i. p. 42. Paris, 1879.
[2] *Ibid.* vol. v. p. 201.

the Eucharist. Catholic theology has, of course, always done so. Reformed standards, as exemplified by that which is most conveniently quotable—those of Westminster—see in it "a commemoration of that one offering up of Himself [Christ], by Himself," and also "a spiritual oblation of all possible praise unto God for the same."[1] The Anglican Article (XXXI.) repudiates "sacrifices of Masses," and that especially in one relation, and elsewhere in the Book of Common Prayer the purpose of "remembrance" is emphasised: but the Communion Service explicitly commemorates Christ's "full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice" upon the Cross, and speaks of the action as "a perpetual memory [memorial] of that His precious death," and its Post-Communion Prayer contains an elaborately full act of self-offering in unity with the self-offering of Christ; and this general teaching has been and is sufficiently extended by at least one school of Anglicanism.

Criticism has fully established the Sacramentalism of St. Paul's teaching, as well as of St. Peter and St. John; and the sacrificial element in that of St. Paul and of the author of Hebrews can hardly be questioned. The Modernist account of the Eucharist turns on a supposed development of ideas borrowed from Mystery cults in which a "religious meal" followed and depended on sacrifice—an account which, if the Eucharist be not admittedly sacrificial, would be irrelevant. Dean Inge finds the idea of sacrifice attach primitively to the Elements unconsecrated as representing the fruits of the Earth,[2] but seems

[1] Westminster *Confession of Faith*, xxix. 2. [And compare Lausanne Conference, *Report on Sacraments*, par. 7.]

[2] *Cont. Ver.*, p. 286 f. See Appended Note A.

to approve what he considers a later extension of that conception to the whole service, culminating in the self-consecration of the faithful as spiritual sacrifice. At a later point he says that "for us the Holy Communion is a sacrifice—that of ourselves . . .; it is a commemoration of a sacrifice—that of Christ on the Cross: it is also the representation of a sacrifice—that of the Son of God, regarded as an Eternal Act"—more than which few Reformed theologians would desire to say. Principal P. T. Forsyth hesitates: there is no such description of the rite, he says, in the New Testament:[1] he does not go into the question of implication in such passages as 1 Cor. x. 18–20 or Heb. x. 19–21; but he repudiates the conception of the Sacrament as only a refreshment of memory —"How can we have a mere memorial of One who is still alive—still our life—still present and acting in us?"; "no Church can live on that";[2] and he thinks it "proper enough in the Act to present before God the finished sacrifice of Christ as His gift to us and therefore the best." Others might put this more strongly—yet one is thankful to find it in the teaching of so eminent and justly regarded a Nonconformist. Professor W. P. Paterson says that the Eucharist can easily be brought within the compass of his "working definition of sacrifice," though he rightly excludes from it the idea of an *expiatory* intention or of expiatory power.

Sacrifice, then—yes; but in what sense and to what effect? For there are more kinds of sacrifice than one; and to ourselves the word has

[1] *Church and Sacraments*, p. 256.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 215.

almost lost religious meaning. As some one says, it has become a metaphor—to do anything that one would rather not do is called a sacrifice—to pay a debt or to reduce a price: spring sales are conducted at gigantic sacrifice—and we do not easily clear our mind of this habit in order to return to the proper sense of the word. "An act belonging to the sphere of worship, in which a material oblation is presented to the Deity and consumed in His service, and which has as its object to secure through communion with a Divine Being the boon of His favour": [1] that is a definition which covers much of the ground, yet hardly reaches the root of the matter. Is sacrifice only of material objects, or is it not always in the first place and essentially personal? Destruction of what is offered is not always necessary—there is also "living" sacrifice. The motive of sacrifice is not always in self, but may be in pure gratitude or adoration. A more satisfactory analysis is that into the Honorific, the Piacular, and the Covenant sacrifice.[2] Without being able to follow with complete assent the historical account on which this is based, one may find its broad divisions to correspond with fact: all sacrifice, as we know it, may be arranged under one or other of these heads. The systems which give us our religion—the Jewish and the Christian—recognise sacrifice of two main types: that which is expiatory and that which is not expiatory, but is motived by gratitude or by the desire for fellowship with the Deity—ideas of sacrifice which are common to religion, revealed or "natural": and with these a third, the Covenant type, which

[1] W. P. Paterson, *H.D.B.*, iv. p. 330a.
[2] Inge, *Cont. Ver.*, p. 272 ff.

also is no doubt general, but which, in what we know as revealed religion, assumes a specific character, as originating with the Deity and in a sense His act rather than that of man; the officiant acting in the name or on behalf of God and not of the worshippers.[1] The Eucharist, if sacrificial, is sacrifice of this third type.

"This do for my memorial"—*τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν*:—what to a Jew of the period would these words convey, spoken, as they were, over a Paschal Table, in immediate sequence to or anticipation of a Paschal meal—the *τοῦτο* ("this") being the breaking of what is declared to be a body and the presentation of what is declared to be the blood of a New Covenant or disposition of God for and to mankind? Apart from grammatical exegesis (which must also be allowed due weight), a sacrificial intention must in some sense be admitted. The Passover, which (whether on that night anticipated or observed) lies in the background of the action and words, was first a sacrifice and only in the second place a meal—the lamb was carried to the Temple, and there in the Court of the Priests was slain, before it could be festally used;[2] it was the commemoration of the supreme deliverance to which the faith of the Hebrew reverted, and of the blood of sacrifice on the doorpost which had protected his fathers when death passed through the land of his exile. This which the Hands soon to be pierced hold forth is defined as the blood of the New Covenant—or rather as itself the New

[1] Ex. xxiv. 3–12. See Appended Note B.
[2] Edersheim, *Jesus the Messiah*, vol. ii. p. 482.

Covenant in Christ's Blood [1]—a phrase in which our Lord gathers up the institution of the Old Covenant in the blood of sacrifice sprinkled on altar and people,[2] with the promise of a New Covenant which God would put in the hearts of His people, to endure while the sun endures.[3]

The phrasing of the Lord's charge to the Twelve accords with this reading of His action. The Greek word which is translated "do" has all the senses in which our own word "do" is used; but when it refers to a religious institution or act of worship, then it is almost technical and is most nearly equivalent to our "celebrate." It is the word employed in the phrase "to keep" a feast, and especially of the Passover (*ποιεῖ ντὸ πάσχα*) as we have it in Hebrews (xi. 28):[4] "By faith he kept the Passover." But most significantly it is the phrase actually used by our Lord (Matt. xxvi. 18) before the Last Supper, "I will keep the Passover (*πρός σε ποιῶ τὸ πάσχα*) at thy house." And in the Institution He repeats the phrase, but now "Do *this*," (keep this observance, celebrate this)—as if He had said: "Hitherto you have, as we have just done, made a memorial of that deliverance from the land of bondage; but now for My memorial and for memorial of the deliverance which I am about to accomplish, "DO THIS."

Similarly of the word (*ἀνάμνησις*, anamnesis), which is inadequately rendered "remembrance" in our Authorised Version. It, too, in such a con-

[1] St. Luke xxii. 20; 1 Cor. xi. 25. [2] Ex. xxiv. 6–8.
[3] Jer. xxxi. 31–37; cf. Heb. viii. 13.
[4] St. Luke v. 29, xiv. 12; Acts xviii. 21 (some texts); in LXX—Ex. xii. 48; Deut. xvi. 10; Josh. v. 10; Esdras B. xxii. 27 (Neh. xii. 27), etc. (also *ἑορτάζειν*).

nection is at least capable of a special and technical meaning—as it has in Hebrews [1] of the Jewish sacrifices (the annual Atonement) in which it is said that "there is an anamnesis of sins every year"—a bringing again of sins *before God* for His mercy and pardon. We find the word used in the Septuagint (the Greek translation of the Old Testament) of the trumpet blasts over the burnt-offerings and peace-offerings,[2] and of the frankincense put upon the Shewbread which lay in the Holiest of all before Jehovah.[3] In such use it indicates, not remembering, but reminding: not what reminds the worshipper, but what witnesses to the eyes of God: "ye shall be remembered before the Lord your God." [4] It is difficult to argue that these words, in the setting of the circumstances and actions of the Institution, do not carry these specific connotations. Lexicographers do not seem to hesitate to quote the New Testament instances of them to which I have referred as instances of their cultic application.[5]

Let us then place ourselves with those disciples on the night of the Betrayal: let us see with their eyes what they saw, and hear with their ears what they heard. There is an action with bread and wine: the bread is taken, made the burden of prayer, broken, the cup is raised, and there is a giving: "Take, eat"; "Drink ye all of it." Words are spoken which carry their mind back to the Covenant in the wilderness and to the blood sprinkled upon the Altar and upon the people, and to the night of the passing Death and to blood stricken upon

[1] Heb. x. 3. [2] Num. x. 10. [3] Lev. xxiv. 7.
[4] Num. x. 9. [5] See Appended Note C.

doorposts, the night of opening freedom: which echo also prophetic words concerning One who should be led as a Lamb to the slaughter, wounded for our transgressions, on Him laid the iniquity of us all, bearing the sin of many: words which recall to them the Baptist's "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world," and also recall such discourses as that which St. John remembered, of flesh given for the life of the world. Could the thought escape these men, men of that experience, that they looked on at a sacrifice of self-offering to God for the death of which their Lord had conversed with them? and that there was appointed for themselves, not its repetition (for an act of instituting cannot be repeated), but reproduction of its witness before God and man until the end of the age? What it was to them (in its nature and in our Lord's intention, which He thus expressed for their apprehension) that it is—for us and always.

So far, that is to say, as it is capable of reproduction. The act of Christ instituting the Eucharist was precedent to the Passion; ours is sequent to it, and commemorates, *not the Institution*, but that which the Institution anticipated, the sacrifice of the Cross. It is easy to appreciate the sacrificial nature of Christ's self-offering for death which He then made: it is less obvious that our Eucharistic action is more than reminiscent of that and is itself sacrificial. Some enquiry into the essential meaning of sacrifice is therefore requisite.

Sacrifice is essentially an act of the will, and what it offers is the self of the offerer: there is no sacrifice unless in so far as the offerer is himself

the victim. And that is true of sacrifice in all its forms: the thank-offering expresses the mind which sees all as from the hand of God and wills to receive and to use all as His; the peace-offering expresses the mind and will to obtain at cost and to enjoy the amity of God; the covenant-sacrifice expresses the will to union—with man or with God, according to the covenant which it is sought to establish; the votive sacrifice expresses the will to pay whatever price is needful to secure the boon which is craved; the expiatory sacrifice offers life for the offerer's forfeit life—another in witness for the self of whose sin the wage is death. And this last is of all sacrifice the ultimately typical and the fundamental of significance. The will issues in an act of sacrifice, which is the only test and guarantee of will: the offering may be only symbolic, but it symbolises at least the reality of the surrender willed, and pledges fulfilment of it. The perfect sacrifice is that in which will is completely submitted and is carried to the actuality of surrender—this only is not symbolic but is real sacrifice. Of such sacrifice there is only one perfect example. At the Institution of the Eucharist we recognise the preliminary offering in will, as Christ, still unbound and free, treats His death as already in process and delivers over the purchase of His Blood to the heirs of salvation; yet still it remained that He should "suffer in the flesh" [1] and "bear our sins in His own body on the Tree"; [2] nor did He say "It is finished" until He had carried obedience almost to the moment of giving up the ghost.

It is not to the offering of will in the upper

[1] 1 St. Pet. iv. 1. [2] *Ibid.* ii. 24.

chamber that the faith of penitence turns, but to the deed of the Cross. The offering of will is the salt with which every sacrifice is salted, but it is not the fire that tries it—and it is not the actual sacrifice. The offering of will, that is, is not finally sacrifice, because will may fail the offerer. It is no expiation. The Institution is not Gethsemane: it is not the Agony: it is not the Dereliction: it is not the Atonement. But it guarantees for these the will to be offered, which gives to sacrifice the character of sacrifice, and which makes the Cross to be the power of God.

It is their bodies, not their affections, which St. Paul beseeches the Roman Christians to present to God in sacrifice,[1] since they have known the mercies of God, and now find their motive there. Man has nothing of his own to give to God, but only his will—which is himself: of that God has made him lord; whatever else he may bring, that alone gives it worth. The sense of this—subconsciously in the lower religions, quite consciously in the higher—underlies all acts which aim to be sacrificial.

This is the valuation which lies behind all the prophetic depreciation of sacrifices which were merely ritual and not expressive of a corresponding mind and intention[2]—a valuation which becomes explicit in the Psalmist,[3] and is reasoned out by the author of Hebrews[4] where he quotes the Psalm and expands its argument. Such an act as the slaughter of a substituted animal was only

[1] Rom. xii. 1.
[2] Isa. i. 11; Jer. vi. 20; Hos. iv. 19; Amos iv. 4; Mal. i. 8, etc.
[3] Ps. xl. 6–8.
[4] Heb. x. 1–10.

the shadow of sacrifice ; [1] and symbolic sacrifice could not be efficient to expiate the bitter reality of sin—its inefficiency confessed itself by constant repetition. These "sacrifices" Christ removes that He may bring the true sacrifice, which is in will and in act. Will must embody itself in the deed which is the sacrifice : therefore a body is prepared for the Redeemer in which on the Tree to bear our sins. And by this will and its fulfilment (one with the gracious will of the Father) we are consecrated—"through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all."

Sacrifice therefore does not in itself necessarily imply suffering, much less the destruction of the oblation or the death of the offered, who in true sacrifice is himself also the offerer ; it implies self-devotion, the surrender of will, and the accordant act. Such surrender of self, such devoted obedience, is not by anything inherent to it painful ; in a right environment it is fulness of joy—the consecrated life is "great peace." [2] It becomes suffering only in an evil environment—in conflict with other wills which are hostile to God and to good. In such surroundings obedience

[1] Heb. x. 1 : *σκιὰν γὰρ ἔχων ὁ νόμος τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν, οὐκ αὐτὴν τὴν εἰκόνα τῶν πραγμάτων*—the Mosaic offerings have the shadow (*σκιάν*), the *πράγμάτα* are the realities in the Heavens (*τὰ ἐπουράνια* of ix. 23) : what then is the third term (*αὐτὴν τὴν εἰκόνα τῶν πραγμάτων*), "the very image" of things in the Heavens, which the Mosaic offering had not? Patristically, it was taken to be the Eucharist (see Westcott *in loc.*). *εἰκών* is a likeness, rather than an image (Moulton and Milligan, *Vocab., in verb.*), though it comes to mean an image as well. The Mosaic slaughter of an unconscious animal had small resemblance to the Antitype—it might be called a shadow of it : the Sacrament is a true representation. I do not know where else to look for this third thing, the *εἰκών* of the Heavenly.

[2] Ps. cxix. 165.

must be at cost—the will of God can be asserted and done only with loss : ultimately and perfectly in such a world as ours (as Plato knew,[1] as the Son of Sirach [2] knew, as Isaiah [3] knew, as Jesus [4] foreknew and foretold), only at the cost of readiness to lay down life itself—only in death.

The self-offering of our Lord was continuous and coincident with His earthly existence, as stage by stage, in childhood, youth, manhood, He lived human life and redeemed it. In a sense the Incarnation itself contains all sacrifice : He did not abhor the Virgin's womb [5]—He counted equality with God no " prize at which to clutch " [6] —He was not ashamed to call us brethren : [7] it was the beginning of His self-yielding to the purpose of Him who sent Him into the world. We speak of Him as living and dying *for us* : His own account of each word which He spoke is that it is the Father's word,[8] and of each work that it is a work of the Father ; [9] His motive is always in God and the end towards which He seeks is always in God. What He does He must do, and He must because for the doing of the Father's will He came into the world. If His death is by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God,[10] it is none the less incurred in the way of obedience, and for that reason is expiatory of the world's disobedience. Christ's life and His self-offering to God were coincident and identical, and were carried to the human limit—a man can do no more than die : death (as we have sadly learned to say) is the supreme sacrifice : " per-

[1] *Repub.*, ii. 362.
[2] Wisd. ii. 12–22.
[3] Isa. lvii. 1–2.
[4] St. Mark x. 33, 34.
[5] *Te Deum*, v. 16.
[6] Phil. ii. 6.
[7] Heb. ii. 11.
[8] John xiv. 24.
[9] *Ibid.* x. 32.
[10] Acts ii. 23.

fect submission is obedience unto death ; perfect fidelity is faithfulness unto death ; and the perfect offering is the life surrendered " : [1] and in the death of the Cross the life's sacrifice was consummated. But *life*, which is itself the offering, goes on beyond death. The sacrifice is carried through death into the glory that has followed : it is borne into the Heavens and offered there—now again " living sacrifice." Christ entered into the Holy Place, the upper sanctuary, " by His own blood " [2]—that was His offering.[3] The symbolism is understood and invariable—the blood is the life ; [4] the Blood of the New Covenant is the Life of the New Covenant, even the Lord's Resurrection Life : [5] life that has endured death and by invincible obedience has overcome death. It is still Himself in the continuance of that obedient life that Christ presents before the Father to be the Instrument and Medium of all the Father's redemptive will and of all His hallowing and saving grace. *He* (not His Atonement : His atoning sacrifice on the Cross was expiatory and is accomplished and is the basis of all that follows), He in His own Person and, so to speak, by His very existence and presence with God *is* " the propitiation for our sins " ; [6] He is our peace—we " who sometimes were far off are made nigh by the blood of Christ." [7]

[1] *The Cup of Life*, p. 9 (A. W. Wotherspoon, 1895).
[2] Heb. ix. 12, διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος, " in its power."
[3] *Ibid.* x. 10. Cf. the use of ἀναφέρειν, Heb. vii. 27 St. Jas. ii. 21.
[4] Gen. ix. 4 ; Lev. xvii. 11, 14 ; Deut. xii. 23–25.
[5] *The Cup of Life*, p. 8.
[6] 1 St. John ii. 2, iv. 10 ; cf. Rom. iii. 25.
[7] Eph. ii. 13, 14.

II

The visions of the Apocalypse are visions and impressed themselves in figures, but in figures of the reality. In them the door opened into the Heavens discloses the throne of the unnameable Glory of Deity; and before it the Altar [1]—the place of sacrifice—encircled by the representative ζῶα (Living Ones) and πρεσβύτεροι (Elders). Midway in the hemicycle stood a Lamb, as if it had been slain,[2] but living: the centre of the universal adoration. This is the Redeemer, the Heavenly Christ, appearing in the presence of God for us [3]—our High Priest, whose offering is Himself, the marks of past death upon Him, His wounds the evidence.[4] Christ in the Heavens is Himself the Memorial, the Anamnesis before God, of His Passion and Death. The vision is a restatement in pictorial form of the doctrine of the Epistle to Hebrews, that "every High Priest is ordained to offer gifts and sacrifices: wherefore it is of necessity that this man also have somewhat to offer," [5] and of St. John, the probable Seer of the Apocalypse, where, once and again echoing St. Paul,[6] he repeats that Christ *is* our propitiation.[7] And so with pre-

[1] Rev. viii. 3: "the golden Altar which was before the throne": ix. 13, "which is before God."

[2] ἐσφαγμένον—in its secondary sense and as applied to animals, σφάζω has generally the sense of "to sacrifice." (Of persons it is simply "to slay," as in 1 John iii. 12. τὸ θηρίον, Rev. xiii. 3, κεφαλὴ ὡς ἐσφαγμένη εἰς θάνατον, is not thought of as a "beast," but as a personification.) Cf. Acts vii. 42, σφάγιον—Heb. (Amos v. 25) זבח. σφάζω in LXX for שחט in Gen. xxii. 10 and Isa. lvii. 5 has the meaning of "sacrifice."

[3] Heb. ix. 24.

[4] See Appended Note D.

[5] Heb. viii. 3.

[6] Rom. iii. 25.

[7] 1 St. John ii. 2, iv. 10, ἱλασμός; St. Paul's word is ἱλαστήριον—which in Heb. ix. 5 is applied to the Mercy

cision the Westminster Divines [1]—" Christ maketh intercession, by His appearing in our nature continually before the Father in Heaven, in the merit of His obedience and sacrifice on earth, declaring His will to have it applied to all believers, . . . procuring for them . . . access with boldness to the throne of grace and acceptance of their persons and services." Christ is Himself the Altar, the Sacrifice, the Memorial, the Priest—He appears for us—and it is enough, for it is everything; what He is, He "that was dead, and behold He is alive for evermore," [2] contains and declares the whole. For He appears in the merit of His obedience and sacrifice; the appeal of Christ is not that He is glorified but that He was slain and so has redeemed us,—therefore He is worthy: [3] because of that He has power in Heaven and Earth.[4]

What the vision discloses in Heaven the Eucharist sets forth here.[5] The vision and the Sacrament speak in the same language—the language of symbol, by which the unimaginable can be revealed and the unutterable can be spoken. The altar in Heaven, holy and spiritual, as the Liturgies define it, is ours as well [6]—there is in

Seat: for illustration, see Moulton and Milligan. Both words are of sacrificial association.

[1] *Larger Catechism*, 55.
[2] Rev. i. 18.
[3] *Ibid.* v. 9.
[4] St. Matt. xxviii. 18.

[5] It has been contended that it is unnecessary for us to plead before God any past expiation, as if He were in danger of forgetting His Covenant. The same reasoning would of course abolish prayer, seeing that God knows our wants before we ask, and is in no danger of forgetting to care for us; or indeed would equally dispose of any attempt to hold converse with God, since He knows our thoughts and is in no danger of misunderstanding. But more—it would equally dispose of need for Christ's Intercession.

[6] Heb. xiii. 10.

Heaven or Earth no other altar, as in truth there is no other sacrifice than that which is upon it, and no other priest for men but Christ. The rest are "shadows,"[1] cast before or behind—Jewish immolations reaching towards a better hope, our Memorial looking back and rejoicing in fulfilment, but ours more than shadow as the Memorial of the accomplished is more than anticipation or presentiment; and more than shadow as it is itself a form of the reality which it reflects. Joined to the Lord, we are with Him one Spirit,[2]—He in us and we in Him[3]—we in Him to be presented to God in His appearing before the Father: He in us to plead here too what there He pleads. It is impossible to state sacramental truth in other terms than those of the unity of Head and members which we call mystical, but which is none the less factual and is equally the basis of our justification in Christ. Christ in us must be Himself in all His distinctive activity, and we in Christ must be sharers in all His vocation—prophetic, priestly, royal. The Shepherd cannot go one way, the flock another; nor has He left us orphaned to seek our own way to the Father, but He goes with us and we go with Him; if in anything, surely in this, the showing of His Death by which He "procures for us quiet of conscience, notwithstanding daily failings, access with boldness to the throne of grace, and acceptance of our persons and services." The Eucharist is our co-operation with Christ in His Heavenly Ministry: or equally it is His co-operation with us in our approach to God. Christ cannot be alone; there is nothing in which

[1] Heb. x. 1.
[2] 1 Cor. vi. 17.
[3] St. John xvii. 23.

He says to us " I have no need of you " ; [1] in His glory, as in Gethsemane, He calls us to be with Him. And apart from Christ we can do nothing [2] —least of all " do this."

What then is offered in the Eucharist ? We can answer only by considering Christ and His oblation in the Heavens, and by losing in Him and in His action consciousness of ourselves except as His agents. For Christ certainly offers Himself to the Father ; but we should hesitate to speak of Christ as offered by us. To do so would be in a manner to separate ourselves from Him and to assume a function too closely associated with His personality to be conceived of as exercised by us, unless in so far as He Himself is pleased to act by our means. We cannot speak as if Christ could be passive in our hands. We cannot speak as if the antitypes of His Body and Blood which He supplies for our handling were identical with Himself. We can think or speak safely only if we see Christ as Celebrant of His own Memorial, and ourselves as the instrument by which He wills that His witness to an accomplished Atonement be made on earth as witness to it is made in Heaven.[3] We cannot in this think truly unless we think mystically, for here we are among things Spiritual, heavenly, and eternal. In the action fulfilled by our agency Christ appears in the merit of His obedience and sacrifice ; Christ pleads Atonement, declaring His will that the same be applied to believers ;

[1] 1 Cor. xii. 21. [2] St. John xv. 5.

[3] See A. Deissmann, *Paul*, last German edit., p. 93 : In the re-active type of cult " God is Himself the real Liturg—the Theurg in the highest sense. The individual man or the community speaks only the Amen."

Christ shows His Death,—the life given a ransom for many [1]—shows it Godward and manward; the world can see no farther than the Death, and to the world it is a proclamation of only that [2]; but, to us, it is that He is risen and is alive for evermore and has the keys of death and the grave. He lives, but He is as though He had been slain: the scars of the Passion testify and speak for us. And in this showing and pleading He will have us with Him, and to be active in it. If we say, "How shall we show the Lord's Death?" He puts certain things into our hands and says, "With these: this is My Body, My Blood: DO THIS." But in obeying, we must be aware of Him as the Doer. The Sacrament is His, not ours, nor, as some say, the Church's—it is fatal in every relation if we let ourselves think of the Church as an entity separate from Christ, a headless body. In unity with Christ and in obedience to Him "the act of man becomes the sacrament of the act of God." [3]

The sacrificial in the Sacrament then is that in it Christ is set forth in the merit of His sacrifice on earth, as once crucified and now risen and ascended to appear in the presence of God for us.[4] His death is shown, and His life. The act of Atonement is represented, as Christ represents it in His own person. It is a memorial, a witness, not a memory—a memorial of Him as He is and a union with Him as He acts. On our side of the veil and seen as we see ourselves acting, it is that, standing before God and in the worship of God, we show the Lord's Death as presently

[1] St. Mark x. 45.
[2] 1 Cor. xi. 26, καταγγέλλετε. See for this *The Cup of Life*, p. 3.
[3] P. T. Forsyth, *op. cit.* p. 266.
[4] Heb. ix. 24.

prevailing for our acceptance and as our plea for all God's mercy; and in unity with Christ's self-offering to the Father, we ourselves are offered.

Thus we escape from all thought of prolonging or continuing the oblation of the Cross;[1] nor do we repeat the action of the Institution, in so far as it contained an anticipation of the Cross, for that is incapable of being repeated, as the Cross itself is incapable.[2] The whole action of the Eucharist is *de presenti*. It does not, except in form and matter, repeat, any more than the Passover repeated the Exodus.[3] It does not prolong that which is finished or continue that which is once for all. It is the witness of the accomplished. The accomplishment and the sufficiency of Christ's expiatory sacrifice is that to which it exists on earth in order to testify—that which is set forth by it and urged, its absolute significance.

The Christ of the Eucharist is the living Christ Who intercedes for us. We see that perhaps most clearly if, anticipating what should more properly be said later, we consider the Gifts which follow—the Body and the Blood. Receiving these we communicate with the Living One and

[1] The Institution was a giving over in advance of self to death.—P. T. Forsyth, *op. cit.* p. 221 f. See the whole paragraph.

[2] And of an extension of the Atonement. Extension of the Atonement would make the Eucharist an expiatory sacrifice: a conception which is excluded by its nature as *ἀνάμνησις*.

[3] I am unable to agree with Bishop Temple that the commemoration is "one in which we actually repeat the action which we commemorate"—by which he apparently means the Institution. It is not of the Institution that we make memorial, but of Christ, and of Him crucified and risen. In any case, as I have already said, institution cannot be reproduced. We follow it in word and action: I should prefer to say that we obey the Institution.

with the power of His Resurrection, not with the Body which was laid lifeless in the tomb, or with the Blood which fell on the rocks of Calvary. The Body given is the Body which was broken in death, one and continuous but changed; the Body not as in humiliation but as in exaltation. Christ's Body no longer exists as mortal—the empty grave is witness of that. To suppose that He now gives that is to introduce inextricable confusion. The idea found supporters at the Fulham Conference of last generation (1900), and then proved an absolute barrier to agreement. It probably involves the reduction of the sacrament to the "crucifix" appeal and to the "simple meal," an act of reminiscence and of fellowship: or else would constitute the Sacrament a re-immolation, a meritorious sacrifice and ultimately an adding to the already sufficient merit of the Cross. I do not think that this view is now widely held outside of the Roman obedience; it was perhaps suggested, but not (as I read the Report) explicitly urged, at Farnham, where most possible views were discussed.

The view advocated above, which sees the Eucharist as the form in which our Lord by our means represents the Heavenly oblation which in the Heavens is presented in His own Person, cannot be set aside[1] as a modified form of the Roman doctrine of re-immolation, with, of course, its corollaries; that doctrine on the contrary it traverses and excludes, since it sees the whole significance of the Sacrament in the fulness and sufficiency of the meritorious sacrifice of the

[1] *e.g.*, Professor W. P. Paterson, "Sacrifice," *H.D.B.*, iv. p. 347 f.

Cross, summarised and expressed in the unchanging Person of Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. Argument to the contrary seems to me to wander between the terms *expiatory* and *propitiatory*, and to use them as if equivalent, which they are not. Expiation is once for all—propitiation is based on expiation, proceeds from it, and must continue so long as from his sinfulness man cries to God. Christ (to quote the words once more) *is* a propitiation for our sins which He *has* expiated. Most prayer is propitiatory—it seeks, that is, that God be propitious to us, gracious, merciful, bountiful; all Christian prayer is in its form directly propitiatory in so far as it is offered in the Name and through the merit of Christ. And the Eucharist is of the nature of prayer, but more: whereas prayer speaks of Christ crucified for us and is "for Jesus' sake" or "in the Name of Jesus Christ," the Sacrament *shows* His Death, and by what it shows it appeals to God. In every act of faith we plead Christ and His sacrifice—the Sacrament sets forth the same in symbol and act, the same which is always being offered to God on the altar of our faith.

The view submitted is not speculative: it is derived from the Institution and from the relevant Scriptures. It states what is, I think, no more than the commonplace doctrine of orthodoxy, which does not cease to be true when it is related to the Sacraments. It impinges on nothing of the exhaustive sufficiency of the oblation of Calvary. It denies, for example, whatever Professor Paterson in the passage referred to rightly desires (as I understand him) to deny, and it asserts what he wishes to protect. The Eucharist is

not expiatory of sin: it does not renew or continue expiation. But it has, as Professor Paterson states, the form of a sacrifice; the form is symbolic and, presumably, symbolic of what it is. In what sense it is a sacrifice I have tried to say: as "organically connected with the ceaseless offering of the Church's Head," and as the form in which He in the midst of the Church praises God.[1] It is in that case more than the occasion[2] of the presentation to God of the sacrifices of prayer, faith, penitence, or self-surrender; it is indeed the occasion of such presentation, but in itself it is the Anamnesis of Christ and of His Heavenly oblation. To recognise this satisfies a profound human instinct to centre worship in sacrificial action, and also a profound sense discoverable in the Christian mind that the Sacrament of the Holy Table shows such a centre for Christian worship; and it does so without disadvantage to the finality of the expiatory Cross of Christ, by linking it to the Cross through the present life of Christ and His eternal self-offering in Heaven.

I find myself more or less content with a summary given by Dean Inge[3]: "For us the Holy Communion is a sacrifice—that of ourselves, our souls and bodies, which we thereby consecrate to the service of God: it is a commemoration of a sacrifice—that of Christ upon the Cross: it is also the representation of a sacrifice—that of the Son of God regarded as an Eternal Act. With reference to this last, we may say, if we like, using popular language, that we are doing on earth what Christ is doing in heaven: we are certainly right to insist that the Sacrifice on

[1] Heb. ii. 12. [2] W. P. Paterson, *op. cit.* p. 348.
[3] *Cont. Ver.*, p. 306.

Calvary has its eternal and therefore ever-active side : but we must remember that it is the Eternal Act that we are symbolically representing, not the temporal act that we are repeating or continuing, when we celebrate the Eucharist." I am safe in assuming that the Dean uses the word *represent* in its full sense. I should wish to put our self-offering, not first, but in dependence on the Heavenly oblation which, the Dean elsewhere says,[1] alone makes that possible ; I should say "the present and eternal act" ; I should omit the somewhat minimising phrases as to "what we like," and so on. Otherwise I should find in the paragraph the elements of the teaching which commends itself to me.

III

Of the two movements or stages of the Sacrament, the Godward and the manward—the Memorial of Christ and the Communion in His gifts—we have so far considered only the former. Of the two, who can say which is chief ? That of which for the moment we think seems always the greatest that is possible. At the same time the former, the Commemoration, has priority, and the second, the Communion, is dependent upon it. The former of the two is that of which Christ has said *This Do* [2] : for the second is not of our doing—it is of His giving. He Himself fulfilled the action with each element before He said of either, *Take* ; and to St. Paul the end of the whole, including the Reception, was *to show the*

[1] *Cont. Ver.*, p. 287.

[2] "'This' is not this object but this Act."—P. T. Forsyth, *op. cit.* p. 221.

Lord's Death—for Christ's Death is not fully shown until by reception the design and result of the Death are shown. In both movements there is proclamation of the Death; but it is in the former of them, not in the latter, that the dying of the Lord Jesus is exhibited. The Communion follows upon the memorial action because the benefits of the Atonement follow and flow from the Atonement which the memorial action sets forth and pleads. It is the former of the two stages of the Sacrament which to the Apostolic age seemed so far the distinctive and essential that it gave name to the rite as a whole—it was called the Breaking of the Bread. When St. Paul draws illustration from the Sacrament, it is the action of which he first thinks, not of the reception, though of that too later—"the Bread which we break," he says, "the Cup which we bless." And when He sums up the Sacrament, it is as an action—a setting forth.[1]

It is possible always—I will not say, to over-emphasise: for who can contrast values of this sort?—but too exclusively to emphasise one value to the neglect of another. This was unquestionably done in one direction when solitary Mass became possible. It may, however, be no less a departure in the opposite direction from the essential purport of the ordinance, if the showing of the Lord's Death becomes a mere preliminary to Communion, and all weight is transferred from it to *our* reception. Cranmer, it is said, turned the Mass into a Communion—it is meant, I suppose, that he transferred emphasis from the Consecration to the Reception—but is it for us to turn a Sacrament into anything? Might it

[1] See Appended Note E.

not have sufficed to restore to Communion its own due emphasis? Of that there was need; but a Sacrament is what it is instituted, and our part is to use it as instituted, unmodified by any preconception.

An example of what I mean by over-emphasis is the assumption, which is not unusual, that "the primary purpose of the Eucharist is for Spiritual food; its secondary purpose is for thankful remembrance." [1] What is really primary was our Lord's Action—"He took bread and gave thanks and brake it—likewise also the cup." To give chief place to the distribution and reception is to deprive the Action of its Godward intention; it is then a mere preparation of the gifts—the Consecration would be dependent on the Communion. But our Lord's face is always set Godwards before it is turned manwards; until His self-offering should be accepted of the Father there could be no giving to us. First the Action, then its fruits: first we show the Lord's Death —then we wait for and receive the Divine response, that which the Lord's Passion has procured for us. The Atonement was an action, and the Sacrament is an action—Christianity is both redemptive and nutritive, but primarily redemptive. It deals with sin and salvation before it deals with the pastoral care of those that are being saved. Christ is given, before Christ can be assimilated; He is self-given to die for us, before He is self-given to be our life. Christ is for us, before He is Christ in us. This is the order of

[1] *Conference on Reservation* (Farnham), p. 130. See p. 83 for statement of the contrary opinion. The idea of reminiscence is no doubt prominent in the Anglican Words of Delivery, but in the Institution the Words of Delivery were *εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν*.

priority and of stress in the Sacrament: the Commemoration takes precedence of the Reception.[1]

Among the Redemptive Acts there are two, either of which may be determinative of the type of religion: namely, the Incarnation or the Atonement, Bethlehem or Calvary. Between these lies choice of a centre for spiritual life. One may either think philosophically of God and of creation and of an orderly evolution which culminates in the union of Word and Flesh (and to think in this way seems to be a present danger to Evangelicalism): or one may think as a sinful man thinks in face of God's holiness and justice, of the havoc and tragedy of the world's ruin and of God's love for man and controversy with his rebellion. Both conceptions may be in mind, but one of them will be dominant. One may say perhaps that Christianity has two foci, the Incarnation and the Atonement, and is as an ellipse rather than as a circle—but that is doubtfully possible, at least from the point of view of the penitent.[2] One must be attracted first, or arrive first, at one point or another; and in approach to God it is the Cross with which one first meets. Calvary is before Pentecost. The religion of the Spirit must grow out of and follow the Gospel of Christ crucified. In the Eternal Mind and purpose Atonement precedes Incarnation as the end sought by Incarnation: the Son became incarnate "for the

[1] On all of this, see Forsyth, *op. cit.* 219 ff., 274 ff., to which in this paragraph I am indebted both for suggestion and in part for expression.

[2] "We can have but the one moral centre in a religion for the whole man—which centre, if humanity is in a tragic crisis with a holy God, is in the Atonement."—Forsyth, *op. cit.* p. 276.

suffering of death," that He should taste death for every man,[1] and is slain from the foundation of the world. Therefore in the Sacrament which expresses the fulness of the grace of God in both aspects, as redeeming and as cherishing, the Action which sets forth our Lord's Act of redemption is fundamental, and in our celebration of the rite should be correspondingly emphasised. We may not turn the Sacrament into a Communion *merely*, making the Consecration a preliminary by which the means of communion are furnished. Surely in these matters the proportion of the faith can be observed and to each of the two great movements of the Sacrament its own be attributed. The modern Sacramentalism seems to be in danger from the excessive emphasis on that which is received over that which is done, which appears in its absorbing interest in questions of the consecrated Gifts in themselves and as used. That way has lain endless disputation, and that way now lies cult of the Gifts with its hazards. It is not necessary and it would not be accurate to say, as has been said, that it is the Action which is the symbol, and the Elements of Bread and Wine only its language or instruments[2]—the Elements are obviously independently symbolic and in the Church's belief, being hallowed, they are more than symbol; but they are not, as also is too often said, the Sacrament. The Sacrament is the action in which the Atonement is set forth in appeal to God, with God's response to that appeal.

I have allowed myself to dwell at what may seem undue length on this first movement of the

[1] Heb. ii. 9. [2] Forsyth, *op. cit.* pp. 221–223.

Sacrament and its interpretation, because, thus interpreted, it seems to have supreme religious value. Here is then entrenched the presentation to human faith of the Atonement as an accomplished fact, which is the heart of the Gospel offered to a sinful world. Christianity as redemptive before it is sanctifying, reconciliatory before it is pastoral, dealing with sin before it calls to holiness or offers aid, is here evidently set forth. In this the Cross is manifest in that relation in which to the experience of the generations it has proved the power of God to salvation to every one who believes. The value is deeply and directly evangelic, and if it is there in the Institution, ought eagerly to be recognised and expounded by whoever sees the evangelic (using the word in its older sense) as the radical term of effective Christian experience ; we should offer it as the Scriptural account of what in Roman theology is impossibly represented as a meritorious re-immolation. To ignore a feature of the Sacrament which we instinctively recognise as such, because it has been elsewhere distorted, is not the way to preserve from error. Better to inculcate doctrine in its true form.

IV

This seems the proper place in which to say a word as to what was formerly in some quarters a burning question. In the older Scottish practice and so long as the " Table gesture " maintained itself, the question did not arise here : during both consecration and dispensation, the church was open and frequented by a reverent multitude ; as is the case in the North of Scotland still, where

only a handful may communicate, but the church be crowded, largely by non-communicants who are nevertheless devout worshippers and in some sense possibly participants. Is their presence hurtful to themselves or a hindrance to others? In any case, in Scotland the practice by which only those who intend to communicate "stay behind" is recent and is not Scottish: and it is, I think, a main obstacle to more frequent celebration.

It is represented that to obey the Lord's call to receive His Gifts is the duty of every member and that to refrain is an unwarrantable refusal: that if one is in fellowship with the Church he should be at all times fit and ready to communicate: that it is inconsistent to desire fellowship in part of the rite, and not in the whole: and that one should either be present for its entire purpose or be absent. But is a man in better case, or is his position more consistent by entire absence? Is his obedience to our Lord any greater, if, after sermon, he takes the entrance of the Elements as his dismissal, or if he stay at home because it is "a Communion Sunday"? To do so might seem more and not less of a dissociation from the Celebration. The ideal, no doubt, is that—the Celebration being in use as the normal worship of the Lord's Day—all communicants should be present and all communicate; and that every Christian be at all times in due preparedness and hungry to receive. But we are far from the ideal: it is a question of what is best in our imperfect conditions. A Christian may be aware of his immediate lack of devotional preparation; he has made no self-examination; he is distracted by cares; his conscience is not at peace; he is at difference with a brother and is unreconciled.

It should not be so, but with him it is so; he doubts of himself. Yet he feels that it would help him to join at least in the action which shows that Christ died for such as himself, and to plead His merit before God; perhaps in spirit to enter some little way into the fellowship of those who are fed. Ought he to be dismissed? Ought he to depart?

I envy always the confidence of those who in such questions can feel sure: for myself I am more aware of the difficulty of numbering that which is wanting and of deciding where the ideal is plainly impracticable. As things are and with such little experience as one has or can gather from others, I should hesitate to think that it is spiritually profitable or advisable or a matter of duty for every member of the Church to communicate as frequently as the Church ought to celebrate the Eucharist, or to advise a communicant to absent himself from worship unless he intends to communicate.

The Sacrament, as it is visible to us, is the act not of the individual, but an act of the Church in which the individual participates. It would seem to follow that the Church may celebrate, and should celebrate, as often as the will of her Lord may be held by her to indicate, and may do so though each individual member does not receive at every celebration which is accessible to him. The Church cannot wait on the individual for opportunity to worship; but—I do not assert this, but submit the opinion—the individual may participate with the Church as far as on any occasion he is drawn to do so. If it is allowable for him to do so, his worship would be an extension to a higher point of the habitual act of faith which is without ceasing, and of that pleading of Christ's

Name which is the sustaining element in all common worship and in all private prayer. I do not think that the Sacrament should be celebrated only that the Action may be fulfilled, as an act of mere worship and without genuine invitation of all who, being communicants, will to communicate; a celebration at which only the celebrant and his assistants[1] are intended or desired to communicate is doubtfully accordant with the nature of the Sacrament or with the purpose of the Institution; but that does not necessarily imply that none be present unless to communicate.[2] Such a limitation would, I fear, put out of sight any hope that under existing conditions the Sacrament should be restored to its place as the normal Lord's Day Service. I incline to the opinion that non-communicating attendance[3] on the part at least of habitual communicants is to be allowed and may have a distinct religious value. In the practice of the Church of Scotland there would be no ground in precedent, so far as I know, for any other course.

Anxiety is sometimes expressed lest a frequency of celebration such as seems to have been primitive should tend to lessen its subjective impression —the awe and reverence which enhalos it. What is the answer of experience? Looking to those areas of Christianity in which Celebration is most frequent, do we find that in those areas the Sacrament is less regarded, or more? less valued

[1] See *Conference on Reservation* (Farnham), p. 71.

[2] The desirability of the presence of baptized children is not, so far as I know, questioned. At what age would exclusion begin?

[3] Cf. Gore, *The Body of Christ*, p. 276 n., and Appended Note 16, p. 307.

or waited on with less devotion or intent of heart? Something, of course, would depend on teaching: if the Sacrament is regarded as an act of pious remembering, or as only a symbolic act of fellowship, or only as an act of self-profession, one can understand that familiarity might weaken its impressiveness to the imagination or its solemnity for conscience. If it is understood as the pleading of the Sacrifice of Calvary before the Father Almighty and as the occasion of supernatural communication of His redemptive mercies, these effects do not seem likely to follow. It is possible that a frequency of communicating disproportioned to spiritual attainment may tend to carelessness in preparation or to insensibility in reception; but attendance at Celebration, as a method of worship, whether to be encouraged or not, does not seem to have that tendency.

Something must also be said of the celebrant of the Sacrament and of the relation to it of the ministry. It is more or less a commonplace of Reformed theology that the notes of the Church are three—the Gospel purely preached, the Sacraments rightly administered, and discipline uprightly maintained.[1] We must find, that is to say, not only the Sacraments, but the Sacraments in "right administration," as the *Scots Confession* phrases it, or, as the *Thirty-nine Articles* have it, "duly ministered." Among the conditions of due or right administration the right and lawful minister can hardly be overlooked. The right person to act is as much a condition of rightness as the use of right elements or a right

[1] e.g. *Scots Confession* (1560), xxv.; *Articles of Religion* (Anglican), Art. XIX., states the first and second of these requirements.

use of word, or a right company of worshippers. All must be "according to Christ's ordinance in all those things that of necessity are requisite to the same" and, among such necessary things, certainly some one who shall minister. The same documents which name right administration of the Sacraments as a note of the true Church are emphatic in condemning the assumption of this function by any who are not lawfully called and commissioned and sent to it;[1] the *Scots Confession* expressly names it as a first condition of right administration that sacraments be "ministrate by lawful Ministers." This is not the place for enquiry into what constitutes lawfulness in the matter, but plainly that question is involved, and universal lawfulness of whatever ministry cannot be assumed.

I am not able to agree with Bishop Temple where, in his generally convincing treatment of this,[2] he speaks of the prohibition of lay celebration as a disciplinary provision and annotates "I do not think that it is more than this"—unless by disciplinary provision may be understood discipline implied and provided in the fact of the gift of ministry by our Lord, and regulated by Apostolic intention in providing for the continuance of that ministry. That meaning is, I think, behind Bishop Gore's instancing of the restriction in question as a crucial example of the Church's exercise of authority in binding and loosing. The authority is in that case exercised, not as discretionary or on the ground of mere expediency, but in the belief that it is used to secure the fulfilment of a principle and purpose

[1] *Scots Confession*, xxii.; *Articles of Religion*, XXIII.
[2] *Christus Veritas*, p. 163 f.

which is involved in the institution of the ministry. I should not agree, if it were meant that the Church's binding in this instance is a matter within its discretion, since that would carry with it the inference that it is within the Church's discretion to abrogate the restriction. I submit that the restriction has for the Church a binding sanction in the fact that Christ has instituted an agency for such administration, the Stewardship which in His behalf shall give to His Household meat in due season ;[1] and that for the Church in such case "to loose" would be to exceed its scope. Dr. Temple takes account of this view, and I think intends to adopt it in his note on the page quoted, but for the reason mentioned on p. 263, I could wish that it had been more conclusively stated. I do not feel that it is possible to answer the question which Dr. Temple raises,[2] whether a layman *can* effectually consecrate and the Divine Gifts be in sequence received. Scripture gives no direct light on that special question [3] (though it does on the general theory of a Ministry), unless that, in the one account which mentions a celebrant of the Sacrament,[4] he is an Apostle. Clemens Romanus,

[1] St. Luke xii. 42 ff.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 163 n.

[3] But see Heb. v. 4. The spiritual Israel is so related to the old Israel that rules which rest on principle ("unless he is called of God as Aaron was") need express abrogation before we can legitimately depart from them.

As to this matter of Ministry the Westminster *Form of Church Government* (Of the Officers of the Church) argues from the charge committed to "the priests and Levites in the Jewish Church" to that of Ministers of the Gospel and bases on Isa. lxvi. 21 and Matt. xxiii. 34, "where our Saviour entitleth the officers of the New Testament, whom He will send forth, by the same names of the teachers of the Old."

[4] Acts xx. 11.

the *Didache*, Justin Martyr, show celebration by commissioned Ministry, and use and practice and tradition are in the historical Church uniform and unbroken in support of the limitation. But these facts do not answer the question, and we cannot answer it, because it is with Christ only to give or to withhold, and where there is honest intention, where there is no consciousness of intrusion, where there is good faith on the part of the lay celebrant and in those who seek to receive, it may be difficult to think that our gracious Lord will entirely repudiate and withhold. Dr. Temple may in that sense and so far be right, and I would prefer to agree with him rather than to disagree. That is all that I could venture to hazard, if it be asked whether a layman can "validly" consecrate; for validity depends on Christ. But *can* is one thing, *may* is another. Of validity we are not judges—of lawfulness we are; and in this matter the law stands in the gift of a Ministry by Christ and in His Word "He that receiveth you receiveth Me."[1] In urgent necessity and in defect of the Ministry, lay Baptism has been generally allowed (though the Church of Scotland is most unwilling to sanction it); and in face of imminent death it has been, I believe, held that a man may with "three blades of grass" communicate himself to full spiritual effect. All the same there is a Ministry of the Sacraments sent by Christ; and not even "the Church," much less an individual, has power to supersede it in its charge which is from Him, or to give its glory to another. In things so great as this is the unlawful may be very hazardous, and should not come into consideration.

[1] St. Matt. x. 40; St. John xiii. 20.

It is not a question of priesthood. There is but one Priest, and He is in the Heavens.[1] In uniting it to Himself He has made the Church a priestly as well as a prophetic and royal body; every member of the Church shares the sacerdotal function in so far as he shares the Church's activity; there is need of priestly doorkeepers and choirmen as there is of priestly presbyters or bishops, and in that there is no difference.[2] The differentia of the sacred Ministry is not that it is a priesthood, but that it is a stewardship, and is sent and given to the priesthood, to fulfil among it representatively for Christ functions within the priestly body peculiar to Christ Himself—functions both sacerdotal and of pastorate and of rule and of giving the Bread in due season—of administering for Him in actions which are proper to His person. Among these are the Sacraments: Christ alone can wash from sin or bestow the Sonship of God —Christ alone appears for us before the Father in the merit of His Sacrifice—Christ alone gives His Body and Blood for our nourishment. The ministry exists in the Church as the Church exists in the world. It is not a caste: a caste is demarcated by something intrinsic, of nature or race; but it is an order, demarcated by commission. It has not powers—God alone has power; but it has responsibility, and it has the prerogative and authority without which no one can be responsible for anything. The Church

[1] Priest is of course but presbyter writ small; but it has come to be used as the English equivalent of *sacerdos* or *ἱερεύς*.

[2] Every Christian is or should be the priestly servant of Christ in his own function; but some forms of service are more obviously priestly and others less obviously—the sons of Merari had charge of the pins of the Tabernacle; but that also was a sacred charge.

is representative of Christ to the world: the Ministry on the other hand functions in and to the Church—and as the Church is sent to the world, so the Ministry is sent to the Church.[1] This is the principle which is enshrined in its successiveness and which lies behind the doctrine of succession: the phrase, "Ministry from above," which sometimes offends, means the same thing.

Something depends on the general view of Ministry. Anglican standards go no further than to require lawfulness and to indicate accepted guarantees of lawfulness;[2] and so leave room for the theory that the Ministry is representative of the corporate priestliness of the Christian community,[3] or for thinking of it as the Church's Ministry and subject to the Church's reconstitution.[4] The teaching of the Church of Scotland is more definite:[5] it is that Word, Ministry, and Sacraments stand together as gifts of the Ascended Lord to the Catholic Church;[6] the Ministry is Christ's, not the Church's, any more than are the Sacraments: what it is and has, is from Christ and not from the Church, and may not be diminished or intruded upon by ordinance of the Church. This is of importance in view of the

[1] Bouquet (*Christian Religion and Its Competitors To-day* (E.T.), p. 147) says that "the business of the Clergy is to stand to their people as Christ the Good Shepherd stands to humanity as a whole":—but that is impossible; and further the Mission of the Clergy is to the flock, not to humanity. Except for this, Bouquet's saying is instructive.

[2] *Articles of Religion*, XXIII., XXVI.

[3] See Moberly, *Ministerial Priesthood, passim.*

[4] A. C. Headlam, *Bampton Lectures*, 1920, p. 242.

[5] And also perhaps more consistent with general positions: it is difficult to imagine the Church as blessing itself from God or as feeding itself with Christ's Body and Blood.

[6] *Confession of Faith*, XXV. 3.

fact that lay celebration exists in some of the lesser Communions, and especially that even within the ambit of Presbyterianism [1] its permission—on ground of supposed necessity—has been suggested, to meet the case of isolated groups where no settled ministry can be maintained. The remedy, however, for lack of presbyters, is not to dispense with presbyters, but to make more presbyters; and that can be done wherever there is a godly Christian man of character and of any spiritual competence. The canon which restrains the clergy from secular employments *is* purely ecclesiastical and can be set aside; it is not primitive—those whom the Apostles ordained were busy in trade or business after, as before, ordination and were not chosen for their learning: yet the Holy Ghost made them overseers of the flock of God.[2] What was done then can be done now, wherever there is a God-fearing shepherd or lumberman or planter, of such qualification that otherwise he might be called to the lay-eldership. Let such a man be ordained and given charge, and let him go on with his shepherding or planting as well, as St. Paul went on with his tent-making; and so let the ordinance of the Lord be observed.

There is, of course, our old friend the Desert Island and provision for its shipwrecked to be considered. George Gillespie [3] and others have dealt with that long ago. "In extraordinary cases something extraordinary may be done," and Christians must go as far as they can towards obedience, hoping in Christ Who can make good the imperfect. But the Dominions are not desert

[1] In Australia.

[2] Acts xx. 28.

[3] *Miscellany Questions*, ch. iii.

islands. "If they can come at any who may ordain them in the usual and right way, they ought not to neglect the seeking of ordination."[1] A less educated ministry may be a lawful ministry, and paid or unpaid is nothing to the question.

A religious value is involved. The givenness of the Sacrament is supported by the givenness of the Ministry of the Sacrament. The place of Christ as the only true and indeed the only possible Celebrant is guarded when His ordinance may be fulfilled only through one who is sent by Himself to minister in His Name. The Sacrament is then unified as His action; the human element which is inevitable is reduced to its minimum; the whole falls into its place in the system of grace which is of God only as Giver, where man is no more than the subject of His grace.

Appended Note A

There is no suggestion of any such preliminary service as Dr. Inge postulates in the accounts of the Institution or in any of the Eucharists mentioned in the New Testament. As to the early Fathers and their sacrificial language which he thinks referred only to offerings from the substance of the worshippers, Justin (*1st Apol.* lxvii. 6) seems to place these offerings after and not before the rite, and certainly in subordination to it. It is difficult to think that the θυσία which Ignatius has in mind when he speaks of the θυσιαστήριον (*Ad Philad.* iv.) is merely of contributions towards an Agape or even for the poor; or that the δῶρα, which to offer Clement evidently considers the dis-

[1] *Miscellany Questions,* ch. iii.

tinctive act of Presbyters (*ἀμέμπτως καὶ ὁσίως προσενεγκόντας τὰ δῶρα*), were in his reference no more than these gifts. The contributions in kind were a *θυσία* (Heb. xiii. 16, etc.), and they were important, a mainstay of primitive Church finance; and they received a certain prominence, giving occasion in the comprehensive thanksgiving for commemoration of the Divine glory in creation and bounty in providence: but they did not exhaust the idea of sacrifice. The Eucharist commemorates a greater Oblation. We must distinguish an offering of things for use, from that offering in which they are used. And we must allow something to the religious insight and devotional sensibility of the first generations, which after all included Apostles and Evangelists, and were as likely as the next generations to search the deep things of God and to apprehend significances. The *Didache*, on whose account Dr. Inge relies, would, I think, be now considered a precarious authority for Catholic faith or practice of the first century.

Appended Note B

Covenant Sacrifice in ethnic religion has regard rather to the bond of man to man than of God to man, though no doubt the fellowship which it establishes is in virtue of a common relation—tribal, national, or group—to the God. The Hebraic ברית and the New Testament *διαθήκη* on the other hand imply a relation of God to man and of man to God in which the initiative is with God. It is associated with sacrifice as a sanction, but not as the productive cause, the Divine will in the matter being ante-

cedent to the sacrifice and determinative of it. There is a suggestion of the Communion meal in Ex. xxiv. 11, but it is not immediately connected with the sacrifice of vv. 5–8. The Passover on its sacrificial side comes under the type of Covenant Sacrifice, but in it the idea of commemoration is much more prominent than that of communion. In certain Jewish sacrifices parts of the victim were either the fee of the priest or were returned to the worshipper for his consumption, but the consumption does not appear as ritual or cultic; it was rather domestic, or, in a domestic sense, festive (Prov. ix. 2, xvii. 1). With the exception of the Passover, no sacrificial meal is prescribed, and the idea of ritual consumption is elsewhere absent.[1] "In the Jewish religion, though not in any other, the idea of atonement made to the god threw into the shade the idea . . . of a meal shared with the god" (Charnwood, *According to St. John*, p. 185). The Jewish mind, in fact, rested on the idea of the ברית established by God of old and was concerned, not with the constitution of fellowship with Him, but with atonement for transgression or with removal of uncleanness incurred, which might interrupt an existing fellowship—that is with *sin* to be expiated or its consequence to be obviated by purification.

Etymologically ברית (root ברה, to cut) is the cutting up of animals for sacrifice, and so the covenant or alliance ratified by passing between two rows of the parts of sacrificed victims (Gen. xv. 10; Jer. xxxiv. 18, 19): hence ex-

[1] But see Gen. xxxi. 54. There, however, the "slaying" is not expressly sacrificial; there may be only a feast of reconciliation, as in v. 46.

tended to any covenant, and specially applied to the Covenant of Jehovah with Israel.[1] Where, as in the latter case, the terms are dictated rather than agreed, the word acquires a new shade of meaning, and is rather an appointment or disposition—"promise on condition of obedience." In the LXX it is translated by διαθήκη (Gen. xv. 18, xvii. 19, etc.; Ex. xxiv. 8, etc.; Ps. xxv. 10, etc.; Jer. xxxi. 31, etc.)—properly a testamentary arrangement (in the Papyri "with absolute unanimity," Moulton and Milligan, *Vocab. of New Testament*, ii. p. 148), but sometimes with the sense of compact, for which συνθήκη would be more usual and unmistakable. Moulton and Milligan point out that διαθήκη exactly suited the differentia of ברית: "a covenant offered by God to man was no 'compact' between two parties coming together on equal terms." Like a will, it decided an arrangement which the beneficiaries could take or leave, but could not affect: when accepted, the διαθήκη would assume a covenant character (Gal. iii. 20). A. Deissmann then possibly overpresses in refusing to διαθήκη any reminiscence of ברית in its primary sense, such as may perhaps be felt in the μεσίτης of Gal. iii. 20; Heb. ix. 16 ("No man in the Mediterranean world of the first century A.D. could ever have thought of the concept of covenant in the word διαθήκη"; *Licht vom Osten*, tr. Strahan, p. 341); but care is needed to remember always the Divine Initiative which lies behind those words, both as Hebrew and as Greek, and the dictated nature of the terms to which man assents and with which he closes, for therein stands the distinction between ethnic covenant sacrifice

[1] See Bresslau, *Hebrew Dictionary, sub voce.*

and that which meets us in the Scriptures, Old and New.

Appended Note C

Τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν must be read in its context, textual and historical. Τοῦτο ποιεῖτε echoes the ποιῶ τὸ πάσχα of Matt. xxvi. 18, and lays evident emphasis on the τοῦτο—"*this* and not what has hitherto been done"; and also on τὴν ἐμήν in its reference to a commemoration (of a deliverance) which has just been made; "but this for *My* memorial—for commemoration of that deliverance which I am about to accomplish." It is rite in place of rite. And ἀνάμνησις must be read in light of the actions to which τοῦτο refers—the breaking of that which is said to be His Body, and the presentation of that which is said to be His Blood, both being declared to be "for" or "in behalf of" (περί, ὑπέρ) others and their sins; the Blood being τὸ τῆς καινῆς διαθήκης (Ex. xxiv. 8; Jer. xxxi. 31). So read, account being also taken of its application to Old Testament sacrifice in Heb. x. 3 (its only occurrence in the New Testament outside of the words of Institution), and with account taken as well of the LXX instances of its use and of their sacrificial setting, its special sense cannot here be denied to the word.

In the LXX it is rare, μνημόσυνον being the usual rendering of זכר or of זכרון; (cf. Matt. xxvi. 13; Acts x. 4). Where it occurs (Num. x. 10; Lev. xxiv. 7) it translates זכרון, which (as is pointed out to me by the Rev. O. S. Rankin) has a technical meaning in relation to celebrations: *e.g.* the festival rites of Chanukka are, according to Maimonides, a זכרון הנס, a

memorial of miraculous event, the deliverance under Judas Maccabæus. That a "Memorial" (זכרון, ἀνάμνησις) could be regarded as offering or sacrifice is shown by Lev. xxiv. 5–9: the Shewbread which lay before God "on behalf of the Children of Israel" was "most holy unto Him of the offerings (מאשׁי) of the Lord made by fire." The Loaves were not burned, but they were reckoned among burnt-offerings. The LXX has *θυσιαζομένων*.

The new Liddell and Scott, under the primary meaning, refers to Lysias 2, 39, *ἀνάμνησεις θυσιῶν*, and translates by (1) "*reminders to the Gods* of sacrifices offered," and adds a meaning (2) *memorial sacrifice*, with the reference "LXX, Num. x. 10, cf. Ev. Luc. xxii. 19"; which may be taken as decisive of the legitimacy. Both *ἀνάμνησις* and *ποιεῖν*, occur in a papyrus of the second century (Moulton and Milligan, *Vocab.*, i. p. 36), but the passage is imperfect and the application uncertain.

As to *ποιεῖν*, its cultic use is more plentifully illustrated. In the New Testament, in addition to the important Matt. xxvi. 18, we have *τὴν ἑορτὴν τὴν ἐρχομένην ποιῆσαι* (Acts xviii. 21, some texts); *πίστει πεποίηκεν τὸ πάσχα καὶ τὴν πρόσχυσιν τοῦ αἵματος*, also important (Heb. xi. 28); and in the LXX, *ποίησει αὐτό* (*τὸ πάσχα*) (Ex. xii. 47); *ἐποίησαν τὸ πάσχα* (Josh. v. 10); *ἐποίησε τῇ Ἀστάρτῃ* (3 Kings xi. 33), etc. Robinson, *Lexicon of New Testament*, cites *ποιεῖν τὰς θυσίας* (Joseph., *Ant.* ii. 15. 3), and *ποιεῖν τὰ Ὀλύμπια* (Xen., *Hell.* vii. 4. 28). Mr. Rankin refers me besides to mention of *ἱεροποίοι* in charge of sacrifices and of torch races at the Ἡφαίστοι (Pauly-Wissowa (*Kroll*), *Realencyc.*, *sub voce*), and to *τὴν δὲ λαμπάδα ποιεῖν*

(*ibid.*, *sub voce* Ἡφαίστος); and for the later Hebrew use of עשה, to do, in the sense of "celebrate," he instances Tosep. Pes. viii. 5, לעשות, and so T. Sanh. i. 12[d]: as to which sources he knows and I do not. Liddell and Scott parallel with *sacra facere*, and cite ποιεῖν Ἴσθμια. The *Vocab. Gr. N.T.* gives as one meaning "to celebrate," instancing Matt. xxvi. 18; Acts xviii. 21 D.; Heb. xi. 28; and a papyrus of A.D. 108 (P. Fay. 117[12]). Celebration does not necessarily mean sacrifice, but in both Pagan and Hebrew practice it generally involved sacrifice, and carried with it that association.

I am referred also to Reitzenstein, *Hellenist. Myst. Relig.*, p. 79, as saying of εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν (which he considers to be Paul's addition to the Gospel record—but that does not affect the question), that he is "unable to interpret these words of a mere remembrance-meal such as the Greek cult of the dead knew. The Sacrament doctrine of Paul which immediately follows is against such a view." This seems to imply that he considers ἀνάμνησις to carry here its pregnant sense.

Appended Note D

Rev. viii. 3: The Altar is not the brazen altar on which expiatory sacrifice was offered—that stood in the court of the Temple—but the altar of incense (thanksgiving, worship, prayer); it is not said that the Lamb stands on the Altar, though Christian art has so interpreted the passage; but the same place, "before the throne," is assigned to both, and the offering is naturally to be looked for on the altar. I am unable to follow Mr. J. Strahan (*H.D.A.C.* i. 52) that

the Heaven of the vision is "a replica of the earthly Temple," of which it does not reproduce any feature unless the Altar in question: I do see in it a notable reproduction of the basilica or of the *atrium* of some great house such as Baring Gould (*Our Inheritance*, p. 83)[1] suggests may have been the meeting-place for Christians of the first generations: the lighted apse or *tablinum*, the *thronos* of the president, the corona of seated presbyters, and "in the midst" the Holy Table with its burden of testimony. If we do not suppose the Apocalyptic description to be reminiscent of such scenes, in which the writer must have been versed, I do not know where we are to look for its suggestion, but certainly not to Moriah. The *thought* at least of the vision may have a Eucharistic basis. The form of a vision is generally reminiscent

Appended Note E

Oscar Holtzmann writes agreeably (*Life of Jesus* (E.T.), p. 464) with this, but thinks that later it was obscured: "In the oldest tradition the eating of His Body and drinking of His Blood are of less significance than the Breaking of the Bread and pouring out of the Wine. St. Paul, too, makes the observance refer explicitly to Jesus' Death." This, however, he thinks, was early abandoned: he refers to the discourse of John vi. as dealing only with the Communion, and says that in the *Didache* and Justin Martyr the utterances of our Lord are no longer made to refer to His Death. But our Lord's discourse in John vi. is of that which He

[1] Cf. Professor Baldwin Brown, *From Schola to Cathedral*, pp. 43–48, 67.

" will give for the life of the world," and this is at one with the " given for you " of St. Luke's account of the Institution : it is doubtful whether the *Didache* gives Eucharistic prayers, and in any case the *Didache* is a precarious witness ; while Justin writes sketchily for Pagan reading and with reserve—nevertheless he quotes the words of Institution and he calls the service θυσία (sacrifice). What Holtzmann says of forgetting seems psychologically impossible. It is to be noted that his allusion to pouring forth wine has no authority. The Eucharist has always been celebrated with a Cup already prepared : our Lord *took* the Cup ; according to Justin, bread and a cup of water and wine were brought to the President (ἄρτος καὶ ποτήριον ὕδατος καὶ κράματος, *1st Apol.* lxv. 3) ; and so, I think, in all the Liturgies. For that which is offered and given is the Blood (the Life) gathered and guarded of God through death, and by our Lord carried into the Holy Place for testimony. The pouring forth was in the outer court, this world ; not at the Golden Altar, but at the Brazen Altar of Burnt Offering.

EIGHTH LECTURE

The Holy Communion: (2) The Reception

I

Passing now to the second stage or movement of the Sacrament, the Divine response to the appeal of the commemoration of Christ's sacrifice, that is to say to the giving and receiving—the giving also is part of the action of the Sacrament—the Lord's Death is still being shown, but now in its fruits and result. That would be no true Memorial of Christ which did not exhibit and include this—that He has not died in vain, but in His Heavenly Priesthood obtains for us and bestows all that by His sacrifice He sought.

The religious value here is simple. It is that of immediate contact with the actual Divine, of the most intimate and personal absorption of the transcendently holy, of the closest wedding of the self in spirit, soul, and body to the Divine Humanity, with whatever that means and promises and assures of absolution from guilt, peace with God and grace sufficient for need, and with whatever response of penitence, devotion, thankfulness, and love the soul finds itself capable of yielding to the infinite Charity. Questions of the mode and method of the gift may be mooted round it, and as matters have come to stand with us may be unavoidable; but these occur when we

reflect upon the Sacrament; they do not enter into the immediate experience of the Church in its fulfilment of the rite, nor into the present experience of the Christian in communicating: and no one is likely to suggest that they are helpful to religion. And it is advisable to consider in the first place those elements of belief in the matter as to which agreement may be assumed: namely, that in the Sacrament Christ Himself is the Giver: that the Holy Spirit is the Medium of His action: that the gift is of His Body and Blood for our spiritual nourishment: that these can be effectively received only upon spiritual conditions which are to be sought in him who receives; and that common reception recognises and knits vital and spiritual fellowship between all who unite in it.

That Christ is the Giver in the Communion is even more evident than that Christ is the Celebrant in the Commemoration: for in the latter we are ourselves active—we *do*; but in the Communion we only *take*. Christ alone can be conceived of as bestowing what is bestowed; the minister of the Sacrament is himself a receiver even as one of the flock. Whatever takes place in the Consecration, it is controlled by Christ, and is in the proper sense of the phrase *opus operatum* and not *opus operantis*—the only *operator* is the Lord.

It is agreed also that the Holy Spirit is the Medium of this operation. Apart from the Holy Spirit Christ does not mediate towards us—it is through the Pentecostal effusion that the Church becomes the sphere of His grace. "It is by His Holy Spirit that He acts towards us. Any

action of the Second Person which was not through the Third Person would be inconsistent with His glorification and therefore of no value to us." [1] "If you enquire as to the method, how this (the μεταβολή) comes to be, it is enough for you to hear that it is by means of the Holy Ghost." [2]

The prayer of Invocation of the Spirit upon the Elements is almost universal in the Liturgies and, except in Roman theology, is recognised as central to their consecration. In all things it is He Who is our vital link to Christ.

Again there is agreement that the given in the Sacrament is the Body and Blood of Christ. The words of the Institution, "This is," are universally employed; and apart from explanation or justification of them are spoken and heard

[1] Fr. Benson of Cowley, quoted *Conference on Reservation*, p. 120.

[2] John Dam., *De Orth. Fid.*, IV. xiii: "The overshadowing power of the Holy Spirit becomes through the invocation the rain to this new tillage. . . . And now you ask how the Bread becomes Christ's body and the wine and water Christ's blood. And I say unto thee, the Holy Spirit is present and does these things which surpass reason and thought . . . if you enquire how this happens, it is enough for you to learn that it was through the Holy Spirit . . . by the invocation and presence of the Holy Spirit." So Cyril Jer., *Catech.*, xxiii. 5: "We beseech the merciful Lord to send forth His Holy Spirit upon the gifts lying before Him that He may make the bread the body of Christ and the wine the blood of Christ: for whatsoever the Holy Ghost hath touched is surely sanctified and changed." So too Chrysost., *De Sacerd.*, vi. 4, says that the celebrant "calls on the Holy Spirit and consecrates"; and *Hom. in Joann.* VI. xlv., "so this bread, through the Holy Spirit descending on it, is made Heavenly Bread." And Allen quotes Cyril Alex.: "By the action of the Holy Spirit the elements of bread and wine are metamorphosed into the Body and Blood of Christ."

by all believers with equal seriousness of apprehension. Sacramentarianism — the doctrine, namely, that the consecrated elements merely represent to the imagination what they are said to be—is alien to the living devotion of the great congregation of disciples. The Christian soul is not by spiritual instinct or as a result of its experience Zwinglian or receptionist or symbolist: it hears Christ's words and does not occupy itself in challenging them. I should doubt whether at the Holy Table itself it is possible to be a Sacramentarian. No part of the historic Church is sacramentarian in its authorised teaching: everywhere it is held—by Geneva and Scotland, by Anglican and by Lutheran formulas, as emphatically as by antiquity, by the Orthodox and the East generally and by Romanism—that the Body and Blood are given, and that their reception is intimately identified with reception of the Elements, and that their reception is objective and actual. Controversy enters only with efforts to explain and to philosophise, which are not normally the occupation of the mind in the act of communicating.

The religious value is in the "discerning of the Body"; and he would needs be bold who should judge that this grace is limited by reflective opinion or is confined to persons holding some particular theory of the manner of the impartation. The question for a communicant is not of *how*, but of *what*. I doubt whether more intense realisation or more active devotion can be found at a Continental or Anglican altar than is manifest in the heart-searching solemnity of any Highland Communion. "It is common ground that the sacramental elements bring the soul into the

presence of the Divine." [1] Even to one who would, if interrogated, describe his theological position in receptionist terms, the Body is the Body and the Blood is the Blood received as he receives the Gifts, as truly and as much as to one who would speak rather in terms of Transubstantiation.

That the spiritual part of the Sacrament can be effectively received only upon spiritual conditions is also common ground: whether these conditions be defined as a state of grace on the part of the communicant, or as an activity of faith, or as an ethical conformity with our Lord's requirement, or as Justin puts it—that he believes and is baptized and "lives as Christ has delivered" to us.[2] The idea that the blessings of the Sacrament are mechanically appropriated by the physical act of reception, or that participation in sacraments can be a guarantee of salvation, is nowhere entertained, much less taught. On the contrary a lively sense of sacramental responsibility is usual, and often a timidity, based on St. Paul's warning, in approaching the Holy Table.[3]

The requirement of faith as a condition of beneficial reception (as in Lutheranism and in the Anglican Statement [4]) or as the means of it (as in the Reformed doctrine), is not Receptionism—it is the commonplace of all sacramentalism. Faith is the apprehensive and receptive activity of the soul, apart from which nothing spiritual can conceivably be apprehended. It does not seem to be customary to examine Calvin's teach-

[1] W. P. Paterson, *Nature of Religion*, p. 342.
[2] 1*st Apol.*, lxvi. 1. [3] 1 Cor. xi. 27 ff.
[4] *Articles of Religion*, XXV. 1.

ing (which is typical of Reformed doctrine on the subject) at first hand, before defining what it is, or rather what it is (popularly) supposed to be—as a matter of fact he accepts as the test of his view the question which was then commonly proposed, whether the Body and Blood of Christ were given to the unbelieving communicant, and in effect he answers, "*Given*, yes; but not *received*." Faith is a subjective condition on which depends the capacity to receive; but what is to be received by us must first be offered to us. Calvin labours to make this clear—"Christ with His Gifts," he says, "is offered to all in common: the unbelief of man not overthrowing the truth of God, the Sacraments always retain their efficiency; but all are not capable of receiving Christ and His gifts. Wherefore nothing is changed on the part of God—but in regard to man, each man receives according to the measure of faith." [1]

For religion, and especially for communal religion as the Christian society knows its exercise, the Sacrament is an encounter with the supra-natural, evidenced and discernible. In it the Numinous, of which Otto writes, enters our fellowship. We are familiar with heavenly truth, heavenly prayer, heavenly praise, worship that

[1] *Mutual Consent*, par. 18. See also *Letter to Churches* and *Second Defence*. Cf. Bishop Gore, *Body of Christ*, p. 46: "The higher the gift which mere outward participation in the Sacrament of the Holy Communion puts at our disposal, the more certain it is that only according to our faith will it be done to us." As to Calvin's teaching, Dr. Gore refers to him with full justice (p. 53) as having, in his later phase, "asserted in the strongest language the actual and substantial communication to us in the Sacrament of Christ's body and blood, His life and self, to be our spiritual food."

seeks a heavenly intercourse, religion that expresses itself in words and is nourished with beliefs and supported by devout thoughts, and that issues in devout emotions and moral efforts: a discarnate religion of soul and mind, exercised in statement, much occupied in self-articulation; and here of a sudden there is the Heavenly itself, coming upon us and active. Bishop Temple in a happy sentence has said that what happened in the Incarnation is not development but invasion [1] —and here too, with whatever difference, there is invasion of the mundane plane by the Transcendent. Not by the miraculous: Lightfoot suggests that the sacramental in Christianity in some measure represents miracle and takes its place; to Thomas Aquinas the sacramental μεταβολή "has something in common with Creation," [2] though it differs as being rather a conversion; and to Principal Forsyth—"How, who can tell? . . . a unique thing and more or less miraculous"; [3] but sacrament is rather the converse of miracle. Miracle is the occasional supernatural, the abnormal; [4] the sacramental is the supernatural become normal, stated, central, and habitual. In the Holy Communion the Bread of Heaven becomes the daily Bread of the Church; and by faith feeding on Christ she lives by Christ. Dr. Inge quotes with approval Gregory of Nyssa—"Christianity has its strength in the

[1] *Pilgrim*, January 1921.

[2] *Summa*, pt. iii. lxxv. 8, quantum in aliquid convenit cum creatione.

[3] *Op cit.* p. 262.

[4] Provisionally defined as "an abnormal event in the physical order, apprehensible by the senses, to which religious value attaches."—E. G. Selwyn, *Theology*, May 1926, p. 267.

mystic symbols" : [1] Forsyth says that, neglecting the Sacraments, the Church cannot survive.[2] These sayings are the positive and the negative of the same truth.

II

And at that, having in view the subject of these lectures, which is the religious value and not the determinative efficacy of the Sacraments, the matter might be left were it not that, with other questions of the mode in which the symbols are vehicles or instruments by which the Gifts of the Redeemer are imparted (the answer to which does not, I think, affect the mind of the recipient in receiving), there is that of the persistence of the relation of the symbol to the heavenly gift, of the consecrated Element to our Lord. In discussing other questions of mode men are in fact seeking a statement of a common experience or even of a common conviction which eludes verbal statement—when Newman for example states Transubstantiation, few perhaps would find offence in what he has to say ; but this further issue of persistence carries discussion into new fields, those namely of extra-liturgical (I should express it, extra-sacramental) uses of the consecrated Elements ; [3] and it is at present agitated

[1] *Op cit.* p. 299. [2] *Op cit.* p. 173.

[3] The related questions have been more or less covered in a Conference of representative theologians and divines, held lately at Farnham, and reported under the title *Reservation* (S.P.C.K.). The origin of extra-liturgical uses of the reserved Element was assigned there (by Mr. Selwyn) to the thirteenth century, Cordonnier tracing it to the establishment of the Corpus Christi festival, 1215 ; Benediction with the monstrance being introduced about the middle of the sixteenth century, prolonged acts of adoration (Forty Hours' Devotion) first appearing 1539 ; the use for private devotion

in relation to what are called Devotions or Cults, their legitimacy and their profit : which is strictly a question of religious value. To be silent of it would be an evasion.

The discussion generally centres round the proper interpretation of the phrase *Real Presence*. It ought, however, to be considered without such reference ; for the doctrine of Real Presence is affirmed by many who do not hold that of persistent presence—and the one doctrine in no sense implies the other, unless where presence is explained by Transubstantiation. Everything that is meant by Real Presence (unless in the Roman sense) may be true of the Sacrament and within the rite—yet not be true outside of the rite and apart from its purpose. It would, for example, be absurd to make Luther, and I think inaccurate to make Calvin, an opponent of the doctrine, unless by " real " is understood physical. Real presence is often popularly confused with Transubstantiation : but the two doctrines are distinct —the one is an attempt to explain the other ; some may accept the Real Presence but not the explanation. The Church of Scotland for

receiving impulse from the publication of Liguori's *Visits to the Blessed Sacrament*, 1747. Dates of this kind can of course be only approximate. Devotional developments are always gradual and are more or less local and individual before they become general and prevalent. The vision of Juliana is given as in 1261, the observance of Corpus Christi was formally sanctioned by Urban IV., and enjoined by Clement V., 1311. There were, however, beginnings of such use earlier than the Lateran Council sanctioning the doctrine of Transubstantiation in 1215. Dr. Darwell Stone has shown that they existed in the eleventh century (at least by 1070). See *Reservation*, p. 73 ff., and cf. p. 138 n. (Dr. Headlam's) ; and Dr. Stone's *Reserved Sacrament*, pp. 65–67, and his *History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*, i. p. 249 f.

example denies Transubstantiation, but in its own terms asserts Real Presence.[1]

The formula "Real Presence," however it originated, became prominent as a test of opinion in the sacramentarian controversies of the sixteenth century. It undoubtedly referred to the presence or absence of the *res sacramenti*: it meant presence of the Body and Blood in or with or under the Elements. The Presence of Christ, "special" or not special, in the rite, is matter of general belief; the reality of the giving and of the given, is unquestioned; the objectivity of the heavenly or spiritual part of the Sacrament is recognised by most as implied in the fact of consecration, since faith is receptive, not creative, and can take out of the Sacrament only what is in the Sacrament. So far there is a large measure of agreement. But all of this has to do with what takes place or is found within the rite; and as to that the greatest boldness of faith is legitimate. There is no greater boldness than that with which in perfect simplicity the Church of Scotland gives the Elements—our Lord said, "This is My Body, My Blood,"[2] and she says as He said: it is unexplained, but it is not incredible: the moment is not one for qualification or hesitation: the boldness is safe and the word is true. But when the rite is past, can the same be said of what may remain unconsumed?

[1] *Confession of Faith*, xxix. 7.

[2] The authorised words of Delivery are: "Take ye, eat ye: this is the Body of Christ which is broken for you: do this in remembrance of Him": "This Cup is the new testament in the Blood of Christ, which is shed for the remission of the sins of many: drink ye all of it" (*Directory for the Publick Worship of God*).

The question may be stated in some such way as this:—in the consecration something, as all believe, takes place; after consecration the Elements are not as they were before; there is a change in their destination, in what would now be called their valuation—and it is their Giver, not we, who destines and evaluates them, changing them in their potency toward us. What they are to Christ they are to us. The whole transaction of the Sacrament takes place, not as an episode of earthly event, but on the plane of our Lord's present existence: it is among the ἐπουράνια, the Heavenlies, in which the conditions of our fleshly existence do not apply, and all is as Christ sees it and as Christ wills. It is not the Elements—it is we and the whole action and the Elements in the setting of that action which are taken into the atmosphere of the supernal: we are "lifted into some apprehension of the Eternal": [1] we taste the powers of the coming age and look upon the invisible. It is no objection that such a statement is mystical—if it were not, it could not hope to be true: the sacramental cannot be discussed in material terms—it is only in mystical apprehension that faith can approach some literality of understanding.

But now, when the rite is accomplished, when we are no longer on that plane or in that atmosphere and are back in our common world, can we see with the same eyes the same things or find them persisting into our material circumstances? The Bread and Wine are still here, but their destination is accomplished: their declared use is served. In consecration they became such that the end purposed thereby should be reached,

[1] Temple, *op. cit.* p. 245.

and now that end is reached and passed. Do they remain what in the Sacrament and for its purpose they were? Is the Bread still and now Christ's Body and this Wine His Blood? Other questions would then arise—of their treatment and use: but the immediate and crucial question is of what they, outside of the rite, are; the rest depends on that.

Reservation for purposes of the communion of the sick "and others" does not come into this discussion—for that is strictly within the destination and purpose of the consecration.[1] Its antiquity and prescription are certain. Justin treats it simply as part of the normal distribution.[2] The Sacrament is not over until all who wait to be fed have received, the invalids and the "prisoners," in whatever restraint of duty or incapacity they are held, so long as it is restraint absolute. The alternative to reservation for the sick is, of course, celebration specially for each, which in some circumstances is extremely difficult; and where there is only one minister of the Sacrament and many sick, may be merely impossible. And while in clinical Communion there is loss to the communicant in the fact of his absence from the consecration, there is compensation in his sense of fellowship with the worship of his brethren and of receiving along with them.

But should reservation for the sick be made the occasion or taken as the opportunity for Devotions directed towards or centring upon

[1] "Does not involve a theological interpretation" (Dr. Streeter, *Conf. on Reservation*, p. 14).

[2] *1st Apol.*, lxvii. 5.

Elements reserved, as still carrying the character which they derived in consecration? For the purpose of the ordinance they have it—but this is not within that purpose. They are consecrated to show the Lord's Death and then to be the food of His people, and that within a single sacramental transaction. To make them afterwards, continuously, apart from the Institution and as things in themselves, the focus (as is often said) of adoration of a presence of Christ carried by them, is to enter on a new conception which is not set before us by the Institution. This, I think, is admitted by the advocates of such Devotions. The Devotions are justified as natural and as permissible, inasmuch as they are not prohibited. But they are natural only if it be presupposed that the character which by common consent the Elements bear in the rite is persistent and is impressed upon them as they are in themselves. The Devotions are natural only if we follow a dubiously cogent logic which identifies the Body and Blood of Christ with Christ Himself, and invests the consecrated Elements with an almost personal character,[1] so that we may properly speak of a presence of our Lord in them as reserved. Logic is cogent only when premisses are exact: the premisses here are the Words of Institution. Christ says "This is my Body." He does not say "This is Myself"—the body is not the self—and we cannot overleap the distinction by reference to the truth, which is true in its own connection, that Christ gives Him-

[1] "The theological basis for the *cultus* of the Reserved Sacrament, then, does require the doctrine that our Lord Himself is the unseen reality of the consecrated Sacrament." —Dr. Stone, *Reservation*, p. 61.

self wholly to His people. What is true of this sacramental giving must be measured by what Christ has said of it.[1] And in any case, the question of persistent character outside of the ordinance (no one claims that the Devotions are ordained) remains.

It is said that we have no reason to suppose that the character ceases with the rite (I avoid speaking of "withdrawal of the Presence," because I feel an ambiguity between the personal presence of our Lord, and the presence of the *res sacramenti*)—but we have rather to ask for reason to think that for all purposes and inferences it persists. Or it is said that the burden of proof rests with those who limit the character to the ordinance: [2] but this is to ask for proof of a negative, a thing generally supposed to be impossible The burden of proof must rest with the positive assumption of persistent character in the once-consecrated Elements—especially if action is to be based upon the assumption.

It is asked again whether the Reserved Sacrament is not the same as the Sacrament in the Service itself.[3] I cannot answer that question in the terms in which it is asked, because I cannot fall into the usage of calling one of the consecrated Elements a Sacrament, still less the Sacrament. A Sacrament is an action, not a thing however sacred. An element is that which is used in the action of a Sacrament—technically "the matter" of it. Water to be used to baptize

[1] If it is the Sacrament which is in our Lord's thought in the discourse of St. John vi., the references there are entirely to His giving and our receiving.

[2] *Reservation*, p. 63.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 63 f.

is hallowed and blessed for its purpose,[1] but it is not called a Sacrament—Baptism is the Sacrament. Or if more sacraments than these are recognised, each is an action. A Sacrament cannot be reserved—an Element can. To speak of an Element as "the Sacrament" seems inexact and highly confusing, and that where only exact terms are admissible: it assumes as true what is not by every one admitted, and it entangles the mind in an admission which it has not intended. For one may say of the Sacrament of the Holy Communion or of the Elements as therein given what one would not say of the same Elements otherwise proposed. It is impossible to discuss these matters if "the Sacrament" is to mean sometimes the Eucharist as a whole action and sometimes one of the Elements which it requires; and I suggest that in theological treatment this ambiguity should be abandoned.

I deprecate talk of superstition or idolatry or fetish-worship about what is evidently intended as a method of adoring our Lord in a very sincere devotion. I do not deny the imaginative appeal, or even the appeal to something deeper than imagination—to the *desiderium* of disciples who stand looking steadfastly toward Heaven which has received their Lord out of their sight.[2] We desire to see one of the days of the Son of Man and do not see it.[3] I will neither think nor speak unsympathetically of such a hunger. But I am unable to see that our Lord has provided in this way for its consolation. The *cultus* in question

[1] See, for example, "Prayer is also to be joined with the word of institution, for sanctifying the water to this spiritual use" (Westminster *Directory*; Of Baptism).

[2] Acts i. 10. [3] Luke xvii. 22.

does not seem to have any warrant in the records which alone could authorise it. These carry us far in the venture of faith—it is the more perilous to overpass their sanction. In things so sacred the silence of the Voice from Heaven may be felt as a restraint. The restraint is not that of limited belief as to the Sacrament, but it is the restraint of its awe—of reverence and of holy fear, lest we intrude officiously upon the purposes of the Giver and exceed them.[1] It is said that the Church has power to expand the use of the Sacraments : [2] I am most doubtful of the powers of the Church in that which is Dominically given and so determined as being given ; the Church is a steward of such things and no more : but in any case the *cultus* is not evidently an expansion of use of the Sacrament, but a novelty of use appended to it : it adds a third movement to the two in which the Sacrament as instituted stands, and one which is not suggested by the Institution—and further, which is a movement not evidently in the line of the Institution ; the action of the Sacrament is Godward, and next it is manward : both actions pertain to our Lord's Mediation towards the Father and from the Father, and are Theocentric : the *cultus* on the other hand is Christocentric. In many relations Christ is central—in the Sacrament we come to God by Him ;[3] and in this the *cultus* does not seem to expand the Sacrament, but to

[1] Such seems to have been Dr. Pusey's opinion ; see quotation of his *Hier. Angl.* iii. p. 341, *Reservation*, p. 120 f.

[2] *Reservation*, p. 64.

[3] Heb. vii. 25. And see *Canons of Hippo*, A.D. 393 (quoted by Gore), "When we stand at the Altar, let the prayer always be directed to the Father." [And see paper by Mr. Eeles, *Reservation*, p. 115.]

pass into a new series of ideas. The sacramental conception is dynamic, of an operation of Christ upon the soul—but here the conception is static—no sacramental efficacy is attributed to the Devotions or sought in them. We seem to have passed out of the " tragic crisis " in which Christ is pleaded and the gifts of His grace reassure us. We lose sight of the Throne which is beyond the Altar. In this, I think, stands the chief theological difficulty with which advocates of the *cultus* of the reserved Element have to reckon.

It is impossible to deny to such *cultus* a religious value for which there is testimony of its attractive power, its power to stir emotional fervour, even of its spiritual uplifting and sanctifying impulse. There is no difficulty in accepting such witness—it is that of individuals to individual experience. But there are other considerations : above all there is that of obedience to the Divine reserve of the Institution and that of abiding within the limitations of the prescribed and of the indicated purpose ; and there is a dread of anything which possibly suggests discontent with these limitations ; we may not take Christ by force, even to make Him King. The *cultus*, we are told, satisfies something in us : but perhaps it is not meant that everything in us be meantime satisfied : rather perhaps it is meant that we be kept desiring and reaching after things that are prepared for us, but not yet given.[1] Also there may be a larger volume of Christian instinct which is timorous of such an expansion. Further, the individual experiences to which there is testimony can hardly in such a matter be the guarantee needed—that can come only from a

[1] Titus ii. 13 ; 2 St. Peter iii. 12.

much wider induction. Devotions of this type have had long trial, and the result is not to every one reassuring.[1] Seeing, as it were, from a distance, and having only such *a priori* considerations on which to go, it is not for me to say more.

III

It remains only to speak of the last of those things which I have called agreed, and that is the value of the Eucharist as the bond of the Church's fellowship, not only with Christ but also as between its members. In claiming union with the Redeemer there is confessed also the debt of brotherhood to as many as share the like faith, and there is asserted a vital unity of the whole company of believers inhering together in Christ. The truth that Christianity and its exercise necessarily demands social faith and social life may be overstated : Robinson Crusoe might be a sound Christian before the arrival of Man Friday, and St. Simeon on his pillar was surely a Christian of some sort. The spiritual life is always lonely because it is personal and in much cannot be shared, and the salvation of one's own soul is not so contemptible a quest as some hold it to be ; nor is it pure gain that in the popular conception of religion it should be so much superseded by zeal for the world's welfare. Personal religion is all-important. But all the more precious is that which lightens spiritual solitude,which braces faith by the consent of the multitude which no man can number, and opens

[1] At the Farnham Conference several speakers seem to have given expression to a feeling of concern as to the wider and ultimate tendency of the *cultus*. See Report, pp. 9, 14, 92 f.

an unlimited field for the exercise of that charity without which the rest is nothing worth. To believe alone is a hard thing—we do not trust even our bodily eyesight unless others see as we do, and spiritual vision is still more uncertain ; the practice of the difficult Christian ethic is at least easier if we know that others also are willing for Christ's sake and the Gospel's to endure its hardship and to suffer the losses which it involves ; the Christian graces and affections cannot be exercised except in the shared life of brethren. And besides there is in the corporate Church a Motherhood : the new life is never a fresh origination, but is born always from her womb ; and though the motherhood is sometimes careless, her children feel the bond of nature, and apart from her are desolate. The significance of that shelter can be realised only when it seems to fail us and the soul finds itself threatened with homelessness—then we know our dependence on it. The Eucharist as shared is the seal of fellowship with the Church : to receive it is to be confessed as one of the faithful. It is the pledge of the Church's support : and on the part of the communicant it is the pledge of his support of the Church's testimony and endeavour. Membership of the Church stands in our Baptism, but fellowship may be interrupted or refused or renounced. Here then the Church binds or looses : for Christ has given to human keeping the Keys of the Kingdom and therewith an administrative, though not a final, judgment of admission or denial. The Table is the Lord's—behind each Celebration stands the consent of the whole Church : the significance therefore of such judgment is of the greatest that is possible ; there is

appeal from it only to the judgment of God: for the present and in this sphere it cannot be disowned—it has authority. Here at the Holy Table a man knows his brother and is known: he acknowledges his fellow in Christ and claims and receives acknowledgment. This social character is so essentially in the Sacrament that alone of Christian ordinances it requires for its celebration the co-operation of at least the representative two or three, as it requires a Ministry universally representative; and exclusion from any celebration intimates exclusion from the Great Congregation. It is therefore, as well as from its own content, the focus of all relations of the individual to the Christian Society; in this Sacrament his privilege is guaranteed and his obligation is imposed and undertaken. How fully this is realised appears in the individual anxiety to maintain the communicant status.

This communal value carries with it a worship value. There is complaint of slackening interest in non-sacramental worship, the "ordinary services" of prayer and sermon; there is no comparable slackness in resort to the Holy Communion when it is offered. There is *then* an abundance of response which is in notable contrast with the Church's parsimony of the opportunity: has the Church nothing to learn from that? and will it not learn? There is always need of instruction and of appeal, and the sacramental life must be embedded in and supported by devotional life, communal and personal: there must be sermons and hymns and public prayer. But the instinct of the flock recognises that in the sacramental there is the root of the matter, that in Baptism and the Lord's Supper

the mystical union with Christ and with His Body the Church is constituted and maintained, and that at the Lord's Table they find what they seek, both the Gospel and the grace of God. "This is not talk about religion, but the spiritual reality itself." [1] The self-evidencing power of the Eucharist appears when we note the contrast of the place which it has always found in the Church's consciousness and practice with the scantiness of Scriptural testimony to it, as compared with the abundant testimony to Baptism. It has attained and vindicated to itself that place by its essential values. The hopefulness and infinite patience with which congregations wait upon preaching is pathetic enough, and still more pathetic the frequency of disappointment. Professor Jacks calls the modern belief in moral exhortation "a prevalent and deadly superstition"—that is an extreme statement—we have all heard sermons that satisfied and sermons that helped; and besides, sermons aim at more than moral exhortation; but they rarely satisfy and do not always help. More is effected by discipline, devotion, *cultus*; these mould character and through character touch conduct. Intellectual curiosity about religion is not necessarily religious, and has very little to do with either conduct or faith or the quest for grace. Religion has of course an intellectual side—"How shall they call upon Him in Whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in Him of Whom they have not heard?" [2] "Sanctify them through the truth: Thy word is

[1] A. E. Baker, "The Idea of the Eucharist," *Theology*, December 1921, p. 318.

[2] Rom. x. 14.

truth" ;[1] and it has a mystical and an ethical and a benevolent side as well. But religion itself is in none of these: religion is in the "call upon God" and in the answer: it is the joy of adoration: it is a contact with God, which is first God's search for man, and then is the Divinely wakened search of man for God, and finally is the action and re-action of grace. This contact is most directly apprehensible and immediately operative in the Sacraments: for in them there is no intermediate third to qualify the given: the Church appears only in stewardship, the Ministry only in obedience: God and the soul, Redeemer and redeemed, meet face to face. "One of the clearest results of all religious history and religious psychology is that the essence of all Religion is, not the Dogma and Idea, but the Cultus and Communion, the living intercourse with the Deity —an intercourse of the entire community having its vital roots in Religion and deriving its ultimate power of thus conjoining individuals from its faith in God." "The absence of Communion and Cultus is the specific malady of modern Christianity and of modern religion generally"[2] —a judgment in which, I think, Professor Kirsopp Lake more or less coincides.[3]

Further—there is also a worship-value in the Sacramental provision of a form which is equally comprehensible to all grades of intellectual and of social culture, and which is equally adapted to them all. The language of symbol is common to "gentle and simple," to the educated and to the ignorant; the Sacrament is the same to all

[1] St. John xvii. 17.
[2] Troeltsch, quoted von Hügel.
[3] *Religion of Yesterday and To-morrow*, p. 36 f.

who love the Lord Jesus in sincerity;[1] they meet there on shared ground who otherwise have few thoughts alike; for whom the same sermons are not suitable, who do not enter easily into the same prayers; who do not like the same hymns: for whom therefore, it is sometimes supposed, there must be opportunity to worship apart, rich with rich and poor with poor. The Holy Communion is our Lord's protest against class distinctions and colour bars and racial antagonisms —it is the Church's protest (how bitterly needed!) against the class-consciousness which has always characterised the upper grades of society and now is being taught to the lower. If anywhere such consciousness is denied and made impossible, it is as men break together that Bread and drink together from the common Cup, of which the Crucified has said "This Cup—drink ye all of it." The moral danger and social harm of such innovations as the individual wafer or the *morcellement* of the Chalice deserve therefore, it may be observed, consideration. Where teaching, worship, and practice are sacramentally based and pervaded, the blending of men of various cultures in a religious unification may be easier than without the sacramental it is sometimes found to be.

It may be asked whether values such as have been indicated can attach to what are, after all, externals to religion. But are they externals? That is external which is ours, but hardly that which is of God: not, for example, the Holy Scripture, though of course Scripture is exterior to ourselves. What is of our own devising or con-

[1] Eph. vi. 24.

structing may be external, but not what is Divinely given or is by operation of the Holy Spirit. Architecture, music, colour, ceremonial, rhetoric, liturgic skill—these are externals. They have æsthetic, but they have not religious, value. The motive which for the Glory of God seeks the beautiful as the setting of worship may be religious : the setting itself is not, and religion may not gain by it. Religious earnestness has oftener manifested itself in severity as to these matters than in lavishness. The Sacraments are very simple and come as near to be purely spiritual as our human conditions admit. They are acts of God made apprehensible by symbolism ; the symbols which they employ are material, but symbolism itself is a spiritual quality assigned to them, and as significant actions the Sacraments are not material at all. Man brings nothing to them but the penitence and surrender of the baptized or the faith, love, and worship of the communicant : and these are not externals. As Sacraments they impart grace, and grace is not an external ; it is between the living God and the living man.

The spiritual atmosphere of our time is throbbing with vitality and hope : the exhaustion of recent years is passing off like a mist and the day is full of promise. The intellectual tasks of the Church are being carried on for it by many thinkers, possibly not all of them concerned for its cause. Old controversies are being settled, old attacks fall silent, old hindrances melt away —the decisions almost everywhere make for faith. Philosophy, criticism, science, historical study, the higher mysticism, as these are extensively interpreted, seem to be converging in a positive

synthesis to the Catholic positions and the Christian belief. Only the Church is despondent —only religion, at least in its communal form, is attenuated and depressed. The danger to all non-sacramental religion is that of drifting into a mere philanthropy and welfare propaganda, and of seeking a better world rather than the Kingdom of God ; and from that it can be preserved only by an intensive culture of the devotional in its life. For such culture there is Divine provision —has the Church used it to the full ? Does it exhaust the possibilities of disciplined resort to the Fountains of the Living Water ? Until we have done so, we need not talk of failure. Everything shall live whither the River cometh.

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